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A bstract
Different agents experience different histories and pursue different economic 
functions. This implies that once a picture of the economic system is taken, 
a lot of cross-sectional heterogeneity appears. This thesis consists of four 
essays each one of them makes a case where the intrinsic heterogeneity of the 
economic system is crucial for understanding macroeconomic performance.
Firstly, it shows when and how an increase in the level of business cycle 
volatility harms the growth process in a Keynesian world where the decision 
to free resources and to take advantage of them lies on different agents.
Secondly, it analyses the effects of an increase in research effort in a 
Schumpeterian world where innovation requires an entrepreneur to imple­
ment a valuable invention. In this context the observed decreasing returns 
in RSzD might be the outcome of lack of entrepreneurial skills rather than 
any vanishing of investment opportunities.
Thirdly, it extends the Solow-Swan growth model allowing for cross- 
sectional heterogeneity. In doing so it reconciles apparently conflicting results 
on cross-sectional convergence and stochastic output dynamics.
Finally, it argues that cross-sectional heterogeneity is an important trans­
mission mechanism. In the context of a stylized vintage model it is shown 
how the mechanism generating heterogeneity in the real world also gener­
ates persistence in the aggregate fluctuations. Moreover, as aggregate shocks 
create very high degree of persistence without affecting either the number 
of firms in the market or technological progress, this degree of persistence is 
simply attributed to cross-sectional heterogeneity.
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0.2 Introduction
Different agents experience different histories and pursue different economic 
functions. This implies that once a picture of the economic system is taken, a 
lot of cross-sectional heterogeneity appears. This observation is neither new 
nor particularly deep unless it is shown that the intrinsic heterogeneity of the 
economic system is crucial for understanding macroeconomic performance. 
This thesis consists of four essays each one of them makes a case where 
cross-sectional heterogeneity might be relevant for macroeconomics.
The first chapter, Long-Run Growth and Business Cycle Volatility, analy­
ses when and how an increase in the level of business cycle volatility harms 
the growth process. In a Keynesian world (Keynes, 1936) where the deci­
sion to free resources and to take advantage of them lies on different agents, 
the business cycle affects growth through two margins: the incentive to do 
research and implement ideas and the amount of resources available in the 
economy. In this chapter I show how the business cycle creates disequilib­
rium and imbalances in the economy. In fact, it destroys the possible good 
balance between amount of resources available and incentive to use them, 
raising the former and reducing the latter in recession and vice-versa during 
boom. As both margins are strictly required to innovate, an economy with 
high level of business cycle volatility will not be able to innovate much.
The second chapter, Lack of Entrepreneurial Skills and Decreasing Re­
turns in R&D, analyses the effects of an increase in research effort in a 
Schumpeterian world (Schumpeter, 1939) where innovation requires an entre­
preneur to implement a valuable invention. In standard endogenous growth
models, the higher the research effort the higher is the innovation rate of 
the economy, but if research and entrepreneurial skills compete in the al­
location of aggregate resources, the relation between growth and RSzD is 
hump-shaped. This chapter proposes a general equilibrium model of endoge­
nous growth in which the observed decreasing returns in RSzD might be the 
outcome of lack of entrepreneurial skills rather any of vanishing of investment 
opportunities. If this is so, the amount of resources devoted to research has 
been excessive and there may be a case for policy intervention. Indirect infer­
ence on the model and a temptative empirical investigation seem to support 
the relevance of this hypothesis.
The third chapter, (Fractional) Beta Convergence, jointly written with 
Paolo Zaffaroni, notes how unit roots in output (Nelson and Plosser, 1982) 
, an exponential 2% rate of convergence (Barro, 1991) and no change in 
the underlying dynamics of output (Jones, 1995a) seem to be three styl­
ized facts tha t can not go together. This chapter extends the Solow-Swan 
growth model allowing for cross-sectional heterogeneity. In this framework, 
aggregate shocks might vanish at a hyperbolic rather than at an exponential 
rate. This implies that the level of output can exhibit long memory and that 
standard tests fail to reject the null of a unit root despite mean reversion. 
Exploiting secular time series properties of GDP, we conclude that traditional 
approaches to test for uniform (conditional and unconditional) convergence 
(see i.e Barro 1991, Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1991) suit first step approxima­
tion. It shows both theoretically and empirically how the uniform 2% rate 
of convergence repeatedly found in the empirical literature is the outcome of 
an underlying parameter of fractional integration strictly between 0.5 and 1.
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This is consistent with both time series and cross-sectional evidence recently 
produced.
The fourth chapter, The Macroeconometrics of Cross-Sectional Hetero­
geneity, starts from the observation that detrended aggregate time series 
display a very high degree of persistence. In frequency domain this shows up 
in a typical spectral shape (Granger, 1966). The chapter uses this well known 
empirical regularity as testing bench for a simple transmission mechanism: 
cross-sectional heterogeneity. To highlight its relevance the chapter analyses 
a vintage model (see i.e. Solow, 1960) where all aggregate uncertainty takes 
the form of a reallocative shock tha t can be driven by either nominal or real 
factors.
The chapter argues that this transmission mechanism is an im portant 
one as it is powerful, realistic, robust and general. It is powerful because a 
sufficient amount of cross-sectional heterogeneity is able to generate typical 
spectral shapes without necessarily relying on real shocks. It is realistic 
because it is shown how two of the most striking empirical regularities in 
economics, the typical spectral shape and the Gibrat’s law, might be just 
two faces of the same coin. It is robust because it is able to generate almost 
any kind of spectral shapes provided tha t reallocations cleanse the economy 
reallocating between very low and very high technological states. It is general 
because the chapter gives micro-foundation for fractional cointegration of 
aggregate economic variables high-lightening why a typical spectral shape 
might be such a generalized phenomenon.
Chapter 1
Long-Run Growth and  
Business Cycle V olatility
A bstract
Before implementation, a new idea is a private good as it is both rivalrous and 
excludable. Its widespread economic consequences arise only when a researcher 
finds in the market resources that suit its economic applicability. In this context 
we analyse how an increase in the size of business fluctuations (business cycle 
volatility) affects the growth process. The business cycle affects growth through 
two margins: the incentive to do research and implement ideas and the amount 
of resources available in the economy. In this chapter we show how the business 
cycle creates disequilibrium and imbalances in the economy. In fact, it destroys 
the possible good balance between amount of resources available and incentive to 
use them, raising the former and reducing the latter in recession and vice-versa 
during boom. As both margins are strictly required to innovate, an economy with 
high level of business cycle volatility will not be able to innovate much. This and 
other implications of the model seem to broadly match recent both theoretical and
12
empirical evidence.
1.1 Introduction
The close interrelationship between productivity growth and business cycles 
has long been recognized (see for example Harrod, 1939 and Schumpeter, 
1939). Armed with the newly developed tools of endogenous growth theory 
(pioneered among others by Romer 1986, Lucas 1988, Stokey, 1988, Romer, 
1990, Grossman and Helpman, 1991 and Aghion and Howitt, 1992) we come 
back to the origins of economic thought to analyse how the amplitude of 
business fluctuations affect the growth process.
The argument of this chapter is based on three premises.
The first is that widespread economic consequences of a new idea arise 
with implementation. As pointed out by Romer (1990) economists studying 
public finance have identified two fundamental attributes of any economic 
good: the degree to which it is rivalrous and the degree to which it is ex­
cludable. Before implementation, a new idea is a private good as it is both 
rivalrous and excludable. It is rivalrous because the extra-profits associated 
with its implementation accrues to who is first able to exploit its economic 
applicability. It is excludable because in principle a researcher is able to 
keep its content secret until it is first implemented. After implementation 
it becomes, at least partially both non rivalrous and non excludable as the 
society learns from the experience of the inventor at almost no cost. That 
the economic consequences of an invention arise with implementation is at 
the core of the Schumpeterian theory. In fact, Schumpeter (1934) notes how
13
“an idea or scientific principle is not, by itself, of any importance for eco­
nomic practice: the fact that Greek science had probably produced all that 
is necessary in order to construct a steam engine did not help the Greeks or 
Romans to build a steam engine; the fact that Leibnitz suggested the idea of 
the Suez canal exerted no influence what ever on economic history for two 
hundreds years” . In Romer (1990), for example, the implementation of a new 
idea breaks the binding constraint of decreasing marginal productivity simply 
because final good producers are able to diversify across a greater number 
of intermediates, while Helpman and Trajtemberg (1994) and Aghion and 
Howitt (1996) note tha t firms learn to use a new technology, not discover­
ing everything on their own' but using and or learning from the experience 
of other firms in similar situations. Technological spill-overs spread across 
society through a process of social learning.
The second premise is that the implementation of a new idea is not a 
mechanicistic process. The researcher must not only search in the market 
for resources tha t suit his idea, but must also compete in doing so with 
other researchers with the same intent. As a result, the amount of resources 
available in the market are a scarce good that different researchers with 
competing ideas try  to take advantage of.
The third is that the resources required to implement new ideas must be 
available and free to be utilised in a new economic process (hereafter we refer 
to them as slacked). The basic intuition here, is a Schumpeterian (1934) one, 
that is “firms must be driven into the bankruptcy court and people thrown 
out of employment, before the ground is clear and the way paved for new 
achievement of the kind which has created modern civilizations and made the
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greatness of this country” . As a result, the market is populated by resources 
freed by old investors that potential new investors try to take advantage 
of. The fact that the supply of resources and the desire to take advantage 
of them lie in different subjects is a old Keynesian (1936) idea. It implies 
tha t an increase in the amount of resources that are kept slacked does not 
necessarily increase the innovation rate of the economy unless it increases 
the prospective yield of an innovation1. Consequently, a lack of coordination 
between the “demand” and the “supply” of slacked resources may arise.
We then go on to show how cross-sectional heterogeneity together with 
the central role of the implementation of a new idea (hereafter simply in­
novation) sheds new light on the relation between the size of the business 
fluctuations and the growth process. We will see how an increase in the size 
of business fluctuations (hereafter business cycle volatility) raises the aver­
age total amount of slackness in the market, the average profitability of an 
innovation and therefore stimulates the total amount of research pursued in 
the economy. Moreover, the higher the level of business cycle volatility the 
higher the degree of renewal in the economy as the “troubles” associated 
with recessions “are the means to reconstruct each time the economic sys­
tem on a more efficient plan” (Schumpeter, 1934). As a result, the higher the 
level of business cycle volatility the closer the economy is to its technology 
frontier. Notwithstanding this, the level of business cycle volatility in the 
economy can be excessive and harm the growth process. In order to inno­
1 Keynes (1936) clearly explains this point with regard to saving and investment deci­
sions: “If, therefore an act of saving does nothing to improve prospective yield, it does 
nothing to improve investment”.
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vate an economy, requires both slacked resources (slackness) and researchers 
trying to implement new ideas (implementation effort). The business cycle 
induces a wedge between the decision to free resources and the decision to 
take advantages of them, so that at high levels of business cycle volatility 
the economy fails to coordinate properly. In fact, the business cycle breaks 
the required to grow balance between slackness and implementation effort. 
On the one hand, during a boom slackness is binding and it is more so the 
bigger the size of the expansion, on the other hand during a recession the 
willingness to take advantage of slackness is binding and it is more so the 
deeper the size of the slump. Despite the increase in the average amount of 
slackness and implementation effort, resources never match because once one 
is high the other is low. As a result an economy with high level of business 
cycle volatility will not be able to innovate much.
The main contribution of the chapter is to show that in a world in which 
recessions cleanse the economy and permanently increase the long-run level 
of output, an increase in both the average amount of slackness and imple­
mentation effort, is not enough to stimulate growth. For an economy to 
grow, it requires a good balance between slackness and implementation ef­
fort. The business cycle breaks this balance and creates disequilibrium and 
imbalances. In section 6 we will relate these results to both theoretical and 
empirical strands of research in the literature. We then note how most of the 
predictions of the model seems to broadly match empirical evidence. It is 
only cross-sectional heterogeneity th a t might be able to explain why business 
fluctuations harm the growth process, in a world in which averages seem to 
stimulate growth.
Section 2 highlights further the general set-up of the model. Section 3 
presents the model in steady states. The analysis confirms standard results in 
endogenous growth theory. It also shows how the correlation between growth 
rates and excess capacity in the market is spurious, as first pointed out by 
Bean and Pissarides (1993). This generalises recent theoretical and empirical 
results. Section 4 introduces business fluctuations in the basic set up and 
shows the basic intuition behind the fact that business fluctuations can be 
excessive. Section 5 analyses more formally how an increase in business 
cycle volatility affects long- run growth. Section 6 analyses the patterns 
of technological adoption of the economy at higher levels of business cycle 
volatility. Section 7 relates the chapter to both theoretical and empirical 
strands of research in the literature. Section 8 concludes. The appendixes 
contain the derivation of some results used in the text.
1.2 The General Set-Up
The three premises highlighted in the introduction imply that an innovation 
requires the simultaneous occurrence of three elements. First of all it re­
quires the existence of an idea suitable for economic applicability, second the 
availability of resources that suit the economic exploitation of the idea and 
last, but not least, that the profitability of the innovation be higher than the 
cost of recovering the required resources in the market.
To evaluate these claims, it might help to have a specific case in mind. 
Suppose that a researcher gets the (very strange) idea of producing quasi­
disposable plastic watches. In this phasis the researcher ensures that the
17
content of his idea is kept secret in order to avoid other competitors exploit­
ing its economic potential. The researcher must then decide if it is worth 
either entering the market and starting a costly search process in order to find 
engineers specialised in plastic materials, machines to melt plastics and deal 
with aluminium and possibly employ a top manager with a good knowledge 
in engineering, marketing and accounting or waiting for more suitable time. 
If the expectation of future profits are higher than the cost of recovering the 
required resources, the researcher can decide that is worth trying to imple­
ment his idea. If eventually the process ends successfully, the idea becomes 
a public good from which other competitors and in general the whole soci­
ety (like car or mobile phones manufacturers) can learn from. Widespread 
economic consequences of an idea arise at this point therefore through an in­
novation. This basic structure of the process of technical change is described 
in Figure 1.1.
In order to model these features of technical change, we assume tha t ver­
tical innovations arise when a researcher with an idea matches with a free 
entrepreneur. As in Schumpeter (1949) “when we speak of the entrepreneur 
we do not mean so much a physical person as we do a function” . Follow­
ing Schumpeter (1947) we define the word entrepreneurial function, as the 
complex number of activities idea specific that are required in order to “get 
things done”2.
To capture the fact that the required resources are idea specific and so
2The interaction between research and entrepreneurial activities can also occur across 
independent departments inside the same firm. In any case it seems unlikely that even 
very large firms can find all the required resources for innovating without entering the 
market.
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Economic consequences 
o f an idea
Research InnovationImplementation
A researcher 
gets an idea
He searches for 
resources that 
suits his idea
A firm run by an 
entrepreneur is 
created
1
Existing firms Liquidation: Amount of
produce for the -------► Resources become -------► slackness in the
market slacked market
Figure 1.1: The Structure of the Innovation Process
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that finding them is time consuming, we rely on an homogeneous-of-degree 
one matching function (see for example Pissarides, 1990). The matching 
function gives the total number of matches between researchers with an idea 
and free entrepreneurs as an increasing but concave function of the total 
number of free entrepreneurs and researchers with an idea to implement. 
The matching function allows to represent in a very parsimonious way two 
key characteristics of the implementation of an idea: the fact that resources 
are heterogeneous so that search is time consuming and that the amount of 
resources available in the market are a scarce good different researchers are 
competing for.
The basic structure of the model is described in the second row of Figure 
1.1. When a researcher gets an idea suitable for economic applicability. He 
can then either look for a free entrepreneur or wait for better time (this is 
the Leibnitz case with the Suez canal). If he opts for the first alternative 
and is able to find a free entrepreneur, a new firm run by the entrepreneur 
is created and it starts producing for the market. The probability of finding 
a free entrepreneur depends on how many other researchers are competing 
for the same resources and on the number of entrepreneurs available. If we 
assume that an entrepreneur already running a firm is not therefore available 
to implement a new idea (the third premise highlighted in the introduction), 
then resources must become slacked before being employed again3.
3Schumpeter (1949) observes how “the man whose mind is entirely absorbed by a 
struggle for entrepreneurial success has as a rule very little energy left for serious activity 
in any other direction”. The basic intuition is either that an entrepreneur involved in a 
profitable activity is not interested in searching for something else or more generally that 
searching for a new economic idea to implement is a costly activity incompatible with 
running a firm.
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We now proceed to describe the formal structure of the model.
W ithin our economy there exists a continuum of researchers and a pop­
ulations of entrepreneurs of measure C. Both entrepreneurs and researchers 
are infinitely lived, risk-neutral and maximise expected returns in output 
units discounted at rate r > 0.
A researcher gets ideas suitable for economic application according to a 
Poisson process with intensity k . He must then decide if it is worth either 
trying to implement the idea now or waiting. If he opts for the first alterna­
tive, he starts searching for a free entrepreneur. The flow cost of searching 
is given by u)x(t) where x(t)  indexes the leading technology in the economy 
at time t. As in the meantime the technological environment changes, the 
researcher must also update his discovery during the search process. We as­
sume tha t old ideas depreciate at the same rate as the rate of growth of the 
leading technology, gt =  so tha t at each point in time a fraction gt of 
the value of the idea is lost in keeping it up-to-date.
An entrepreneur can be either running an enterprise or producing at 
home. If he rims a firm, the entrepreneur gets a real flow of profit equal to 
7r(e, r , t ) where e is a firm specific component of productivity, r  is the date 
of creation of the firm and t is the current date. Profits of the entrepreneur 
are chosen so as to share with the researcher the gains from the innovation 
at each point in time. The entrepreneur’s share is (3. If he works at home, 
the entrepreneur is able to produce a flow of goods equal to hx(r)  where 
x(r)  is the technology tha t the entrepreneur last used in a firm. hx(r)  is a 
measure of the level of human capital of the entrepreneur at time t > r. We 
assume tha t the entrepreneur can only upgrade his level of human capital
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when he meets a researcher with a new idea. This implies tha t r  is the 
date of creation of the enterprise that the entrepreneur last ran. Upgrading 
human capital, however, is costly. In fact, the entrepreneur must allocate to 
the scope, a fraction r(r,t) =  [x(t) — x ( T ) ] / x { t )  of his wealth. This cost is 
sunk and is paid before the meeting takes place, therefore it is not shared 
with the researcher.
This way of modelling the process of accumulating human capital implies 
that the upgrading cost depends on how far left behind the level of human 
capital of the entrepreneur was left, on the leading technology currently used, 
and that it has the nature of an interaction cost that must be paid, for the 
meeting to take place and be profitable. For instance, in the quasi-disposable 
plastic watches example, an engineer that had previously worked in the food 
industry must first update his human capital before knowing whether he suits 
the specific requirement of the new idea. Thus the timing of the bargaining r 
is as follows: first the entrepreneur updates his human capital and then the 
researcher and the entrepreneur bargain to share the potential profits of the 
firm exploiting the new idea.
An innovation requires a researcher with an idea and a free entrepreneur. 
Once they meet, a new firm run by the entrepreneur is created. Following the 
third premise in the introduction we assume that an entrepreneur running a 
firm is not available for implementing new ideas.
An innovation tha t occurs at time r  will open access of that enterprise 
to the leading technology x (t ) as of that date. Each firm created at time 
t  is characterised by a fixed irreversible technology and produces at each 
point in time a flow of goods equal to x (t ) ( P  + ae). P  and a  are common
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to all enterprises in the market, whereas e is firm specific. P  is an aggregate 
component of productivity. In this section we assume that all aggregate 
uncertainty is completely solved so that P  is a constant. The parameter 
a  reflects idiosyncratic volatility, an increase in a  representing a symmetric 
mean preserving spread in the dispersion of the firm specific component ae.
As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) the process that changes the idio­
syncratic component e is Poisson with arrival rate A. When there is a change, 
the new value of e is a drawing from the fixed distribution F(y), which has 
bounded support [ez, eu] and no mass points. Firms are always created with 
an idiosyncratic component equal to the upper support of the distribution 
eu. Once the firm is created, however, the entrepreneur has no choice in the 
firm’s productivity. Thus, the productivity of the firm is a stochastic process 
with initial condition the upper support of the distribution F  and terminal 
state the level of idiosyncratic productivity at the firm closing date. The 
firm is shut down because either the idiosyncratic productivity falls below 
some critical value ed < eu or because of a catastrophic exogenous event that 
arrives with frequency S. This implies that at each point in time existing 
firms are closed at rate AF(ed) +  8.
The rate at which researchers with ideas and free entrepreneurs meet is 
determined by the homogeneous-of-degree one matching function m{it \ st). 
Where it is the number of researchers trying to implement an idea and st 
is the number of entrepreneurs working at home. it is a measure of the 
aggregate level of implementation effort in the economy at time t while st 
is a measure of the aggregate amount of resources suitable for economic 
exploitation (slackness). We assume that the matching function is increasing
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and concave in each of its arguments. Since prospective new firms offer the 
highest human capital opportunities in the market and some profits, no free 
entrepreneur turns down a firm-creation opportunity. The probability that 
a researcher meets an entrepreneur is given by q(0t) = m (it \ st) / i t. Where 
$t is defined as it/st  and measures the willingness to take advantage of a 
given amount of slackness at time t. By analogous considerations it follows 
that 0tq(6t) is the instantaneous probability that a free entrepreneur finds a 
researcher with an idea. So that z  =  9tq(9t) measures, at the aggregate level, 
the actual use that is made at time t  of a given amount of slackness.
We assume that vertical innovations are the unique source of growth. We 
follow Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1994) in assuming that the rate of growth 
of the technological parameter x(t) is given by the product of the size of 
the innovation (7 ) and the frequency of innovation. Our assumptions imply 
that 9tq(0t)st is the number of innovations created by the economy at time 
t, so that the growth rate gt of the technological parameter x{t) is given by 
9tq(9t)stln'y.
The unknowns of the model are the level of willingness (6t), the growth 
rate of the technological parameter (gt) and the level of the critical idiosyn­
cratic productivity (ed) that determines the amount of firms that are closed 
at each point in time.
1.2.1 The R&D Sector
The assumption that a researcher gets an idea with intensity k, implies that 
R{t) = ET>Q{[sup(D(t +  r); O ) ^ } ,  (1.1)
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where R(t), and D{t+r)  are respectively the value at time t of doing research, 
and the value of trying to implement the idea at time t +  r . The above 
equation embodies the option for the researcher to wait for better time, so 
that D(t 4- r )  is always greater than 0.
If the researcher decides that it is worth trying to implement his idea he 
enters the market and searches for a free entrepreneur. The assumption that 
searching costs x{t)u  and that ideas depreciate at the rate of growth of the 
technological parameter x(t), gtt implies that the value of the attem pt of 
implementation, D (t), follows the Bellman equation
(r + gt)D(t) =  - u x ( t )  +  q(9)[I(eu',t,t) -  £>(£)] +  D , (1.2)
where J(eu,£,t), and D  are respectively the present discounted value of the 
rents of an innovation introduced a t time t  with idiosyncratic component eu 
and the time derivative of D(t).
Free entry until the exhaustion of all rents from research implies that 
R(t) — 0. Using equation (4.10) and (1.2) researchers will try  to implement 
ideas up to the point that
(1.3)
so that the value of an innovation, I(eu;t, t) ,  equates the expected cost of 
implementation
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1.2.2 The Value o f an Innovation, Human Capital and 
Profits
Since researchers and entrepreneurs have the option to close non-profitable 
enterprises at no cost, a firm will be shut down only if either its value is 
below zero or the exogenous event with frequency 8 arrives. For any idiosyn­
cratic component e, the asset value at time t of the rents from an innovation 
introduced at time r ,  7(e, r , £), solves
r l (e , r , t )  = P x (t ) +  <jcx(t ) — ir(e,T,t) +  \ [ j ^  max(I(s , r , t ) ;0)dF(s)  +  
-  I(c,T,t)] + 6[ 0-  I (e ,T , t ) ]+i .  (1.4)
(P  +  (7e)x{r)7 7r(e,r,£) and I  are respectively the flow of goods that a firm 
created at time r  is able to produce, the profits that the entrepreneur gets 
for running the firm and the time derivative of the rent from innovation. The 
assumption that profits are the outcome of a bilateral bargain between the 
researcher with an idea and the entrepreneur implies
/?[/(e, t , t )  -  ii(t)] = ( 1 - / 3 )  [E(e, r, t )  -  H ( t , t)], (1.5)
where E(e,  r , t) measures the value at time t  of an enterprise created at time 
r  with idiosyncratic component e and H ( r , t) measures the asset value of an 
entrepreneur working at home whose human capital is given by hx(r).
The assumption tha t the entrepreneur can update his human capital only 
when he meets a researcher with an idea and that he has to pay as upgrading 
cost, a fraction r(r, t) of his wealth implies that
rH(r , t )  = hx(T) +  eq(6){[( 1 -  T(T,t)]E{eu, t , t )  -  H(r , t ) }  + H,
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where 0q(6) is the probability of meeting a researcher with a new idea and 
H  represents the time derivative of H.
Similarly the value of an enterprise, E(e,r,t),  follows the Bellman equa­
tion
rE{e,T,t) = 7r(e,T,t) + \ [ J t max(E(s,r, t ) ,H(r, t ))dF(s)  4-
-  E(e9T,t)] +  6[H(r,t) -  E(e,r,t)] +  E , (1.6)
where E  indicates the time derivative of E(e,r,t).  Using equations (1.4), 
(1.6) and substituting in (1.5) we find that profits are equal to
7r(c, t ,  t) = fi(P + cre)x(r) + (1 -  (3)0q(6)hx(r) +
+  (1 -  P)dq(6){[ 1 -  T(T,t)]E(eu,t, t) -  H(r,t)}.  (1.7)
Substituting this expression into equation (1.4) and after integration by parts 
we find that
(r +  <5 +  X)I(e,T,t) = (1 -  /3)x (t ){P + ae -  h) +
-  (1 -  P)0q{0){[ 1 -  T(r,t)\E(eu,t , t) -  H(r, t)}  +
+  L [1 - F{s)]ds + 1  (L8)
Basic dynamic programming arguments guarantee that the value of an in­
novation strictly increases in the idiosyncratic component 6, so that a firm 
will decide to shut down for all idiosyncratic components lower than a given 
reservation productivity ed. We conjecture that
I(e-r,t) =  / ( c ; r , r )  = / ( c ) ® ( r ) l V e, V r , V t,
E(e;r,t) =  E(e;T,r) =  E(e)x(r), V e, V r , V t.
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As our conjecture turns out to be satisfied in equilibrium, using equation (1.8) 
and the previous considerations, we find that the reservation productivity (ed) 
solves
P ~ h  + aed + r  +as\  A j£*[ 1 -  F(s)]ds -  =  0. (1.9)
Moreover given our conjecture on the functional form /(e; r,t) ,  the free entry 
condition (1.3) can be written as
J (6“) =j=w^ ) ’ v t- (1-1°) 
Equation (1.10) defines the willingness to take advantage of a given amount 
of slackness in the market, 0, as a monotone increasing function of the value 
of an innovation (q(0) < 0). The higher the value of an innovation, the bigger 
is the incentive to enter the market and try  to implement an idea.
1.2.3 Steady State Analysis
The assumption that vertical innovations are the unique source of growth 
and that 7  is the size of technological improvement implies that the growth 
rate of the technological parameter x(t) is given by
x(t')
9t = =  Stq(9t) stltvy, ( 1.11)
where 6tq{0t)st is the number of innovations created by the economy at time 
t. As the population of entrepreneurs has fixed measure C, and at each point 
in time firms are shut down at rate AF(ed)+<5, slackness in the market evolves 
according to the differential equation
st =  [<5 +  AF(ed)](C -  St) -  8q(6)sf 
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This implies that in steady state the amount of slackness in the economy is 
equal to
6 +  AF(e“)
6 +  \F ( e * )  +  e q ( 0 y  ’
As a result, the steady state rate of growth, g, is equal to
6 4- AF (ed) / i  i  o \
9 = ZC  6 + \F(e*) + z ln^  (1'13)
where we have indicated with z = 0q(9) the actual use that is made of the 
steady state amount of slackness. This equation defines the growth rate of 
the leading technology x(t)> g> as the product of the steady state value of 
slackness, s, given by equation (1.12) times the actual use that is made of
it, 2. As the probability that a firm will last forever is equal to 0, g is also
the expected long-run growth rate of the economy. Equation (1.13) together 
with equations (1.9) and (1.10) and the auxilium of (1.5) and (1.8) solve the 
model for the key parameters g , ed and 6.
This simple simultaneous equation system in three equations with three 
unknowns has several implications. C  is the size of the population of entrepre­
neurs and measures the total amount of resources available in the economy. 
Equation (1.13) shows how our economy exhibits scale effect. The bigger the 
size of the economy, the easier it is to implement new ideas. The higher the 
amount of implementation effort sustained by the economy, the higher is the 
innovation rate in equilibrium. This is a very well known result in endogenous 
growth theory (see, for example, Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1995)4.
4 The existence of scale effect in standard endogenous growth models has recently been 
questioned by Jones (1995a, 1995b). In a related chapter, I show why the empirical ob­
servation of decreasing returns in RSzD does not exclude the possible relevance of scale
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This formula is also consistent with results found by Romer (1990a, 
1990b). In order to  sustain growth we must assign some degree of mar­
ket power to researchers. If for example (5 is equal to 1, all the gains of an 
innovation would accrue to the entrepreneurs and the value of an innovation 
would be equal to 0 (see equation 1.8)5. In this case the willingness to take 
advantage of slackness would tend to be equal to 0 and no idea would be 
implemented in equilibrium. In order to sustain growth we need a value of 
P strictly less than 1 so that a positive value of willingness can be sustained 
in equilibrium.
The above formula can be read also in another way. It shows how the 
correlation between the long-run rate of growth and the amount of slackness 
is spurious. If we think of the unemployment rate in an economy as positively 
correlated to the amount of slackness, this very simple formula generalises 
the results by Pissarides (1990) (Chapter 2), Aghion and Howitt (1994) and 
Mortensen and Pissarides (1995). For example, an increase in the value of an 
innovation, drives through equations (1.9) and (1.10) an increase in willing­
ness 6 and as a consequence an increase in the actual use made of slackness 
z. This increases the growth rate and reduces the amount of slackness in the 
market given by equations (1.13) and (1.12) respectively. On the other hand, 
an increase in the liquidation rate AF(ed) +  6 that does not alter the value
effects. The main intuition is that if research crowds out more socially useful entrepreneur­
ial skills the growth rate of the economy can fall despite a rise in the amount of research 
effort. In this case, the observed decreasing returns in RSzD would be the outcome of the 
lack of entrepreneurial skills (see chapter 2.
5The world analysed by Romer (1990), Romer (1990b), Aghion and Howitt (1992) and 
more generally by Barro and Sala-I- Martin (1995), roughly corresponds to the case /? =  0. 
In fact, in these models, the researchers accrue all the rents from innovating. Here, on the 
contrary, the rentiers are two.
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of an innovation, does not alter willingness 6 and so the actual use made of 
slackness 2 remains also unchanged. In this case, the growth rate tends to 
increase as well as the amount of slackness. As most changes tend to affect 
both willingness and the liquidation rates, we have at hand a very simple 
explanation for the lack of empirical correlation between growth rates and 
the amount of slackness in the market, see for example Bean and Pissarides 
(1993) and Caballero (1993).
As the next section deals with the effects of changes in business cycle 
volatility on long-run growth, it is interesting to investigate the effects of a 
change in idiosyncratic volatility. An increase in idiosyncratic volatility is 
equivalent to an increase in a. This is easy to assess, differentiating equation 
(1.8),(1.9) and (1.10), as it increases the value of an innovation, of willing­
ness, 6 and thus of the actual use made of slackness, z. Moreover, also the 
reservation productivity ed increases, driving a rise in the liquidation rate of 
the economy. This implies that the growth rate will tend unequivocally to 
increase even if the effects on the average amount of slackness are ambiguous. 
It might be useful to understand why this happens. The reason is that an 
increase in a  drives at the same time an increase in the value of an innovation 
and in the amount of resources that are freed and so available in the economy. 
The business cycle, on the contrary, induces a wedge between the decision 
to free resources and to take advantage of them. It raises the amount of liq­
uidation in the economy but reduces the willingness to use slackness in the 
recession and vice-versa in the boom. Because of this reason, an increase in 
business cycle volatility can result in very different effects from those caused 
by idiosyncratic volatility, as it breaks the required to grow balance between
implementation effort and slackness in the aggregate economy.
1.3 Cyclical Fluctuations
In this section we extend the model to the case where one of the variable 
changes probabilistically. We model in detail the case where the common 
productivity component P  takes two values, a high value Pb  and a low value 
Pr , according to a Poisson process with rate fi. The Poisson process captures 
the important feature of cyclical shocks, a positive probability less than one 
that boom or recession will end within a finite period of time. In this context 
we will analyse the effects of mean preserving increases in business cycle 
volatility. We will show how the business cycle drives a wedge between the 
decision to free resources and to take advantage of them. Because of this, 
an increase in business cycle volatility breaks the balance between slackness 
and implementation effort in the economy and eventually harms the growth 
process.
1.3.1 The R&D Sector
As people discount the change in aggregate regime, the value of doing research 
at time t in aggregate state i, Ri(t), is equal to
rRi(t) =  -K[sup(Di(t)] 0) -  Ri(t)\ +  fi[sup(Rj{t)\0) -  Ri(t)] +  Ri(t),
i = B , R , j ^ i ,  (1.14)
where fi is the instantaneous probability that an aggregate switch occurs. The 
structure of this Bellman equation is exactly as in equation (4.10), where we
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just added a term to take into account the possible gains and losses associ­
ated with a change in aggregate regime. The above equation embodies the 
option for the researcher to wait for better time, so tha t when the aggregate 
environment changes, the researcher can always decide to stop researching.
Reasoning analogously, we find that the value of the implementation a t­
tempt at time t, Di(t), follows the Bellman equation
(r +  gt)Di{t) = -Lux(t) +  g(0t)[/i(eu; t , t)  -  Di(t)] +  fi[sup(Dj(t)\0) -  £><(*)] +  
-I- A ,  i = B , R ,  j ^ i ,  (1.15)
if the economy is in state i. 9t , q{0t), Ii{eu\ t Jt) are respectively the level of 
willingness in the market for resources at time t, the probability of finding 
a free entrepreneur and the value of the rents from innovating. The above 
equation embodies the option for the researcher to wait for better times, so 
that Di(t) is always greater than 0. The exhaustion of the rents condition 
implies that
Ri(t) = Rj(t) =  0, Vi, i — B ,R ,  i,
and using equation (1.14) and (1.15) we find that researchers will try  to 
implement ideas up to the point that
Ii{enX t ) = u > - 4 £ , V t ,  i = B , R .  (1.16)
This is a marginal condition that states that in each aggregate state re­
searchers will find it profitable to try  to implement an idea up to the point 
that the expected implementation cost is equal to the value of an innovation.
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1.3.2 Value of an Innovation, Human Capital and Prof­
its
Reasoning in the same way as in the previous section, we find that the value 
of an innovation in state 2, Ii(e,r, t),  is equal to
rI i (e,T, t )  =  x(r)(Pi +  ae) -7Ti (e ,T, t )  +X[J^ max(Ii( s , r1t);0)dF(s)  4- 
- /* ( e ,r ) ]  +  <5[0 -  / i(e ,T ,t)]  +  0) -  Ii (e, r , t ) ]  +  /*,
i = B ,R ,  (1-17)
where t , r  and e are respectively the current date, the implementation date 
and the idiosyncratic component of productivity. As in the previous section, 
the equation embodies the option to close non-profitable firms so that the 
value of an innovation is always greater than 0. (P» +  cre)rr(r), 7t* are respec­
tively the flow of goods that the firm created at time r  is able to produce and 
the profit th a t the entrepreneur gets for running the enterprise in aggregate 
state i. The assumption that profits and rents are split according to the Nash 
sharing rule and that the entrepreneur can update his level of human capital 
only when he meets a researcher with a new idea paying an upgrading cost 
equal to fraction T(r,t)  of his wealth imply that
7Ti(e, r , t) = P(Pi +  ae)x(r) +  (1 -  P)9tq(9t)hx(r) -f
+  (1 -  p)9tq(9t){[ 1 -  r ( r , *)][£*(£“ ,*,*) -  Hi(r,£)]},
i = B ,R .  (1.18)
If we conjecture that
/<(e;r,t) =  Ii(c;T,r) = Ii(e)x(r), Ve, Vr, Vi,
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Ei(e’,T,t) = Ei(e\T,T) = Ei(e)x(r),  Ve, Vr, V£, 
i = B ,R ,
and we then substitute equation (1.18) into (1.17) we find tha t equation 
(1.16) can be written as
Ii(eu) = u j - ^ Vt, i = B ,R .  (1.19)
This equation tells us that willingness to use a given amount of slackness can 
take just two values, equal to 0B in recession and equal to Or  in a boom.
We now want to solve for the reservation productivity in boom and reces­
sion, equal to eB and respectively. Substituting the equation for profits
(1.18) into equation (1.17), we get an expression for the value of an inno­
vation. Basic dynamic programming arguments and the fact that the value 
of an innovation strictly increases in the idiosyncratic component e, imply 
that a firm will decide to shut down for all idiosyncratic component lower 
than a given reservation productivity. If we describe eB as the reservation 
productivity in a recession and edB as the reservation productivity in a boom, 
we can then prove (see Appendix A) that
4 > 4-
The liquidation rates reflect the value of the option to keep the firm operating. 
Clearly the higher the value of this option, the lower is the incentive to 
liquidate and thus the lower is the reservation productivity. During a boom 
the aggregate value of productivity is higher and higher also is the value of 
the option to keep the firm operating and this in turn lowers the value of
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the critical reservation productivity eB . Using equations (1.17), (1.18), the 
previous considerations, the Nash sharing rule and after integration by parts 
we find that
v l t(e) = ( l - 0 ) ( P i - h  + ae) +  (1 -  0 ) —  f  [1 -  F(s)]ds +
V  J e f
-  08i<l(9i)Ii(e'1) +  0 ,  i f  £  >  £ b » i  =  B > R > J f  * •
(1.20)
On the other hand, firms with idiosyncratic productivity e greater than eB 
but lower than eR will operate only in a boom, so that
i/IB(e) =  (1 - P ) { P B - h  + ac) + { l - P ) - ^ - ^ J dR[ l - F ( s ) ] d s  +
+  (1 -  P)—  f  [1 -  F(s)]ds -  pOBq{0B)Ii(eu), i f  edB < e < edR, 
V  Jed
(1.21)
while
I R{e) =  0, i f  edB < e <  edR,
because of the option to close non-profitable firms. The previous considera­
tions and equations (1.20), (1.21) imply that the two reservation productiv­
ities eB and eB are such that
P x - h  + a e i  =  ~  / " [ I  “  F(s^ ds + ~  ^ b ( 4 ) ,
V  JedR 1 — p
( i .22)
PB -  h +  <  =  / 4 [ 1 -  F(s)}ds -  ^  f  “ [ 1 -  F(s)]ds +
V > - f l J e dB V  JedR
+  j p9Bq{9B)IB(£u)- (1.23)
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Equations (1.22) and (1.23) together with equations (1.19) and (1.20) 
define a simultaneous equation system with 4 endogenous variables edRi 
0R and 0B.
1.3.3 Creating an Innovation
At each point in time the rate of growth of the technology parameter x(t)  is 
given by
9t =  777 =  st) I n i  =  0tq(0t)st ln i ,x(t)
where Otq(0t)st = rn(it \ s t) is the number of innovations created by the econ­
omy at time t. As the probability that a firm will last forever is equal to 0, 
the expected long-run rate of growth is given by the unconditional expected 
value of x(t)/x(t) .  Condition (1.19) implies that 0t can take just two values, 
equal to Or in recession and to Or  in boom. 0tq(0t) measures the actual use 
that is made of slackness at time t. We indicate with zB and z r  its value in 
boom and recession respectively. All these considerations and the fact tha t 
in the long run the economy will spend half of its time in a recession and half 
in a boom, implies that the long-run growth rate of the economy is given by
x(t') 1
g =  £ [ ^ y ]  =  - I n i  st)\Boom) 4- E(m(i t; st)\Recessiom§\.2A)
=  ^ l n i [ z BsB +  z r S r ] ,  where (1.25)
sB = E(s t \Boom),
Sr =  E(s t \Recession).
E(-\i) indicates the expected value of the random variable conditioned to 
being in aggregate state i. The amount of slackness in aggregate state i , sj,
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evolves according to the differential equation
= [6 +  AF(e- )](c -  s\) -  9iq{9i)s\, i = B , R ,
where a change in the aggregate state implies a change in the way in which 
the system evolves over time. The stochastic dynamic system is further 
characterized by the initial condition of slackness at the time of an aggregate 
switch. In fact, when the economy switches from a boom to a recession, it will 
exist a positive mass of marginal enterprises with idiosyncratic productivity 
— 6 — tR’ that will decide to shut down. Appendix B derives the long- 
run expected percentual mass of firms that at the end of the boom, have 
idiosyncratic productivity between eB and and shows that it is equal to
a A[F(4) -  f  (4 )]
A — A * - ( 4 ) +  « +  /*• (L26)
A measures the instantaneous cleansing effect that takes place when the 
economy shifts from a boom to a recession. Appendix B derives also the 
expected value of the amount of slackness in boom and in recession. It shows 
that
r/z2A J  +  a B(pB (fi +  <Ar)i 
SB =  C[~H  + ‘ (m +  0b)H  ]>
_  + ^ (1  — ^b))A ( J  4- olr 4>2r {il +  (pB)^
** "  Cl H  +  b  + ]>
where
,  a i m ,
(pi
(pi =  Z{ 4* 6 4- XF(ed), i = B , R.
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oti is the long-run steady state value of the slackness rate if the economy 
forever remained in aggregate state i while (pi is the speed of adjustment of 
slackness in aggregate state i. J  and H  are appropriately defined constant6. 
Appendix B shows how sR is always greater than sB so that the amount of 
slackness in the economy is counter-cyclical.
1.4 Growth and Business Cycle Volatility
In this section we analyse the effects on long-run growth of a mean preserving 
increase in business cycle volatility. In other words we consider how the 
growth rate changes when
dPB “I- dPR =  0, dPB > 0. (1.27)
We will show how the business cycle creates disequilibrium as it breaks the 
balance between slackness and implementation effort in the aggregate econ­
omy. We will first highlight the main intuition in a stylised framework, we 
will then analyse the results of the chapter fully exploiting the dynamic na­
ture of the model.
1.4.1 Growth and Business Cycle Volatility: the Basic 
Intuition
A new idea needs to be implemented to exert widespread economic conse­
quences. As a result innovating requires a certain amount of both slackness 
(st) and implementation effort (it), so that gt = m(i t, st). This implies that
6Appendix B shows how J  =  il2(ocb4>b 4- olr^r ) 4- g(aR<j>R(f>B 4- olb<S>b <I>r ), while 
H  =  g{(j>R 4- 4>b ) 4- 4>R<f>B +  M2A.
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slackness and implementation effort are two strictly complementary inputs 
of a hypothetical aggregate production function, m(it\ st) that gives the total 
number of ideas that a society transforms into a public good (innovation).
Willingness Boom
Implementation
effort iffident Balance
Willingness Rec.
R E C E S S IO N
B O O M
slackness
Figure 1.2: BCV harms Growth
Suppose that in the absence of business fluctuations the economy would 
settle into a point- like A (Figure 1.2) with a balanced level of slackness st 
and implementation effort it. The two orthogonal lines crossing A represent 
the isoquant of the aggregate production function m(it, St) with an amount 
of innovation equal to that in A. In this context, an increase in business 
cycle volatility breaks the perfect balance between slackness and implemen­
tation effort. During a boom the economy settles into a point-like J3with an 
enhanced level of willingness 6b = it/st driven by an increase in the value
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of an innovation (see equation 1.19) but with a reduced level of slackness 
as now the value of the option of keeping old firms operating has increased 
(see equation 1.22). An analogous reasoning suggests that during a recession 
the economy settles in a point like C (Figure 1.2), with an enhanced level 
of slackness (because of the fall in the value of keeping old firms operating, 
see equation 1.22) but with a reduced level of the willingness O r  — i t / s t 
to use it (see equation 1.19). As implementation effort is now binding, the 
amount of innovation in the economy falls to a level equal to that associated 
with point C' (Figure 1.2). Despite the increase in the average amount of 
slackness and implementation effort measured respectively by the midpoint 
between B ”C  and BB',  the innovation rate of the economy unequivocally 
falls. The business cycle creates disequilibrium and the economy fails to co­
ordinate properly. There are two Keynesian (1936) features here. The first 
is the one highlighted in the introduction: in a world with cross-sectional 
heterogeneity where the decision to free resources and to take advantage of 
them lie in different subjects, an increase in the amount of resources tha t are 
kept slacked raises the innovation rate of the economy if and only if it raises 
the prospective yield of an innovation. The second is more subtle and shows 
the source of the coordination failure in the economy. “Though an individ­
ual can safely neglect the fact that demand is not a one-sided transaction, 
it makes nonsense to neglect it when we come to the aggregate” in general 
“there cannot be a buyer without a seller or a seller without a buyer” (see 
Keynes, 1936). Researchers look at the amount of slackness in the economy 
and at the value of a successful innovation and decide whether or enter the 
market. At the aggregate level, however, this effort can be too much (in a
boom) or too little (in a recession) as a lot of buyers (researchers) enter a 
market with too few sellers (free entrepreneurs), a similar situation as in the 
game of the musical chairs7.
In what follows to capture the appropriate degree of complementarity 
between slackness and implementation effort we rely on a CES aggregate 
matching function with elasticity of substitution strictly less than 1, that is
r a f e  «t) =  +  ((1 -  c)stY]K p < 0 .
This function implies that one-sided constant percentual increases in either 
it or st have decreasing effects, tha t is the elasticity is a decreasing function 
in the relevant variable. Figure 1.3 plots the long-run growth rate of the 
economy at different levels of business cycle volatility measured as Pb^Pr 
( a). We have chosen a level of complementarity between slackness and 
implementation effort such that p =  —1008. Despite the increase in both the 
average amount of implementation effort (panel d) and slackness (panel b)
7The “coordination failure” analysed here is of a nature strictly different from that 
at the core of the earlier neo-Keynesian literature (i.e. Cooper and John, 1988), here 
no multiple equilibra arise. The point that “idiosyncrasies” can arise in a laissez faire 
economy was first made by Caballero and Hammour (1994a) in a similar environment but 
in a different context.
8The other parameters are chosen as follows, c =  0.5 so that slackness and imple­
mentation effort are equally important in the matching process, /i =  0.333 to capture a 
business cycle of duration of about 7 years. The distribution function F  is chosen without 
loss of generality to be uniform with upper support equal to 2y/3 and zero expected value. 
a =  3, r =  0.1, 5 =  0 and h =  7. The value of A is chosen to be equal to 0.2 implying 
that change in the idiosyncratic productivity occurs every 5 years. The average level of 
productivity is chosen to be equal to 6. The amount of resources in the economy
C  and the size of technological progress In 7  are chosen to be equal respectively to 100 
and 0.01 to capture the fact that we are modelling an aggregate economy with very small 
innovations. Following standard practice in search theory the bargaining parameter, /?, is 
set to be equal to  0.5. The cost of searching, u;, is set to be equal to 7.6 in order to start 
with a balanced level of slackness and implementation effort given the other parameter 
values, so that Or  =  Or =  1 when Pr  =  Pr .
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Figure 1.3: BCV Harms Growth (Simulations)
the long-run growth rate of the economy falls as the balance between the two 
quantities i t and St breaks down (panel c).
In the previous paragraph we analysed the effects of an increase in the 
level of business cycle volatility under two extreme hypotheses: the level of 
complementarity was set at a sufficiently high level (p =  —100) and we as­
sumed that in the absence of business fluctuations the balance between slack­
ness and implementation effort was perfect. If we relax either of these two 
assumptions, an increase in business cycle volatility can stimulate growth. 
Suppose, for example that the economy in the absence of business fluctu­
ations would settle into a point-like A  (Figure 1.4) that is with a binding 
value of slackness9. Now if the level of business cycle volatility increases, the 
economy would settle in a point- like B  in the boom and a point-like C  in the 
recession. We will see in the next section that the business cycle helps to free 
resources increasing the amount of liquidation in the economy. This implies 
that the average amount of slackness given by the midpoint between CC'  
tends to be higher than the one associated with A. As slackness is binding 
and as an increase in business cycle volatility helps in liquidating resources it 
also stimulates the growth process. Nonetheless, further increases in business 
cycle volatility will eventually harm the growth process and the same case 
will arise as that analysed in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.5 shows the relation between long-run growth and business cycle 
volatility once we start from a binding initial value of slackness. The graph 
is generated with a value of p = — lO10. In the next section we will see how
9Similar considerations would hold if implementation effort were binding.
10 .Figure 1.5 is generated with the same parameters as Figure 1.3 except for the search
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this is the typical shape of the relation between growth rate and business 
cycle volatility provided that p < 0. Two elements are worth noting in Fig­
ure 1.5. The first is that the long-run growth rate of the economy initially 
increases as business cycle volatility increases (panel a). The second is that 
the threshold beyond which further increases in business cycle volatility harm 
the long-run growth of the economy tends to be higher the lower the degree 
of complementarity between slackness and implementation effort (high value 
of p)11.
Despite their usefulness these figures completely neglect the dynamic na­
ture of the model. In fact, slackness is an endogenous variable with a spurious 
correlation with the growth rate. Both Figure 1.2 and 1.4 seem to suggest 
that the innovation rate of the economy can not rise unless the level of slack­
ness also raises. We have already noted in Section 2 how this proposition is 
false, as for example, an increase in the actual use made of slackness z raises 
the growth rate but reduces the amount of slackness in the market12. In the 
next subsection we will exploit the dynamic nature of the model to analyse 
more carefully the mechanism through which the business cycle creates dis-
cost u> which is set at a smaller value equal to 5 in order to start from a situation where 
the aggregate amount of slackness is binding. That is, Or  =  Or  >  1, when the level of 
business cycle volatility is equal to 0 .
11 In a previous version of the chapter we compared the behaviour of the economy for 
positive value of p against negative one. When p >  0 an increase in business cycle volatility 
always increases the growth rate of the economy. The intuition is simple. A positive value 
of p implies that slackness and implementation effort are substitutes so that the innovation 
rate of the economy depends on the average amount of resources in the market rather than 
their composition. In this version we ruled out this case as highly implausible. Because of 
their intrinsic nature, slackness and implementation effort seem to be strictly complements 
rather than substitutes and a temptative guess should assign a very negative value to p.
12For example a more careful analysis of both Figure 1.3 and 1.5 show how the level of 
slackness in boom tends to increase at high levels of business cycle volatility.
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Figure 1.5: Small Level of BCV Stimulates Growth (Simulations)
equilibrium in the economy.
1.4.2 Growth and Business Cycle Volatility: a D y­
namic Approach
The rate of growth of the technological parameter given by equation (1.25) 
can be written as 
1
g =  - ln j[{zB +  zR)(sB +  sR) -  (zB -  zR)(sR -  sB)].
An increase in either the average amount of slackness in the economy (sB+sR) 
or in its average actual use (zB + zR) would necessarily increase the long run 
growth rate of the economy if they were uniformly spread out over both the 
aggregate states. The business cycle, however, tends to move the amount of 
slackness and the willingness 0 to use it in opposite directions. The terms 
(zB — zR) and (sR — sB) represent a first measure of the waste of resources 
produced by the business cycle. It is not however the only one. We can 
decompose the effects of an increase in BCV on the long-run growth rate of 
the economy into three components:
(A + B  + C), (1.28)
(zR + zB)(dsR + dsB),
(dzB + dzR)(sB + sR),
~ ( s r  ~  sB)(dzB -  dzR) -  (dsR -  dsB)(zB -  zR).
All three terms are potentially able to capture different aspects of the destruc­
tive effects of an increase in the level of business cycle volatility on growth. 
The terms A, B  and C  respectively measure the impact of an increase in
48
dg =  
A  = 
B  =  
C =
business cycle volatility on the average amount of slackness in the economy, 
the average use that is made of it and the waste of resources.
Average amount of slackness in the market
The term A  in (1.28) measures the impact of an increase in business cycle 
volatility on the average amount of slackness. In Section 2 we established that 
there are two independent sources affecting the amount of slackness in the 
economy; the amount of liquidation in the economy and the actual use th a t is 
made of slacked resources. An increase in the level of business cycle volatility 
tends to increase the level of the former and reduce the level of the* latter 
so that the average amount of slackness unequivocally increases. In fact, 
every time the economy switches from a boom to a recession, the economy 
is “cleansed” of all marginal enterprises with idiosyncratic productivity is 
between edB and edR. The percent of firms that are shut down at the time 
of the aggregate switch is given by the “cleansing” parameter A in equation 
(1.26). As the level of business cycle volatility increases, the amount of 
cleansing in the economy represented by the parameter A also increases, 
as the difference between the reservation productivities in recession and in 
boom given respectively by equations (1.22) and (1.23) widen (see Appendix 
A). In this sense the business cycle frees resources making them available for 
the implementation of new ideas. At high levels of business cycle volatility 
old firms are more likely to be destroyed, therefore the business cycle helps 
in liquidating old investments and business, making resources available for 
new investment and technological opportunities. The equilibrium average 
amount of slackness is also a function of the actual use that is made of the
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slacked resources currently available. We turn now to the analysis of the 
term B  in equation (1.28).
The average actual use made of slackness
The average actual use of a given amount of slackness z  depends of both 
the profitability of an innovation Ii(eu,T,t) and the technology with which 
the economy transforms ideas and slackness in innovations represented by 
m (iu st)- The higher the profitability of an innovation, the higher is the 
willingness to use slackness and also the higher the actual use that is made 
of it. However, an increase in willingness only has a relevant effect on the 
actual use of slackness, if the market is asking for it. For example, in the 
case of Figure 1.2, a further increase in the profitability of an innovation in 
a boom has no effect at all on the actual use because what is binding is the 
amount of slackness and not the willingness to use it. If the market power 
of researchers (/? close to 0) is sufficiently high the average profitability of 
an innovation increases but despite this the average actual use of slackness 
eventually falls as business cycle volatility increases.
In fact, implicit in a firm is an option to stop losses that increases the 
average value of the innovation as the variance increases. This implies tha t 
the increase in the value of I b tends to be higher in absolute terms than the 
decrease in I r • The mathematical reason behind this fact is that firms have 
a margin that they can adjust when things go wrong. If we differentiate the 
value of an innovation given by equation (1.20) and (1.21) with respect to 
a change in business cycle volatility, we note how the impact of this change
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does not depend on the particular value of the idiosyncratic component e. 
Moreover, we note that the differential of the value of the innovation in a 
boom depends on the interval in which the idiosyncratic component lies. If 
we indicate with dIB the differential of the value of an innovation in a boom 
when <  e <  eu, and with dIB the differential of the value of an innovation 
in a boom when edB < e < we find that the impact of a change in business 
cycle volatility on the average value of an innovation solves
{ „ - A [ l -F (4 ) ] - /* } ( ( i£ + < t f H) =  \F (edR)IB(edR) <24+A [ F ( 4 ) - F ( 4 ) ]  dPB,
where we have assumed that (5 =  0. This result shows that the average value 
of an innovation increases as the level of business cycle volatility increases 
if both the two differential on the right are positive. Appendix A shows 
that this is actually the case. The option to stop mechanism implies tha t as 
business cycle volatility increases, also the size of the cake that the researcher 
and the entrepreneur have to share increases. These additional gains accrue 
to researchers only when they have a sufficient amount of market power. On 
the other hand, if /? is closer to one, most of the additional gains accrue 
to entrepreneurs. In this context, therefore, an increase in business cycle 
volatility can make the average value of an innovation fall as the increase in 
the average profitability of innovating positively affect the outside option of 
entrepreneur.
Despite the increase in the average profitability of an innovation, the 
average actual use of slackness eventually falls. By using equation (1.19) 
and (1.20) the value of rents from innovating at the upper support of the
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idiosyncratic distribution F , can be expressed in the general form
X ^ I ^ )  = i = B , R ,  (1.29)
where is a complex function of the parameter Pr , P b  and the reservation 
productivities in boom and recession. An increase in the level of business 
cycle volatility increases (decreases) the value of K b  {Kr )- Using equation
(1.19) and equation (1.20), it can be shown that the impact of a change in 
Ki on the actual use made of slackness Zi is given by
dzi =  h(0)dKi, i = B , R ,
m  =  . 1 . - s g — . (i-3o)
9(0)+9(*)0
Appendix C shows how the function h(6) in equation (1.30)is decreasing 
in 0, and satisfies the following boundary conditions:
M * ) - e  (0), i f  01  0 ,
h(0)-> 0 (£), i f  0 T oo,
where £ =  °p(^ p) . At high levels of business cycle volatility the net impact of 
a further increase (decrease) in the value of an innovation on the actual use 
made of slackness tends to vanish (be magnified). Eventually an increase in 
business cycle volatility will necessarily reduce the average actual use made 
of slackness, as Figure 1.2 suggests.
Waste of resources associated with business fluctuations
The term C  in equation (1.28) represents a further measure of the de­
structive effects of an increase in business cycle volatility increases. Both
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the two terms in C  are negative and their absolute value tends to increase 
as business cycle volatility. The business cycle tends to move slackness and 
the willingness to use it in opposite directions. In particular, the amount 
of slackness tends to increase when research is less profitable (the term 
( z r  — zB)(dsR — dsB) in C) and the willingness to use a given amount of 
slackness tends to increase when less resources are available to implement 
new ideas (the term (sR — sB)(dzR — dzB) in C).
Figure 1.6 summarises the results of this section13. Initially the business 
cycle frees resources as it helps to liquidate bad investment (panel b) therefore 
increases the growth rate (panel a). Eventually, however, despite the increase 
in the average value of an innovation (panel / ) ,  the average actual use made 
of slackness falls (panel e) and the waste of resources captured by the term 
C  in equation (1.28) (panel c and d) climbs. At this point, a further increase 
in business cycle volatility harms the growth process (panel a) and slackness 
increases too (panel b) as resources become slack when no one is willing to 
use them.
1.5 Unit Roots, Cleansing and Technological 
Adoption
According to the liquidationist view “depressions are not simply evils” but 
’’are the means to reconstruct each time the economic system on a more 
efficient plan” (Shumpeter, 1937). Recent both theoretical14 and empirical
13The parameter values are the same as those used for Figure 1.5.
14See for example Bradford De Long (1990), Davis and Haltinwanger (1991), Mortensen 
and Pissarides (1994) and Caballero and Hammour (1994b).
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Figure 1.6: Growth and BCV: a Dynamic Explanation
evidence15 has shown how this view deserves credit: recessions tend to cleanse 
the economy and raise the long-run level of output. Therefore, if a theory 
explains why business cycle volatility harms growth, it must do so in a world 
in which the “cleansing” property of recessions is satisfied. Figure 1.7 shows, 
in an intuitive way, how our model satisfies this property. Panel a in Figure 
1.7 shows the simulated time series for the level of total output16 when the 
value of business cycle volatility is equal to 4.517.
Panel b shows how a recession cleanses the economy. In fact, it liquidates 
businesses adopting old technologies, and makes these resources available 
for the creation of firms adopting the current leading technology. As a re­
sult, when aggregate conditions turn good the economy is able to produce a 
greater output (Figure 1.7, panel b). The cleansing effect of recessions can be 
measured by the sum of the Wold coefficients of the moving average repre­
sentation of the growth rate of total output. This is carried out for different 
levels of business cycle volatility in Figure 1.8 panel c 18. This sum is always 
negative and decreasing, therefore the degree of cleansing of recessions tends
15See for example Bean (1990), Gali and Hammour (1991), Saint-Paul (1993) and Nickell 
et al. (1992).
16We have defined the total output (GDP) of our economy as the sum of output produced 
by firms operating in the economy plus the amount of output produced by entrepreneurs 
working at home.
17The other parameter values are the same as those for Figure 1.5. The time series 
in this section is generated as discrete limits of the continuous model described in the 
previous sections. Each interval lasts one month and the simulations are run for 1200 
intervals (100 years). The programs used for running the simulations are available on 
request.
18The parameter values are the same as the one used for Figure 1.5. In order to calculate 
the moving average representation of the growth rate of total output we looked for the best 
ARMA representation of the series according to the Akaike criterium. For a discussion on 
how these time series have been generated see the previous note.
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Figure 1.8: BCV and Technological Adoption
to increase as business cycle volatility increases. In fact, when business cycle 
volatility increases, the average duration of firms falls as the probability of 
being one of the marginal firms with idiosyncratic productivity between edB 
and Ex at the time when aggregate conditions switch from a boom to a re­
cession is greater (panel b). If we define the level of potential output in the 
economy as the level of output that would be produced if all economic units 
were using the current leading technology in the economy, we cab then note 
that the higher the level of business cycle volatility, the higher the average 
ratio between actual output and potential output (see Figure 1.8, panel d). 
As a result, at high levels of business cycle volatility the economy tends to 
stay closer to its technology frontier independently of what is the impact of 
business cycle volatility on the long run growth rate of the economy (panel 
a).
1.6 Some Empirical Implications
The model described in the previous sections has some further empirical 
implications tha t might be worth exploring. This section tries to throw some 
light on them, leaving a more exhaustive investigation to further research.
One of the main implications of the model is the existence of possible 
non-linearities in the relationship between business cycle volatility and long- 
run growth. If the balance between slackness and implementation effort is 
not perfect, small cyclical fluctuations help in liquidating old businesses, in­
crease the profitability of doing research and stimulate growth. As the level 
of business cycle volatility increases, however, the business cycle creates dis­
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equilibrium and imbalances destroying the required to grow balance between 
the amount of resources available in the market and the willingness to use 
them. Figure 1.919 shows how the relation between growth and business cy­
cle volatility might exhibit a threshold effect using cross-sectional evidence 
for OECD countries in the period 1970-1990. Ramey and Ramey (1995) find 
in their sample however, a significant negative relationship between growth 
and business cycle volatility once conditioned by a set variables identified by 
Levine and Renelt (1992). According to our model this implies that world 
economies have settled on the negative sloped-arm of their growth business 
cycle volatility technological frontier. If we consider the simulations used for 
building Figure 1.8, we assume that world economies settle on the negative 
sloped arm of their growth business cycle volatility technological frontier, we 
are then able to regress the growth rate of the technological parameter x ( t ), 
gt , on its standard deviation, sdgt , we find that
gt = 0.0153 -  0.354 sdgt 
(187.93) (-13.35)
(t statistics in parenthesis). This coefficient of -0.354 resembles very much 
the coefficient equal to -0.385 found by Ramey and Ramey (1995), Table 1, 
for the set of OECD-countries in the period 1952-1988.
The size of the population of entrepreneurs, C, measures the total amount 
of resources available in the economy. Our model implies that an economy 
with higher C will have a magnified effect in the relation between long-run 
growth and business cycle volatility. As empirically the relation is found to 
19Data are taken from the OECD-CEP data set, see Bagliano et al. (1991).
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be negative, the model implies that richer countries should have a stronger 
negative correlation. This is what in Ramey and Ramey found in Table 1. 
The regression for the set of OECD countries exhibits a coefficient in front 
of the standard deviation of growth rates that is more negative than tha t for 
the world economy, tha t is -0.385 against -0.211.
1.7 Conclusions
We have presented in this chapter a model of endogenous growth in which 
the widespread economic consequences of a new idea arise only when a re­
searcher recovers in the market resources that suit its economic applicability. 
In this context we have analysed how the level of business cycle volatility 
affects the long- run growth rate of the economy. We have disentangled the 
question at three levels. Can an increase in the level of business cycle volatil­
ity stimulates growth? This chapter suggests a positive answer if the amount 
of resources suitable of economic exploitation represents in the absence of 
business fluctuations a binding constraint for the economy. Can the level 
of business cycle volatility be excessive and harm the growth process? This 
chapter suggests a positive answer again, as the business cycle eventually cre­
ates disequilibrium and imbalances in the economy destroying the balance 
between the amount of resources available in the market and the willingness 
to use them. So why have people sometimes argued that even deep recession 
are beneficial? We have seen how at high level of business cycle volatility an 
economy tends unequivocally to be more efficient in the sense that it stays 
closer to its technology frontier. Notwithstanding this, at high levels of busi­
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ness cycle volatility an economy will not be able to innovate much, as it fails 
in transforming new economic ideas from private to public goods the whole 
society can learn from .
Schumpeter (1934) observes that “all those features of depressions, which 
spell widespread suffering and needless waste, can yet be taken care of” . In 
this chapter we claim that the level of business cycle volatility experienced by 
most countries seems to have represented a case of “needless waste” . On the 
other hand, if a country has been detrimentally affected by a lack of business 
cycle volatility, it remains a call for further research.
1.8 Appendixes
1.8.1 A ppendix A: Properties of Reservation Produc­
tiv ities
In this appendix we will prove 4 results:
• the difference between eR and edB tends to increase as business cycle 
volatility increases,
• an increase in business cycle volatility raises the value of the rents from 
innovation during a boom if eB < e < eR,
• an increase in business cycle volatility raises the value of the rents from 
innovation during a boom if edR < e. The converse holds for the value 
of rents from innovation in recession.
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First of all, we note that it is enough to prove these results for any fixed 
level of market tightness 6. As the free entry condition given by equation 
(1.19) is increasing in 9, while the value of an innovation is decreasing in 6 by 
equation (1.23), these partial equilibrium results extend easily in the general 
setup. In general equilibrium the size of these effects will be dampened but 
their signs will not be changed.
BCV=0
Figure 1.10: Structure of Reservation Productivities
For any given level of market profitability, basic dynamic programming 
arguments imply that the value of an innovation is an increasing function 
of both the level of aggregate productivity in a boom (Pb ) and a recession 
(Pr ). Moreover, discounting and persistence of the business fluctuations 
implies that, for any given value of e, the rate of substitution between Pb 
and jPr is higher for the value of an innovation in recession (IR(e)) than for 
that in a boom (JB(e)). Symmetry implies that the first will be higher than
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one, while the second will be lower than one. Consider now, for each given 
idiosyncratic productivity, the set of indifference curves in the state space 
Pb — Pr for both I r and I b . Now suppose that the reservation productivity 
in boom and recession be equal to ed. Let us now consider the indifference 
curve of I r evaluated at the reservation productivity ed. The value of this 
indifference curve is clearly zero. Consider now the indifference curve of 
Ib (ed) delivering the same value as the one for recession. This indifference 
curve would cross the indifference curve for Ir (ed) in point A (see Figure 
1.10) , where the level of BCV is equal to 0. This implies tha t the indifference 
curve in boom through the actual value of BCV is associated with a positive 
value. Monotonicity with respect to the idiosyncratic component proves the 
first point. An increase in the level of BCV is equivalent to a movement 
from A to B (Figure 1.10). The structure of the indifference curves clearly 
implies that will tend to rise while edB will tend to  fall. This proves the 
second point. To prove the third point just note that the indifference curve 
associated to point B is always on an higher level than that trough A, so that 
the value of rents in a boom increases as we.move from A to B. This proves 
the third point. Point four follows easily from the same lines of reasoning.
1.8.2 A ppendix B: Expected Slackness in B oom  and 
Recession
The amount of slackness in the market in aggregate state i evolves according 
to the differential equation
K = h ( c ~  st) -  i = B ,R ,
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6i — <5 +  AF(e?), i f  i = B , R .
We indicate with
"7 j Ti" ( q  \ >  ^ ^Ot +  0;g(0*)
the long-run steady state level of the slackness rate if the economy stayed 
forever in state i, and we indicate with
4>i =  0 i# * ) +  $ , i = B , R ,
the speed of adjustment of the amount of slackness. Then the value of slack­
ness after U periods in state i, is given by
s\ = e ' ^ S j  -f cc*i(l — e- ^ ) ,  i — B ,R ,  j  =  0,1.
where Sj represents the value of slackness at the beginning of state i. So that
•  So=value of slackness at the beginning of the boom,
• So- —value of slackness at the end of recession,
• Si=value of slackness at the beginning of recession,
• Si_ =  value of slackness at the end of boom.
Our model implies that
Si =  + s i_,
Sq =  So- j
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where A tB is the measure of enterprises that at the end of a boom have an 
idiosyncratic productivity between eB and eB.
Given that a Poisson process is a renewal process with inter-occurrence 
probability given by a negative exponential, we find that the expected value 
of slackness in state i is
=  E (s‘) =  - T X ^ f o )  +  ^ T T ’ i  = B ,R ,  j  = 0 , l ,  (1.31)fi 4- (pi fi' + cpi
where E (sj) represents the best forecast of the value of slackness at the 
beginning of state i.
To have a close form solution for the value of slackness we have to find 
an expression for E(s^), j  =  0,1. In equilibrium Sq solves
So = e - + R t R [e - * BtB 3o + co tB { i  _ e -4>BtB) + Atfi] + C a R { l  -  e - + * 1* ) .
^r {^b ) is a negative exponential random variable representing the duration 
of the recession (boom).
As the inter-occurrence random variables are independent, the expected 
value of s0 is equal to
E{so) = ir^r[irhrE{so)+S f r +E(A,s)1+ inrt' (1-32)A6 +  4>r  [ i  +  ( p B  V  +  <Pb  t1  +
where E (A tB) is the expected measure of enterprises that at the end of a 
boom have an idiosyncratic productivity between eB and eB. To solve for 
E(so) we need an expression for E (A ts )• A ts  solves the simple Cauchy 
problem given by
A, = - S B\  + A[F(4) -  F(e£)](C -  s f  -  A t), A0 = 0.
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Together with the differential equation for slackness given by equation (??) 
we have to solve a recursive linear dynamic system. This implies that
Ats =  A[F(4) -  F (4 )H C (1:  ae) [1 -  e - ^ ]
— ■ [e — e
5 r  ~  (f>B
As a result
E (A tB) = \[F (4 )  -  F (4 ) ]{ C(1 ae) [1 -  - £ - ]
Or  Or  +
E(s0) - C a B . fi_______ f i _ .
Substituting this expression in that for E (s0) as given by equation (2.7) we 
find
r v  \  &B<f>B +  & R (f>R )  +  OLR<})R(j)B +  A [ / i 2 +  1  — C K #)]
F { S 0 ) = C ----------------------------------— ---------------------------- , (1.„  ,
and
E{AtB) =  AC(1 -  -  A —£ — E (s0),
H<f>B H + <t>B
where
H  =  fl((/)B +  <I>r) +  <f>R<l>B +  
a  =  A [F(4) -  F(e%)\
XF(eji) +  6 +  /x
Analogously it can be shown that the expected value at the beginning of 
recession is equal to
TP,  ^ +  (XB^BtpR +  A[(/X + 0b)(M +  ,
E \ SV = W --------------------------------- Jj----------------------------------+
_  fJ'(c*B<i>B + aR<f>R) — (XB<f>B<l>R] ->
H
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To obtain the average value of slackness in boom we substitute the ex­
pression for the expected value of Sq in equation (1.31). We then have
, J  + a B<t>2B(n + 4>r ) ,
=  E (st ) = C [— + + I
where
J  =  /i2(OlB(j>B +  OtRtpR) +  tJ'(a R(l>R(i)B +  ^B ^B ^ r )-
Reasoning analogously, we find that the expected value of slackness in a 
recession is equal to
S* =  £ (3 t ) =  C { --------------------------+
It is easy to show the following two propositions.
Proposition 1:
The average amount of slackness during a recession is higher than that 
during a boom if a #  < o l r . This means
Sb < S r .
Proof
The difference between the level of slackness in the two states is equal to 
_  _  1 — Qb) J(<I>b ~ <I>r) +  + (Pb)2 ~  <Xb<I?b(p +  4>R)2
SR SB -  [ H  + (ll + 4>g)(jl + 4>H)H
The first term is positive as the steady state value of the slackness rate is 
a number between 0 and 1. To prove the positiveness of the second term 
we just have to check that the numerator is positive. Substituting back the
68
value of J  into the above equation, we find that the numerator has the same 
sign as
0LR<l>2R(t>B(ll' +  <Pb ) — (fj> +  </>R)otB<l>%<t>R +  IM*R<I>R<I>b (P +  <Pb ) ~  +  4>R)•
This is equal to
a R  ( p R ^ B ^  +  4>b ){M +  4>r)  — OCB <f>B<f>R(lJ' +  4>b ) ( P  +  <I>r ) =
=  ( a R  ~~ a B)<pR(t>B(fJ' +  0s)(M  +  4>r )  >  0-
C V D  .
Corollary 1:
The amount of slackness in the economy is counter-cyclical. That is
SB  <  Sr .
Proof
This follows easily from proposition one, the fact tha t >  edB (appendix 
A) and last from the procyclicality of willingness 0*.
Proposition 2:
Both the average slackness rates in recession and boom are increasing 
function of the parameter A. Moreover, as A increases, the difference be­
tween the two average amounts of slackness in a recession and boom also 
increases.
Proof:
A fraction
a +  cx 
b +  dx*
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is an increasing function in x iff
cb > ad.
If we apply this simple result to the case of the average amount of slackness 
in the case of a boom, we find that it is an increasing function with respect 
to A, iff
[ l ta R(f)R (n  +  <pB) +  lxotB(j>B{^ +  <pR)\(<pB — <Pr) +  
+  OLR (j)2R { i i  +  (/>b ) 2 ~  +  0R )2 >
this is equivalent to
( M + (Pb )\^{<Pr  +  <Pb ) +  <Pr <Pb ] >  A^2{^B^pB +  OlR<f)R) +
+  ^{ctR^RCpB +  <*-B<Pb <Pr)  +  +  ^ r )-
This inequality is automatically satisfied, as the average slackness rate in 
a boom is a quantity between 0 and 1.
Reasoning analogously, we can then prove the same result for the average 
slackness rate in recession.
To prove the second part of the proposition, we note that the difference 
of the slackness rate is equal to
^  fA(pB ( 1 — olb ) , 
s r - s b  =  C [  K— ---- +
. J{<Pb  ~  <Pr ) +  a R(pR (fi +  (pB)2 ~  o^Bfp'sifJ' +  ^ r )2i
<jjl  +  <Pb ) ( h  +  <I>r ) H  J '
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Reasoning in the same way as before and using the definition of H, it 
follows that this quantity is increasing in A. CVD.
1.8.3 Appendix C: Average Actual U se of Slackness in 
th e Case o f a CES M atching Function
This appendix shows that at high levels of BCV, the impact of an increase 
in the value of an innovation on the actual use made of slackness tends to 
vanish.
The time independent component of the rents from an innovation at the 
upper support of the idiosyncratic distribution F  can be expressed in the 
general form
f.fet) =  i = B ,R ,i/ + fiZi
where Ki is a complex function of the parameter Pb , Pr  and the reservation 
productivities in boom and recession. Using the free entry condition (1.19) 
we find that the impact of a change of Ki on the actual use made of slackness 
in boom and recession, Zi is given by
dzi =  j ; i =  B ,R ,
w vm  + m
m  = - # ) 2[*+f§}]>
g(8) = q(6) + q(9)0.
Assuming that the matching function is CES,
r a f e  st) = [(cit)p +  ((1 -  c)st)p]p, p < 0,
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we find that
g(9) = [c? + (1 -  c)" 6 - r } l - \
f t$ )  =  6>',+1(—— y\c?, +  ( \ - c y e - i,fr .
1 — c
It is easy to check that both the function f(9)  and g{9) are decreasing in 
9. This also implies that the function h(9) tha t measures the impact of an 
increase of the component Ki on the actual use of slackness, z£, is also a 
decreasing function in 9.
Moreover it is easy to prove that f(9)  and g(9) satisfy the following prop­
erties at the boundaries
9(6) - 0, i f  9 T 00
m - 0, i f  9 ? 00
9 (6) -* cott-ri i f  6 10,
m - 00, i f  0 |  0.
This implies that the function h(9) has the following properties
m  & n  e i  o,
h(9) —> 0, i f  9 T oo,
where f
This proves the result stated in the text.
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Chapter 2
Lack of Entrepreneurial Skills 
and Decreasing Returns in 
R&D
A bstract
In standard endogenous growth models, the higher the research effort the 
higher is the innovation rate of the economy. Innovating, however, is a complex 
process that requires an entrepreneur to implement a valuable invention. If re­
search and entrepreneurial skills compete in the allocation of aggregate resources, 
the relation between growth and RSzD is hump-shaped. This chapter proposes a 
general equilibrium model of endogenous growth in which the observed decreasing 
returns in R&cD might be the outcome of a lack of entrepreneurial skills rather 
than any vanishing of investment opportunities. If this is so, the amount of re­
sources devoted to research has been excessive and there may be a case for policy 
intervention. Indirect inference on the model, observed changes in fiscal structure 
and more formal empirical investigation seem all to support the relevance of this 
hypothesis.
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2.1 Introduction
Since the Malthusian (1798) and Ricardian (1817) prophecies of the eventual 
coming of a stationary state, the spectre of diminishing returns has hovered 
over economics. Recent empirical evidence seems to support some form of 
diminishing returns in research over time. For example, Griliches (1990) 
and Kortum (1993) note how the ratio of the number of patent applications 
to the scientists and engineers involved in R h D  has fallen over time in 
the post-war period (Figure 1), while Jones (1995a, 1995b) points out that 
the increase in the amount of R h D  effort (Figure 2) has been translated 
into stagnant or declining growth rates. Moreover, Griliches (1979) observes 
that “the exhaustion of inventive and technological opportunities remains 
a major suspect for the productivity slow-down in the 70’s” . According 
to Schumpeter (1943, 1946) the vanishing of investment opportunities is, 
however, just one of two competing explanations of the “state of decay” of 
the “capitalist society” . A “more plausible” one states that “the individual 
leadership of the entrepreneur tends to lose importance” .
According to Schumpeter, the amount of entrepreneurial as well as re­
search ability is important in determining the growth rate of an economy. 
Moreover, Schumpeter (1947) notes how the inventor and the entrepreneur 
are distinct entities: “It is particularly important to distinguish the entrepre­
neur from the inventor....The inventor produces ideas, the entrepreneur “gets 
things done” ....an idea or scientific principle is not, by itself, of any impor­
tance for economic practice” . This chapter then proposes a general equilib­
rium model of endogenous growth in which a vertical innovation arises only
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when an entrepreneur matches with a valuable invention. In other words, 
in order to grow, an economy requires both researchers producing inventions 
and entrepreneurs implementing them. If these two inputs compete in the al­
location of aggregate resources, the relation between growth and R&D  effort 
is hump-shaped.
The trade off between allocating resources to either research or entrepre­
neurial activities arises in many situations. For example, the economist must 
allocate his time between reading old papers in order to write new ones and 
teaching students, talking with colleagues, presenting work at the NBER 
meetings, etc. Per se, scientific knowledge has no economic impact unless 
some effort is made to spread it. As a result, a no growth equilibrium can 
be the outcome of absence of either research or entrepreneurial skills. In a 
world where the allocation between research and entrepreneurial activities 
takes place through the market, where the rents from innovating are ex-post 
shared by researchers and entrepreneurs and where there are externalities as­
sociated with innovating, there is no compelling reason why private incentives 
should coincide with social ones. If the allocation of resources takes place 
through the market, agents choose how to allocate their skills as a function 
of their private incentives. If there are then both rents to be shared among 
different rentiers and externalities associated with innovating, it will be mere 
chance that private and social interests coincide. This implies that any point 
on the growth R&D  technological frontier can be sustained as a competitive 
equilibrium. In this framework, the decreasing returns in research observed 
in some industrialised countries (see Jones, 1995b) could be the result of an 
inefficient equilibrium shift that has increased the amount of research effort
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to the detriment of more socially useful entrepreneurial skills.
We try to test for the plausibility of this hypothesis. We initially show 
how in the US the increase in the amount of resources allocated to research, 
and more generally to education, has gone together with a dramatic fall in 
the amount of entrepreneurship once this is proxied by the population of 
self-employed (see e.g. Evans and Jovanovic, 1989 and Evans and Leighton,
1989). We then try to explain why entrepreneurship might have become 
progressively less profitable from a private point of view. According to the 
model, the observed tendency for the real interest rate to fall as an economy 
develops (see Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995, p.6), the fall in the obsoles­
cence rate of an innovation (Caballero and Jaffe, 1993) and the increase in 
the degree of appropriability of the rents of an invention (consistent with the 
empirical evidence contained in Schankerman and Pakes 1986), might all be 
able to explain the alleged equilibrium shift. Changes in the fiscal structure 
are, however, the most obvious candidates. As they merely redistribute re­
sources across occupations, fiscal changes alter the private profitability of an 
occupation without altering its social value. We show tha t basic and applied 
research funded by nonprofit institutions, government expenditure in educa­
tion and the amount of subsidies to firms have all substantially increased in 
the postwar period in the US. All these changes tend unequivocally to make 
research relatively more profitable than entrepreneurship without changing 
its underlying social value and they might thus explain why the US economy 
ended up by suffering from a lack of entrepreneurial skills. Finally, we check 
for some more direct empirical evidence. Looking at both time series (relative 
to the US) and cross sectional (OECD countries) evidence, we show how the
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claim of a non-monotonic relation between growth and relative R&D  effort 
is consistent with the data. Moreover, the hypothesis tha t US growth rates 
have stagnated as a direct result of a lack of entrepreneurial skills can not be 
rejected at standard level of significance.
Relation to the Literature. This chapter relates to several strands of re­
search in the literature. It shares with Helpman and Trajtenberg (1994) and 
chapter one the premise that the widespread economic consequences of an 
invention arise only with its implementation. The statement that research 
effort can be excessive is also a feature that arises in Tirole (1988, p.399) and 
in Aghion and Howitt (1992), while the claim that the allocation of talent 
matters for economic performance is contained also in Baumol (1990) and 
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991). It is the joint interaction between these 
strands of the literature that is new here. In a world where the inter-temporal 
spill-overs at the heart of endogenous growth models (see i.e. Romer, 1990) 
arise only with the implementation of endogenously produced inventions, it 
is the allocation between research and entrepreneurial activities that drives 
growth performance. The main reference is, however, the recent literature on 
growth and scale effects. Jones (1995b), Kortum (1994) and Young (1995) 
propose a theoretical solution to the empirically observed lack of any scale 
effect in the relation between R&D  effort and growth. These theoretical so­
lutions share some important features. In particular, all models assume that 
at higher levels of development the output cost of an innovation progressively 
increases. In other words, the decreasing returns in RfoD  derives from some 
form (at least in relative terms) of vanishing of investment opportunities. The
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side effect of this assumption is that the solutions of all these models satisfy 
some optimality property. For example, both in Jones (1995b) and Kortum
(1994) the economy growth rate is the social optimal one, while in Young
(1995) the amount of R h D  effort is optimal even if its allocation among dif­
ferent dimensions of innovation might not be. In any case, all these models 
explain the empirically observed increase in the amount of R&D  effort as 
the welfare improving response of a competitive economy to an increase in 
the scale of the economy. The contribution of this chapter is to propose a 
different reading of the same empirical facts. We show both theoretically 
and empirically how the alleged decreasing returns in RSzD might be the 
outcome of an inefficient equilibrium shift that has increased the amount of 
research effort to the detriment of more socially useful entrepreneurial skills. 
This would be consistent with the Schumpeterian hypothesis that the “state 
of decay of the capitalist society” will ultimately be driven by the lack of 
entrepreneurial skills.
Section 2 expounds the general set-up of the model. A more formal pre­
sentation is contained in section 3. Section 4 explores how the theoretical 
framework can account for the alleged decreasing returns in R h D .  Section 
5 checks for some direct empirical evidence in favor of the “lack of entrepre­
neurial” skill hypothesis.
2.2 The General Set-up
Our economy is populated by a continuum of agents of size C. Each agent is 
infinitely lived, risk-neutral and maximizes expected returns in output units
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discounted at rate r  > 0. At each point in time agents can choose either 
to become researchers in order to produce inventions or entrepreneurs. We 
indicate with f t the relative (with respect to C ) size of the population of 
researchers, at time t.
A researcher discovers inventions according to a Poisson process with in­
tensity A. When he makes a discovery, he starts searching for entrepreneurs 
able to implement it. The flow cost of searching is given by xx(t), x  >  
where x(t) represents the leading technology in the economy at time t . We 
assume that the innovation opportunities associated with the invention van­
ish according to a Poisson process with rate of arrival i/. This implies tha t 
at each point in time the stock of scientific knowledge, fy, measured by the 
number of inventions suitable for economic exploitation, tends to increase 
in response to the discovery of new inventions, while it tends to fall as the 
old ones become obsolete. This allows one to capture some key characteris­
tics of the process of accumulating scientific knowledge (see Adams, 1990). 
Firstly, the stock of scientific knowledge is fundamental as it is the outcome of 
research. Secondly, it recognises the heterogeneity of information, as the im­
plementation of an invention requires a costly search process in order to find 
suitable entrepreneurs. Thirdly, the use of the stock of knowledge is repeti­
tive, as an invention can give rise to a “cluster” of innovations concentrated 
“in certain sectors and their surroundings” (Schumpeter, 1939, pp.100- 101). 
Finally it recognises the time specificity of information, as scientific knowl­
edge becomes obsolete as time goes by1.
*It might be argued that the rate at which inventions become obsolete, depends on the 
rate of growth of the leading technology of the economy ( technological obsolescence). We
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An innovation requires an invention discovered by a researcher and an en­
trepreneur. Once they match, a new firm run by the entrepreneur is created. 
An innovation that occurs at time t will open access of that enterprise to 
the leading technology x(t) as of that date. Each firm can produce, at each 
point in time t, a flow of goods equal to Px(t)  and is shut down according 
to a Poisson process with rate of arrival 6.
The entrepreneur can be either running an enterprise or producing at 
home (see Benhabib et al., 1991). If he runs a firm, the entrepreneur obtains 
a real flow of profit equal to nt. Profits of the entrepreneur are chosen so as 
to share with the researcher the gains from innovating at each point in time. 
The entrepreneur’s share is (5. If he works at home, the entrepreneur is able to 
produce a flow of goods equal to hx(t), a measure of the level of human capital 
of the entrepreneur at time t. In equilibrium an entrepreneur running a firm 
has no incentive to search. This implies that only entrepreneurs working at 
home are “available” for innovating.
The rate at which free entrepreneurs find suitable inventions is determined 
by the homogeneous-degree one matching function st) (see Pissarides,
1990), where represents the stock of scientific knowledge suitable for eco­
nomic exploitation at time t and st is the number of entrepreneurs working 
at home2. St is a measure of the amount of entrepreneurial slackness avail­
consider this the kind of simplifying assumption that does not affect the main results of 
the chapter. Moreover, it might be argued that the economic applicability of an invention 
might be time dependent ( clock time obsolescence) if some uncertainty is associated with 
it, if the inventor is finitely lived or if there is some loss of memory in the accumulation 
of intangible knowledge. In this chapter we follow the empirical work by Adams (1990) in 
assuming a constant rate of obsolescence of the stock of scientific knowledge Kt .
2Schumpeter (1949) was very worried that his model looked like a model of “exogenous” 
technological growth: “a stumbling block” of the theory “may be expressed by saying that
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able in the market. We assume that the matching function is increasing 
and concave in each of its complement arguments. The matching function 
allows one to represent in a parsimonious fashion two key characteristics of 
the implementation of inventions: the fact that both entrepreneurial skills 
and inventions are heterogenous, so that search is time consuming, and the 
fact that entrepreneurial skill is a scarce good for which different researchers 
are competing.
Since an invention offers the highest human capital opportunities in the 
market plus some profits, no free entrepreneur turns down an investment 
opportunity. Thus, the probability that an invention matches with an en­
trepreneur is given by q(9t) = rn{Kt\ s*)//% where 9t defines tightness in the 
market for entrepreneurial skills and is equal to Kt/st. By analogous consid­
erations it follows that p(9t) =  9tq(9t) is the instantaneous probability tha t 
a free entrepreneur finds a valuable invention. We also assume that
p( 0) =  q{ oo) =  m( 0; st) =  m («t; 0) =  0, p( oo) =  q( 0) =  oo. (Al)
Vertical innovations are the unique source of growth. We follow Aghion 
and Howitt (1992, 1994) in assuming that the rate of growth of the techno­
logical parameter x(t)  is given by the product of the size of the innovation, 
7 , and the frequency of innovation. Our assumptions imply that 9tq(9t)st is 
the number of innovations introduced in the economy at time t , so that the
the entrepreneur simply does nothing but take advantage of technological progress, which 
therefore appears, implicitly or explicitly as something that goes along entirely indepen­
dently of entrepreneurial activity...It is perhaps not difficult to understand that technolog­
ical progress, so obvious in some societies and so nearly absent in others, is a phenomenon 
that needs to be explained”. This set-up allows us to model the entrepreneurial function 
in an endogenous growth framework.
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growth rate gt of the technological parameter x(t) is given by 0tq(0t)stln/y. 
Finite present values and positive economic growth require
r  > g, (A2)
A(1 - P ) { P - h )  > 0, (A3)
respectively. Condition (A2) is standard, while condition (AS) is the same as 
that in Romer (1990). In order to sustain growth we must assign a strictly 
positive degree of market power to researchers, /? <  1. Research is an invest­
ment that requires the costs sustained today to be compensated by strictly 
positive economic rents in the future.
The unknown in the model are the level of tightness 0, the relative size 
of the population of researchers f t and the steady state growth rate of the 
economy g.
2.3 The M odel
In this section we first introduce the formal structure of the economy previ­
ously described. We then analyse the steady state equilibrium and its welfare 
properties.
2.3.1 Research, Innovation and Profits
The assumption that a researcher produces a valuable invention with rate of 
arrival A and the option he has of becoming an entrepreneur imply that
R t = R x ( t)  = ET>o{[(Lt+T +  sup(R t+T; i / t+r)]e~rr}, (2.1)
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where Rt , L t and Ht are respectively the value at time t of doing research, of 
producing an invention and of being a self-employed entrepreneur (working 
at home), t + r  is the arrival date of the first invention produced by the 
researcher.
As a researcher is unable to implement the invention himself, when he 
makes a discovery he starts searching for entrepreneurs able to implement 
it. The assumption that the flow cost of searching is Xx (t)iX > 0» anc  ^
inventions vanish with arrival rate v imply that the value of an invention 
follows the following Bellman equation
(r +  v)Lt =  -* x ( i)  +  Q(0)lt +  Lt , (2.2)
where It measures the present discounted value of an innovation introduced 
at time t and Lt is the time derivative of the value of an invention. As, 
at each point in time, a firm produces a flow of goods equal to Px(t)  and 
entrepreneurs get a real flow of profits equal to 7rt , the asset value of an 
innovation to the researcher is equal to
(r -4- 8)It = P x ( t) — 7Tt +  It, (2-3)
where i t represents the time derivative of It while 6 is the rate at which enter­
prises are shut down and thus measures the obsolescence rate of innovations.
A self-employed entrepreneur working at home at time t gets, in present 
value terms, a real income equal to Ht. Ht solves the Bellman equation
rH t =  hx(t) +  0q{0){Et -  Ht) +  H u (2.4)
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where hx(t), Et and Ht are respectively the real flow of goods produced by 
an entrepreneur working at home, the value of an enterprise run by the entre­
preneur and the time derivative of Ht. 0q(0) is the instantaneous probability 
that a free entrepreneur finds a valuable invention. Analogously, E t , the 
present value of an enterprise solves
rE t = 7Tf 4- 6[sup(Rt", Ht) — Et\ 4- Et, (2*5)
where the above equation embodies the option entrepreneurs have of becom­
ing researchers. The assumption that profits are the outcome of bilateral 
bargaining between the researcher with the invention and the entrepreneur 
implies tha t profits maximize the weighted product of the entrepreneur’s and 
researcher’s net return from the creation of a new firm:
7rt =  argm ax(/t +  Lt -  Ltf ~ p (Et -  Ht)p, 0 < /? < 1,
where (3 measures the bargaining power of entrepreneurs. As a result, profits 
are such that
I t =  (1 -  p)(E t — Ht + I t) = (1 -  P)SU (2.6)
where St = Et — H t+ It  is the private net surplus associated with the creation 
of a new firm. Of this surplus, researchers and entrepreneurs appropriate 
fractions 1 — (3 and (3 respectively. If we now impose a the free entry condi­
tion, it follows that in equilibrium an entrepreneur working at home must be 
indifferent between searching for an investment opportunity and becoming a 
researcher, i.e. Ht = R t . Substituting in (2.3), (2.4), (2.5) and (2.6), we then
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find that profits are equal to
7rt =  /3Px(t) +  (1 -  P)hx(t) +  f30q(6)It .
2.3.2 Steady State Equilibrium
(2.7)
In steady state each variable is growing at the same rate g as the economy 
so that
R t = Rx(t),  I t = Ix(t) ,  L t = Lx(t), Ht = Hx(t),  E t = Ex(t).  (2.8)
We can then make use of (2.8) to rewrite equations (4.11), (2.3), (2.4) 
and (2.5) as
L  =
I  =
H  =
r + v - g - x  +
q(6){ 1 -  0)(P  -  h)
r  +  S + /38q(9) — g
(1 -  0){P -  h) 
r  +  6 + P8q(6) — g ’
p e q ( d ) ( P - h )h +
r  +  /39q(8) + S -  g 
E  = p i  + ( l - 0 ) H .
r - g
(4.11’)
(2.3’)
(2.4’)
(2.5’)
Moreover, using (2.8) and the free entry condition (R t = Ht), we find
that
R  = (L + R)Er> o(e(,- 9)T)
POO
(L + R) /  e-(T- g)T\ e - XTdT 
Jo
XL
r - g
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Together with equations (4.11’) and (2.4’) this implies that the free entry 
condition (Rt =  Ht) can be written as
08q(9)S + h  =  A—— , (FE)
r  +  v — g
where S  = I  + E  — H  measures the private net surplus associated with the 
creation of a new firm and is equal to
5 =  P ~ h
r + 6 + (36q(0) -  g
The left-hand side of equation (FE) represents the relative profitability of 
being an entrepreneur as an increasing function of the amount of tightness 6 
in the market for entrepreneurial skills. The higher the amount of scientific 
knowledge Kt available per entrepreneur, the more profitable is entrepre­
neurship. Analogously, an increase in 9 reduces the profitability of being a 
researcher as the implementation of inventions becomes progressively more 
difficult. As a result the right hand side of equation (FE) defines a decreasing 
function in 6 that measures the relative profitability of being a researcher. 
At the point at which the right-hand side and left hand side cross individuals 
are indifferent between becoming researchers or entrepreneurs.
The assumption that enterprises are closed according to a Poisson process 
with rate of arrival 6 implies that slackness evolves according to the differ­
ential equation
st = <5[C(1 -  / )  -  st] -  0q(6)st. 
so that in steady state it is equal to
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*  ( 2 9 )
Using the assumption that the frequency of innovation is equal to the 
number of successful matches between the steady state level of the stock of 
knowledge Kt =  £ / ,  and the amount of entrepreneurial slackness given by 
equation (2.9 ), we find that the growth rate g of the technological parameter 
x(t) is equal to
"  ( D B >
where 0, or tightness in the market for entrepreneurial skills, solves the simple 
non-linear equation
0 = - = + y ~ (t h e )St v 0(1 -  f )
Equations (DE) and (FE), given the constraint imposed by (THE), com­
pletely solve the model in the growth rate g, relative research effort /  space 
(Figure 3). Equation (THE) merely expresses tightness as the ratio of the 
steady state amount of scientific knowledge to the amount of slackness given 
by equation (2.9). Equation (DE) defines the frontier of technological possi­
bilities of the economy. It defines a strictly concave relation between growth 
and relative research effort (Figure 3), satisfying the property that no growth
can be the outcome of either too much or too little research effort (see ap­
pendix 7 for a formal derivation). As both research and entrepreneurial skills 
are required to sustain growth, an over-allocation to either factor harms the 
growth process.
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Condition (FE) defines an equilibrium locus and tells us, for any given 
level of the growth rate, the relative amount of resources that the economy 
will end up devoting to research. This condition defines a strictly positive 
relation between growth rate and research effort, mapping the zero one in­
terval over the whole real line (see appendix 7). The positive slope of the 
relation (Figure 3) is a consequence of the nature of research as an invest­
ment. A researcher incurs an immediate cost in the expectation of future 
rewards that will arrive only after the implementation of valuable inventions. 
The higher the growth rate, the lower will be the effective discount rate of the 
researcher and the higher the gains associated with a successful innovation. 
As a change in the discount factor always tends to have a greater effect on 
the investment with the longer time horizon, an increase in the level of the 
growth rate will always make research relatively more profitable than entre­
preneurship. The steady-state equilibrium is defined by the point at which 
the (FE) and (DE) condition cross (point A in Figure 3). At that point no 
researcher has any incentive to become an entrepreneur (or vice-versa) and 
the economy will grow at the constant steady state growth rate defined by 
the technological frontier (DE). In appendix 7 we show how any point on the 
technological frontier (DE) can be sustained as equilibrium of our economy. 
The basic intuition is the same as the one in Hosios (1990) and Caballero 
and Hammour (1996). An economy characterised by ex-ante competitive re­
lationships but ex- post bilateral monopolies has no compelling tendency to 
coordinate itself towards the social optimum, as there is no reason why the 
outcome of the bilateral bargain should reflect the actual social value of the 
function pursued by each agent. If the allocation of resources takes place
through the market, agents choose how to  allocate their skills according to 
their private incentives. Moreover, if there are both rents to be shared among 
different rentiers and externalities associated with innovating, it will be mere 
chance that private and social interests coincide. In the next subsection we 
investigate the structure of the constrained social optimum.
2.3.3 Welfare Implications
In this section we analyse the social planner’s problem and show how the 
constrained social optimum always lies on the positively sloped arm of the 
technological frontier defined by condition (DE) plus {THE). In the steady 
state, the social planner maximizes the aggregate flow of utility in output 
units. If we indicate with n{f),  g , 9 and rr(0) respectively the number of 
enterprises operating in the economy, the steady state growth rate, the level 
of tightness in the market for entrepreneurial skills, and the starting value of 
the level of technology, we find that, in the steady state, the social planner 
solves
max j f  j p r t ( / )  -  ^ x f  + h[l — f  -  n(f)\  j  x(s)e TSds =
x(0)max
/
(P  -  h)n(f )  -  +  h ) f  +  h (2 .10)
where
< n >
M  (DEI
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a  M e )  +  s] f
* = r  6(1- 1 ) - -  (THE}
It is clear from equation (2.10) that the problem of the social planner 
consists of maximising both the growth rate and the number of firms op­
erating in the economy, while keeping the number of researchers as low as 
possible. The economic intuition is pretty simple. Given the objective of 
maximising the present discounted value of output, the central planner will 
maximise the growth rate keeping as high as possible the level of utilisation 
of the resources. This involves keeping as high as possible the number of 
firms operating in the economy and as low as possible the costs of getting a 
given outcome, namely the number of researchers. From equation (FI*) and 
(DE*) we note how the value of /  that maximise the number of operating 
firms, n ( /) ,  maximises also the growth rate of the economy g. As condition 
(FI)  and condition together (DE)  define a strictly concave hump-shaped 
relation, while the cost component implied by /  is linear, the social optimum 
will always lie on the strictly positive arm of the technological frontier. More 
formally, we find that the derivative of the objective function of the social 
planner with respect to /  is equal to
-  & + » ) -  1'V r - g ( f ) ’
where g' and n' indicate respectively the derivatives of g( f )  and n ( f )  with 
respect to / .  This derivative is clearly negative at the point in which n' =  
gf = 0 , implying that the social optimum will always lie to the left of the
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point that maximises the growth rate of the economy3.
2.4 Lack of Entrepreneurial Skills
The model presented in the previous section shows that an increase in re­
search effort can crowd out more socially useful entrepreneurial skills and 
ultimately harms the growth process. As the amount of relative research ef­
fort increases, the stock of scientific knowledge increase, but it also becomes 
progressively more difficult to implement inventions both because more re­
searchers are competing for the same resources (congestion externalities) and 
because an increase in research effort crowds out useful entrepreneurial skills 
(thin market externalities). If the stock of scientific knowledge is already big 
while the amount of entrepreneurial skills is low, an increase in research ef­
fort reduces the growth rate of the economy, because it misallocates socially 
useful resources. If this is the case, the growth rate stagnates despite the 
increase in research effort because of the lack of entrepreneurial skills. More 
formally, an increase in research effort can be translated into stagnant or 
declining growth rates, if for example the equilibrium of the economy shifts 
from point A  to point B  (Figure 3). The considerations in the previous sec­
tion show how this equilibrium shift is inefficient but nonetheless feasible. 
If so, research becomes more profitable relative to entrepreneurship despite 
there having been no increase in its social productivity.
Despite an upward trend in the relative amount of research effort (Fig­
ure 2) and high education expenditures (Figure 4), the US growth rate has
3The social optimum growth rate will also be different from zero as the derivative of 
the technological frontier at /  =  0 is infinity.
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stagnated or even declined, so that the productivity of research effort has 
been decreasing over time (Figure 1). At the same time, the amount of en­
trepreneurial skills in the US economy, as measured by the population of 
self-employed4 (see i.e. Evans and Jovanovic, 1989 and Evans and Leighton, 
1989) has dramatically fallen. If we examine Figure 1, 2 and 4 together, it 
seems that the increasing amount of education and research effort financed 
by the US society has been to the detriment of more socially useful entrepre­
neurial skills.
In what follows we try  to explain theoretically why the private returns 
from entrepreneurship have progressively fallen in the US over the post-war 
period. Firstly, we look for shifts in the underlying structural parameters of 
the model. Secondly, we consider the effects of changes in the fiscal structure. 
In particular we focus on the effects of subsidies to research and to firms.
2.4.1 Changes in Structural Param eters
It is possible to posit changes in the underlying parameters of the model 
able to explain the increase in the relative profitability of research. We focus 
on three possible candidates: changes in the discount factor, changes in the 
private value of an innovation and changes in the obsolescence rate of an
4It is reasonable to ask how good this proxy might be. There are grounds to believe 
that it satisfies some basic Schumpeterian criteria (see Schumpeter, 1949). According to 
Schumpeter (1949) the entrepreneurial function can be identified only a posteriori: “our 
definitions of entrepreneur, entrepreneurial function and so on can only grow out of it 
a posteriori' and again “when we speak of the entrepreneur we do not mean so much 
a physical person as we do a function, but even if we look at individuals who at least 
at some juncture in their lives fill the entrepreneurial function it should be added that 
these individuals do not form a social class. They hail from all the corners of the social 
universe”. In fact, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) note how, in their sample, 20 percent of 
the individuals who switched into self-employment formed incorporated businesses.
92
innovation.
A fall in the discount factor, r, makes research relatively more profitable 
(equation FE). This arises from the nature of research as an investment. A 
researcher incurs an immediate cost in the expectation of future rewards that 
only arrives after the implementation of valuable inventions. As a change in 
the discount factor always tends to affect the investment with the longer time 
horizon more severely, a fall in the discount factor will always make research 
more profitable relative to entrepreneurship. Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995, 
p.6) cite empirical evidence that seems to support this, as they claim tha t real 
returns exhibit a tendency to fall over some ranges as the economy develops. 
This would be consistent with a decreasing value of relative risk aversion at 
higher level of wealth.
Innovating creates rents that must be shared. These rents are the rewards 
that society leaves to both researchers and entrepreneurs in order to remu­
nerate them for the inter-temporal positive knowledge spillovers embodied 
in equation (DE) and to sustain the growth process. These rents are shared 
according to an ex-post bilateral bargaining whose outcome does not nec­
essarily reflect the social contribution of each agent to the introduction of 
new technology in the economy. In our framework the rent-sharing is mod­
elled as the Nash bargaining solution to a bilateral monopoly. Here a fall 
in the bargaining power of entrepreneurs /?, makes research relatively more 
profitable (see equation FE) in the absence of changes in the fundamentals 
of the economy. Schankerman and Pakes (1986, Table 5) find that the aver­
age value of a patent in France, UK and Germanyin 1975 is on average 70% 
higher than it was at the beginning of 1955. If we assume that the value of
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a patent measures the rents from innovating accruing to the researcher, this 
would imply an upward trend in the value of It in our model5. Equation (2.8) 
implies that as time goes by the value of an innovation increases at the same 
rate as the growth rate of technology. If we assume that the trend observed 
by Shankerman and Pakes (1986) has been repeated in the US, with similar 
magnitude, and that the average growth rate of total factor productivity per 
year has been equal to about 0.4%, as found in Young (1995a), this would 
mean that about 62% of the increase in I t =  Ix(t )  is left unexplained and 
must therefore be attributed to a change in its steady state value I.  Even if 
we take the growth rate of GDP per worker as the right proxy for the growth 
rate of the economy we still find 33% of this increase to be unexplained. In 
order to explain such an increase, one could perhaps invoke a rise in the 
level of the bargaining power of researchers, 1 — /?. Schumpeter (1943, 1946) 
attributes the fall of the bargaining power of entrepreneurs to cultural and 
sociological shifts that tend to destroy the “protective strata” able to sustain 
the entrepreneurial function. More specifically, /? measures the outcome of 
a bilateral bargaining problem here specified parsimoniously. For example, 
we could assume the presence of, but not explicitly modelled, asymmetric 
information, the size of which depends on the technological content of the
Alternatively, we might think that the value of a patent measures the total private 
surplus associated with innovating, St . If this is the case, the calculations below would 
apply to St rather than It- In the model, any increase in the total private surplus from 
innovating increases the relative profitability of research (see equation FE). This comes out 
because of both the nature of research as an investment and the fact that researchers and 
entrepreneurs appropriate fractions 1 — (3 and 0, respectively, of the total private surplus 
from innovating (see equation 2.6). As a change in the level of future rewards always tends 
to affect more the investment with the longer time horizon because of leverage, an increase 
in the total private surplus from innovating, St , will always make research relatively more 
profitable than entrepreneurship.
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innovation, if so, there would be a bias in favour of the researcher. At higher 
level of development the ability of the researcher to appropriate rents would 
be increased.
Particularly rich are the dynamics associated with changes in the obsoles­
cence rate of an innovation, 6. A fall in 8 increases the relative profitability of 
research for any given level of tightness, 0, in the market for entrepreneurial 
skills (see condition FE). In fact, for given probability of matching with a 
free entrepreneur (i.e. given 9), the gains associated with research increase 
thanks to higher gains associated with a successful innovation (lower effective 
discount rate of an innovation). However, for a given value of / ,  the value of 
6 tends also to increase, as a fall in 8 reduces the number of entrepreneurs 
who are currently searching for some invention to implement. The ultimate 
impact on the (FE) curve, defined as it is in the growth-relative research 
effort space, is thus ambiguous. W hat is not ambiguous is the impact on 
the technological frontier defined by (DE). A fall in the obsolescence rate 
of an innovation 8 implies that the economy tends to renovate less, so that 
for a given allocation of effort the amount of entrepreneurial slackness is 
lower. This implies a downward shift of the technological frontier DE, with 
the hump moving leftward as the constraint imposed by the lack of entrepre­
neurial skills becomes more binding for each given level of relative research 
effort, / 6. In other words, an economy that liquidates more often (higher
6To prove the downward movement of the (DE) condition we merely note that for given
/  a fall in 8 reduces the steady state level of slackness given by (2.9) both directly through
8 and indirectly through the increase in 9. As slackness falls for any given level of / ,  the 
constraint imposed by the thin market externality becomes more binding as /  increases. 
This explains the leftward movement of the hump. A formal proof of this last proposition 
is contained in the appendix.
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S) has more frequent opportunity to rebuild its productive stock at a higher 
technological level and grows faster thanks to the inter-temporal spill-over 
typical of standard endogenous growth models (see i.e. Romer, 1990). Ca­
ballero and Jaffe (1993, Figure 9) show how the degree of obsolescence of 
innovations has exhibited a strong downward trend over the 1964-1990 pe­
riod although they do question the reliability of their estimate at the end of 
their sample7. This support the notion that the constraint imposed by the 
amount of entrepreneurial slackness has become progressively more binding 
over time.
2.4.2 Changes in Fiscal Structure
As they merely redistribute resources across occupations, fiscal changes alter 
the private profitability of an occupation without affecting its social value. 
As a result, changes in the fiscal structure are the most obvious candidates 
to explain why the US economy ended up by suffering from a lack of entre­
preneurial skills.
In what follows we focus on two forms of fiscal intervention: subsidies to 
research, and more generally to education, and subsidies to firms. In order to 
isolate their relative impact we assume that any form of fiscal intervention is 
financed with lump-sum transfers to the whole population, independent of the 
occupation currently chosen. We model the effects of a subsidy to research, 
6r , by assuming that the actual flow cost of searching, x,  is thereby reduced
7If we had endogenised the obsolescence rates following along the lines of Mortensen 
and Pissarides (1994), 6 would reflect the value of the firm and thus the option of keeping 
it operating. At high levels of development the technological content of a firm increases, 
raising its value and thus reducing the willingness to liquidate.
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to x  ~  br- From the researcher’s point of view, a subsidy to research reduces 
the actual cost sustained today in the expectation of the future rewards that 
he gets after the implementation of inventions. We model the effects of a 
subsidy to firms, bf, by assuming that the actual flow of goods produced by 
the firm is equal to P  +  bf. A subsidy to a firm increases the return tha t 
agents get from running it. Fiscal changes do not change the technological 
frontier of the economy while they do modify the allocation of skills in the 
economy. Condition (FE) can then be rewritten as:
P6q(9)S + h = A(.1 T ^ ) # ) S ~ .X, +  fcr (FE)
r  +  v — g
where S  =  I  + E  — H  measures the private net surplus associated with the 
creation of a new firm and is equal to
P  + bf - h  
r + 6 + f3Qq(Q) -  g
Subsidies to research and subsidies to firms work in very different ways. 
An increase in the level of subsidies to research, br, reduces the cost of do­
ing research and increases the relative profitability of being a researcher as 
measured by the right hand side of equation (FE). This drives up the rela­
tive amount of resources, / ,  that society ends up allocating to research. An 
increase in the level of subsidies to firms, bf, increases the incentive to cre­
ate firms. These rewards are appropriated only after the match has taken 
place and thus they are split between the researcher and the entrepreneur 
with fractions 1 — (3 and (3 respectively. In the model, any increase in the 
total private surplus from innovating, 5, increases the relative profitability of
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research8 (see equation FE). As a change in the level of future rewards always 
tends to more severely affect the investment with the longer time horizon, 
an increase in the total private surplus from innovating , S, will always make 
research more profitable relative to entrepreneurship.
Figures 5 and 6 show how both subsidies to firms and subsidies to research 
and education, as proportion of GDP, have significantly increased over the 
post-war period in the US. According to our previous considerations, this 
should have made research more profitable relative to entrepreneurship de­
spite there having been no change in its underlying social value.
2.5 Early A ttem pts to  Test the Lack o f En­
trepreneurial Skills H ypothesis
In this section we use both time series and cross sectional variation in order 
to test implications of the lack of entrepreneurial skills hypothesis.
If we assume that the matching function is Cobb Douglas, that is
m(it ,s t) = A(it)a(sty ,  0 < a, (3 < 1, (2.11)
equation (DE) then suggests we run the following regression
ln(9t) = a  ln(/t Ct) +  (3 ln(sf) +  a  In(^) 4- ln(ln 7 ) +  In (A). (2.12)
We implement equation (2.12) for the US over the period 1950-1990. We 
follow Griliches (1979, 1990) in taking the total number of patent applica­
8Provided that the nature of research as an investment is preserved, that is — x  +  br 
remains lower than h.
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tions as an index of innovative activity in order to proxy for gt9, and Jones 
(1995b) in considering the ratio of scientists and engineers involved in R&D  
over the population if working age as a measure of relative research effort f t . 
As a proxy for the scale of the economy Ct in equation (2.12) we take the 
population if working age, while we follow Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and 
Evans and Leighton (1989) in using as a measure of the amount of entrepre­
neurship in the US economy the population of self-employed10. In order to 
control for cyclical disturbances we also consider a specification with the un­
employment rate as an independent variable11. Table 1 shows the estimates 
obtained by running the regression (2.12), allowing for different lags in the
9Whether a patent corresponds more to the notion of invention or innovation, is a 
topic beyond the scope of this chapter. The Patents Laws-United State Code, U.S.C. 
101, states that “ whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent”. The UK Patents Act 1977 states that the invention to be patented 
must be “capable of industrial application”. More generally Cornish (1989) states that “a 
patent cannot be granted for a thing or process which however interesting or suggestive 
it might be to  scientists, has no known practical application at the priority date”. The 
requisite of “industrial applicability” is not contained in the US law. It seems however, 
that the requisite of “usefulness” roughly coincides with that of “industrial applicability”, 
so that even if a patent still represents something between an invention and an innovation 
as defined in this chapter, it would seem to be closer to the latter.
10See footnote 4 for a discussion.
11A more formal and alternative justification for introducing the unemployment rate in 
running equation (2.12) derives from the direct substitution of the steady state value of the 
amount of entrepreneurial slackness, s, given by equation (2.9). After doing so equation 
(2.12) looks like
ln {9t) =  a  ln(/t Ct) +  0  ln(C( — f t Ct) +  0\n f — ln(—) +  ln(ln7 ) +  ln(A),\  z t + 0 t J  v
where In  ^Z(^ t  ^ measures the percentage of entrepreneurs currently searching and thus 
“unemployed”. This last interpretation, however, does not seem all that compelling as the 
coefficient in front of the unemployment rate turns out to have the wrong sign (negative 
rather than positive).
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Indep.
Variable 1 lags 2 lags 31ags 41ags 1 lags 2 lags 3 lags
Const. 1.21(.31)
0.98
(.31)
0.76
(.33)
0.39
(.36)
0.56
(2.21)
0.19
(.41)
0.05
(.49)
0.47
(.03)
0.49
(.03)
0.50
(.04)
0.52
(.04) O 
OI
 
rfs* 
O .53
(.04)
.54
(.04)
ln(st_i) 0.24(.10)
0.29
(.10)
0.37
(.10)
0.48
(.10) i-1 
CO
 
o 
o .37
(.09)
.46
(.10)
Unempl.
Rate -
- - - -.11(.05)
-.12
(.036)
 ^
o
 
1 
__
R 2 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.88
Wald Test 
(p-value) 
a  +  =  1
0.005 0.03 0.24 0.94 0.06 0.37 0.96
Table 2.1: R esu lts  from  ru n n in g  regression  (2.12). The regression was 
ran using OLS, the dependent variable being the number of patent applica­
tions. Similar results emerge when allowing for first order auto-correlation 
in the residuals and a non-scalar auto-covariance matrix. These last results 
are available upon request.
relation between research effort, entrepreneurship and innovation.
The model presented in the previous section has two important testable 
implications. The first is that the parameters a  and (3 must both be positive 
numbers strictly between zero and one. Table 1 shows this is actually the 
case. In fact both a  and (3 are positive and significantly different from zero 
with a  ranging between 0.47 and 0.54 while (3 ranges from a value of 0.24 to 
0.46. This implies that the relation between the number of innovations and 
research effort f t  Ct turns out to be concave and hump-shaped. The second 
testable implication is stronger and allows one to discriminate between the 
two competiting theories purporting to explain the alleged decreasing returns
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in R&D: the vanishing of investment opportunities and the lack of entrepre­
neurial skill hypothesis. The fact that the parameters a  and (3 are positive 
and significantly different from zero implies that this last one deserves some 
credit. It is however a more “plausible” one only if the matching function
(2.11) exhibits constant returns of scale, that is a  +  /3 = 1. In fact, if so, the 
economy exhibits scale effects and well-balanced increases in the amount of 
research effort and entrepreneurial skills have constant effects at the margin 
on the number of innovations introduced in the economy. If we consider rea­
sonable a lag of over two years before research effort shows up in a patent 
application, Table 1 shows how the hypothesis that the matching function
(2.11) exhibits constant returns to scale cannot be rejected even at a 10% 
level of significance. Moreover, in the specification with the unemployment 
rate as independent variable, this hypothesis cannot be rejected whatever 
the number of lags considered.
The main claim of this chapter is that in a world where the allocation be­
tween research and entrepreneurial activities takes place through the market, 
the rents from innovating are ex-post shared by researchers and entrepreneurs 
and there are externalities associated with innovation, there is no compelling 
reason why private incentives should coincide with social ones. This implies 
that the economy might end up by devoting too many resources to research 
while neglecting neglecting other important functions for sustaining growth 
and ultimately reaching a Pareto dominated equilibrium. If this is the case, 
the relation between relative research effort and growth is hump shaped. Fig­
ure 4 plots the average growth rate of the index of total factor productivity for 
the set of OECD countries considered by Coe and Helpman (1993) together
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with the ratio of the RSzD expenditure over GDP. The hypothesis of non 
monotonicity in the relation between growth and R&cD cannot be rejected 
according to cross-sectional evidence, with the US, the UK and Switzerland 
settled on the negatively sloped arm of the growth-R&D technological fron­
tier.
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter has shown how an increase in the amount of resources devoted 
to research does not necessarily increase the growth rate of the economy. In a 
world with rent sharing and inter-temporal spill-overs an increase in research 
effort can crowd out more socially useful entrepreneurial skills, reduce the 
growth rate and ultimately be Pareto worsening.
If this is the case, the observed increases in research effort have been 
excessive, raising a call for policy intervention. Indirect inference on the 
model, observed changes in the fiscal structure and more formal empirical 
investigation all seem to support the relevance of this hypothesis for the 
US. The Schumpeterian warning, that the “state of decay of the capitalist 
society” will ultimately be driven by the lack of entrepreneurial skills, might 
have some theoretical and empirical foundation. If and how relevant this 
notion might be in practice remains a question for further research and one 
that only more careful micro-based empirical investigation can solve.
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2.7 Appendixes
2.7.1 A ppendix A: Technical Appendix
In this Appendix we derive some technical results discussed in the text.
Properties of the THE Condition
Proposition 1: The (THE) condition defines tightness in the market (0) 
as a monotone increasing function of / ,  call it 0(f),  with the property that 
#(0) =  0 and 0(1) =  oo.
Proof: To prove monotonicity, we first note that the right hand side of 
condition ( THE) is an increasing function with respect to 0, with elasticity 
less than 1. We then we note that the right hand side is also a monotone 
strictly increasing function with respect to / .  The fact that the left hand side 
is a linear function proves monotonicity. The properties of the function 0(f )  
at the boundary follow from a direct analysis of condition (THE) together 
with the fact that the elasticity of the right hand side with respect to 0 is 
less than one.
Properties of the DE Condition
Proposition 2: The (DE) condition defines the growth rate of the economy 
g, as a concave function of / ,  call it d(f ) ,  with the property that d(0) =  
d( 1) =  0.
Proof: We first note that (2.9) together with proposition 1 define slackness 
in the market for entrepreneurial skills as a decreasing function of / ,  call it 
s(f).  This implies that the function d( f )  defined by (DE)  is equal to
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9 =  d( f )  = In'ym ( c ^ f \  s(f)^j .
It follows that the second derivative of d with respect to /  is equal to
=  I n j K C X f m n  + 2 C \ m n $'(f)] <  0,
In'yS
where rriij indicates the second derivative of m  (•, •) with respect to the i j th  
argument. The negativeness of the derivatives follow from the concavity of 
the matching function and the complementarity of each of its arguments, 
with 77I12 > 0. The properties of function d( f )  at the boundaries follow from 
condition (A l ) and proposition 1.
Properties of the FE Condition
Proposition 3: The (FE) condition defines the growth rate of the economy 
g as a monotone increasing function of / ,  call it e ( /) , with the properties 
that e(0) =  —oo and e(l) =  oo. Moreover, any point on the technological 
frontier defined by (DE) can be sustained as a competitive equilibrium of the 
economy.
Proof: The left hand side of condition (FE) defines a function strictly 
increasing in Q and equal to h(r +  6 — g) when 6 = 0. The right hand 
side of condition (FE) defines a function strictly decreasing in 6 which, if 
condition (AS) holds, approaches infinity when 6 goes to zero. This implies 
that a solution always exists. An increase in g causes a downward (upward) 
shift in the left (right) hand side so that the equilibrium level of tightness 
unequivocally increases. Together with proposition 1, this proves tha t e( f )  is
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strictly increasing in / .  The properties of the function d( f )  at the boundary 
follow from condition (A l ), proposition 1 and the fact that the right hand 
side goes to plus (minus) infinity when 6 goes to zero (infinity). To prove 
the last part of the proposition, we note how changes in P, h , x  an<  ^ P 
change, for a given level of g , the value of 0 implied by condition (FE) 
without altering condition (THE). This implies that, for given g, there does 
exist a combination of parameters such that any value of 9 is sustained as an 
equilibrium. Proposition 1 and the fact that these changes do not affect either 
( THE!) or (DE) imply that any combination of /  and g on the technological 
frontier defined by (DE) can be sustained as an equilibrium.
A fall in the Obsolescence Rate, 6, moves the Hump Leftward
The derivative of the growth rate defined by equation (DEJ) with respect 
to /  is equal to
dg( f )  =  m i ;  - m 2C 
d f  ^  1 +  77i26C In 7
where s( f )  defines the steady state value of slackness as defined by equa­
tion (2.9), while m,- defines the derivative of the matching function with 
respect to the zth argument. Noting that for given /  a fall in 8 reduces the 
steady state value of slackness s ( /) , that the matching function is concave, 
that m i2 is positive and finally that at the peak of the hump m i ^ - m ^ C  =  0, 
we see that a fall in 8 reduces the slope of the technological frontier at the 
value of /  corresponding to the previous peak. This proves the leftward 
movement of the hump.
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2.7.2 A ppendix B: D ata Appendix
Total Factor Productivity Growth data for the period 1970-1990 are taken 
from Coe and Helpman (1993).
The data for the real value of the expenditure in R h D  for the OECD 
countries for the period 1970-1990 are calculated using information in Coe 
and Helpman (1993).
Data on Patent Applications, self-employment, expenditures in educa­
tion, number of Scientists and Engineers involved in R h D ,  subsidies to firms, 
and on the labor force are taken from various issues of The Statistical Ab­
stract of the United States and from Historical Statistics of the United States: 
Colonial Times to 1970.
Data on the sources of funds of basic and applied research expenditure 
are taken from National Science Foundation/SRS “National Patterns of RSzD 
Resources, 1994” .
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Figure 2.1: Decreasing Returns in R&D: US (1950-1990). Source: see 
data appendix. Regressions: Growth over S&E in R&D =5.43E-05(5.469)- 
1.34E-06(-2.86)tt. Patent Application over S&E in R&D= 0.26577(28.07)- 
0.003728(-8.3532)tt. Notes: t-statistics in parentheses, Growth= 3 year mov­
ing average of the growth rate of real GDP per Worker, S&E in R&D= 
Scientists and Engineers involved in R&D, tt=time trend.
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Figure 2.2: Relative allocation of resources in the R&D sector: US (1950- 
1990). Source: see data appendix.
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Figure 2.3: Steady state equilibrium
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Figure 2.4: Lack of Entrepreneurial Skills (US 1950-1990). The dotted line 
shows the dynamics of the number of degrees conferred by institutions of 
higher education (Bachelor’s, Master’s, Doctor’s) as a ratio of the labor force. 
The bold line shows the dynamics of the number of self-employed over the 
labor force. Source: see data appendix.
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Figure 2.5: Subsidies to research (US 1953-1990). The dotted line shows the 
dynamics of the amount of basic and applied research expenditure funded by 
non profit institutions (Federal Government, Universities & Colleges, other 
nonprofits institutions) over GDP. The bold line shows the dynamics of the 
total amount of state and local government expenditures in education as a 
ratio of GDP. Source: see data appendix.
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Figure 2.6: Subsidies to Firms (US 1950-1990). Source: see data appendix.
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Figure 2.7: R&D and Growth: OECD Countries (1970-1990). Source: 
data appendix.
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Chapter 3 
(Fractional) B eta  Convergence
A bstract
Unit roots in output, an exponential 2% rate of convergence and no change 
in the underlying dynamics of output seem to be three stylized facts tha can not 
go together. This paper chapter the Solow-Swan growth model allowing for cross- 
sectional heterogeneity. In this framework, aggregate shocks might vanish at an 
hyperbolic rather than at an exponential rate. This implies that the level of out­
put can exhibit long memory and that standard tests fail to reject the null of a 
unit root despite mean reversion.Exploiting secular time series properties of GDP, 
we conclude that traditional approaches to test for uniform (conditional and un- 
conditional)convergence suit first step approximation. We show both theoretically 
and empirically how the uniform 2 % rate of convergence repeatedly found in the 
empirical literature is the outcome of an underlying parameter of fractional inte­
gration strictly between 0.5 and 1. This is consistent with both time series and 
cross-sectional evidence recently produced.
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3.1 Introduction
The debate on unit roots and stochastic trends has dominated macroecono­
metrics over the eighties. Since the seminal work of Nelson and Plosser 
(1982), this literature has noted how standard unit roots tests have failed to 
reject the null of a unit root in output per capita. The nineties has signed 
the revival of the empirics on growth and convergence. Conditional uniform 
convergence, namely Beta convergence, means that aggregate shocks are ab­
sorbed at an uniform exponential rate. Most of empirical studies conclude 
that outputs per capita of very different economies converge to their long 
run steady state values at a uniform exponential rate of 2% for year,( see for 
example Barro , 1991, Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1991, 1995, Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil 1992). These seem to be two of the most striking empirical regu­
larities in modern empirical macroeconomics. More recently, Jones (1995b), 
has observed that in line with the standard exogenous growth Solow model, 
the trend of output per capita for OECD economies is pretty smooth over 
time and does not exhibit any persistent changes in the post World War era.
These three stylized facts seem to be inconsistent. On the one hand a 
unit root in output implies that shocks are permanent so that output does 
not exhibit mean reversion. On the other hand Beta convergence, henceforth 
/^-convergence implies that output converges to its steady state level at a 
rate tha t even if very low it is positive and uniform across economies. The 
Jones invariance property implies that steady state output could well be 
represented by a smooth time dependent linear trend. If this is true, unit 
roots tests and /^-convergence are testing for the same hypothesis.
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This chapter starts from the observation that the “size of the unit root” 
component in GDP (the long-run effect of a unit shock) is usually found 
to be very low, (see Cochrane 1988, Cambell and Mankiw 1987, and Lippi 
and Reichlin 1991) and follows Quah (1995) in noting that cross-sectional 
and time series analysis can not get different conclusions. In agreement with 
Diebold and Rudebusch (1989), and Rudebusch (1993) we propose a different 
explanation. Perhaps the speed with which aggregate shocks are absorbed is 
so low that standard unit roots tests fail to reveal it1. This could actually be 
the case if GDP per capita exhibits long memory (Diebold and Rudebusch 
1991). If we consider the standard Solow-Swan model and we allow for 
cross sectional heterogeneity in the speed with which different units in the 
same countries adjust, we show tha t the dynamics of output can exhibit long 
memory. We can then test for both uniform conditional and unconditional 
convergence allowing for rate of convergence different from the exponential 
one. In this framework, we show how a 2% percent rate of convergence 
superimposed as exponential and estimated over a time span that ranges from 
a minimum of 20 years to a maximum of 100 years correspond to a parameter 
of fractional integration that ranges from 0.51 to 0.99. This process is not 
covariance stationary but still mean reverting, so tha t standard unit roots 
test are likely not to reject the null of non stationarity despite the fact that 
convergence takes place. Using GDP per capita data for OECD countries for 
the period 1885- 1994, we test for this hypothesis. We conclude, that it can 
not be rejected, so that convergence takes place at an hyperbolic very slow
1 Diebold and Senhadji (1996) that Rudebusch (1993) approach produces evidence that 
distinctly favors trend-stationarity using long spans of annual data.
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rate.
The contribution of this chapter is to put together two different strands 
of research. On the one hand, time series analysis has concluded that shocks 
tend to have permanent effect on the level of output. On the other hand the 
literature on growth and convergence has concluded that countries converge 
to their long run steady state value at an exponential rate that is very low and 
uniform across countries. In this chapter we note that the two literatures are 
inconsistent once we allow for the invariance property by Jones and we follow 
the standard exogenous growth Solow model in approximating the dynamics 
of long run GDP per capita with a linear trend. In line with Diebold and 
Senhadji (1996) we propose a theoretical solution and we test for it. We 
conclude tha t standard tests for convergence suit first step approximation 
despite the mispecification of the empirical model. In doing so we show that 
the parameters of fractional integration of different OECD countries, though 
of similar magnitude and smaller than one, are significantly different one 
from the other. This delivers a possible explanation of why time series tests 
of convergence based on cointegration reject the null of convergence even 
among OECD countries (see for example Quah 1992, Bernard and Durlauf 
1993 and Bernard and Durlauf 1996). As they are these tests are mispecified 
as different variables can be cointegrated only if they exhibit the same order 
of integration.
Section 1 reviews the Solow-Swan model. In this context we highlight 
further why the three stylized facts can not go together. Section2 briefly 
reviews the theory of long memory processes and shows how in a extension 
of the theoretical model, the path of adjustment of output can exhibit long
117
memory. In this context we show why standard unit roots can not reject the 
null of a unit root while a uniform 2% rate of convergence can be found to 
be statistically significant. In this framework we check for uniform (condi­
tional and unconditional) convergence. This is done in section 3. Section 4 
concludes.
3.2 Empirics of the Solow Growth M odel and 
Unit Roots
We begin by briefly reviewing the Solow growth model. We then focus on 
the time series properties of the reduced form of the model.
Solow Growth Model
Solow model takes the rates of saving and technological progress as exoge­
nous. There are two inputs, capital and labor. We assume a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, so production at time t is given by
Y (t)  =  K i ty iA M U t) ) 1- 01, 0 < a  < 1.
The notation is standard:!^ is output, K  capital, L  labor and A  the level 
of technology. A  is assumed to grow exogenously at rate g.
The model assumes that a constant fraction of output s is invested. Defin­
ing k and y  as respectively the stock of capital and output per effective unit 
of labor, k =  K /A L  and y = Y /A L , the evolution of k is governed by
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— P =  sk? ~ ( g  + 6)kt, (3.1)
where 6 is the depreciation rate. Equation (3.1) implies that kt converges 
towards a steady state level k* defined by
g + o
We can then consider a log-linear approximation of equation (3.1) around 
the steady state so that
d l^n^  = -P[ln{yt) -  ln(y*t )], (3.3)
with
P =  (1-<*)(£ +  <$),
where y* =  (k*)a. Discretizing equation (3.3) and indicating with yt the 
log of output per capita, viz. y  =  ln (Y /L )  and by yl the log of the level of 
output per capita in steady states we get
y t - y t - i  = g  + Pvl-i - P y t - i ,  0 < ( 3 < i ,  (3.4)
or equivalently
yt -  vt = (i -  P) b t- i  -  (3.5)
We now analyze the time series properties of both equations (3.4) and 
(3.5).
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Time Series Properties
Equation (3.4) is the basic equation used to test for /^-convergence (see 
for example Barro 1991, Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1991 and Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil 1992). /^-convergence applies if a poor economy tends to grow faster 
than a rich one. This arises if the coefficient (3 in equation (3.4) is found to 
be positive and significantly different from zero. If this is the case, aggregate 
shocks tha t have pushed the current level of output away from the steady 
state level will be absorbed at the exponential rate (3 so tha t the dynamics 
of output will exhibit mean reversion. The standard approach to test for 
this property consists of approximating g +  (3yl_1 with some control or envi­
ronmental variables like the investment rate, population growth, government 
expenditure and so on, then estimating the regression (3.4) and eventually 
testing for the significance of the coefficient (3. In practice, empirical studies 
repeatedly find a 2% coefficient, uniform across countries and significantly 
different from zero (Quah 1993) .
A test of unit root, like for example the Dickey Fuller’s test (Dickey 
1979), still uses an equation like (3.4) and tests for the coefficient (3 being 
significantly different from zero, where the term g - f  (3y%_i is substituted 
by a smooth time dependent function. A value for the coefficient f3 not 
significantly different from zero is interpreted as an hint of the presence of 
a unit root in the underlying data generating process. If this is the case 
a temporary shock has permanent effects on the level of output and the 
dynamics of output does not exhibit mean reversion towards the smooth
1 2 0
trend. Since the seminal work of Nelson and Plosser (1982) these tests have 
not been able to reject the null of a unit root in GDP per capita, even if their 
low power is well recognized (see for example Diebold and Rudebusch 1991, 
Rudebusch 1993 and Diebold and Senhadji 1996).
In general the existence of a unit root in output is not in contradiction 
with /^-convergence if we allow for the steady state level of output to be 
cointegrated with the current level of output. In this case aggregate shocks 
are still absorbed at an exponential rate despite the fact that output is inte­
grated, as implied by equation (3.5).
Jones (1995a, 1995b) has observed that the dynamics of aggregate out­
put has moved smoothly and independently of most of the controlled variable 
used for testing /3-convergence. This is in line with the standard exogenous 
growth Solow model where the level of long run GDP per capita, y*t , is rep­
resented by the linear trend, gt. If we take the data from Maddison (1995) 
for 16 OECD countries over the period 1885-1994 and we plot the dynamics 
of per capita GDP versus a common linear trend among all the countries in 
the sample, we note that this simple common trend fits long run per capita 
GDP extremely well. This is shown in Fig.l where we plotted each series 
together with a country specific linear trend and a common linear trend ob­
tained pooling together the series of all 16 OECD countries in our sample. 
The former has been estimated with OLS, the latter with GLS. Particular 
informative is the GLS estimate of the common trend. GLS estimating pro­
cedure implies that the better the fit of the specific trend the greater is the 
weight of this country in the determination of the common trend. In this 
case the US case outperforms by far all the other countries. This shows up
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in the final outcome, in fact the common GLS trend and the US OLS spe­
cific trend are almost undistinguishable (see Figure 3.1). Thus we can think 
of the US performance as representing the long run benchmark of all the 
other countries’ performances. Nelson and kang (1984) argue, however, that 
regressions of driftless integrated series against a time trend can result in 
the inappropriate inference that the trend is significant and that it is a good 
description of the data, as Durlauf and Phillips (1988) show. Instead Jones 
(1995a) notes how a time trend calculated using data only from 1880 to 1929 
forecasts extremely well the current level of GDP of the US economy. Follow­
ing Diebold and Senhadji (1996) this is clearly incompatible with difference 
stationarity in aggregate output, as new information seems to be irrelevant 
for forecasting on very long horizons.
This suggests that, in accordance with the standard exogenous growth 
Solow model where the level of long run GDP per capita, y is represented 
by the linear trend, g t, the dynamics of steady states output mimics a simple 
trend. As a deterministic function can not be cointegrated with a variable 
exhibiting stochastic trends, it turns out that /^-convergence and unit root 
tests are both checking for mean reversion towards a smooth time depen­
dent trend. In a time series formulation we can say that /^-convergence is 
testing for trend stationarity in output where the stationary disturbance is 
superimposed as an autoregressive process of order one 2. These simple con-
2The nature of the problem is just further complicated by the fact that growth theorists 
use panel data instead of just time series. Recent results (e.g. Levin and Lin 1992) show, 
however, that panel data just make dramatically increase the power of a unit root test as 
the cross sectional dimension increases.
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Figure 3.1: The dashed and bold lines represent the country-specific (OLS) 
and common (GLS) trend, respectively. The solid line represents logged 
GDP.
siderations imply that testing for /9-convergence is meaningless if we assume 
the Jones invariance property together with the existence of a unit root in 
output3. As they stand, these three stylized facts can not go together. Our 
claim is that the (two equivalent) tests are both checking for a superimposed 
rate of “exponential” mean reversion.
If the rate of mean-reversion in (logged) GDP per capita or equivalently 
the rate of absorption of the shocks is hyperbolic (in a sense to be defined 
precisely below) instead of exponential, /9-convergence would apply in the 
sense that poorer economy would grow faster and would converge towards 
their long rim steady state and standard unit-root tests would fail to reject a 
unit-root albeit not present (see for example Diebold and Rudebusch 1991).
3.3 Theory o f Long M emory and the Barro 
Regression
In this section we briefly review the theory of long memory processes which 
allows the possibility of “hyperbolic” mean reversion together with non- 
stationarity. We will then analyze why the Barro regression might be robust 
to rate of convergence different from the exponential one delivering the right 
answer to the problem of convergence.
3For example Den Haan (1995) notes that the slow speed of convergence observed in the 
data can be reconciled quantitatively with the neoclassical growth model assuming either 
a capital share equal to around 0.8 or a sufficient amount of persistence in the stochastic 
process driving technological progress. In either cases, the 2% rate of convergence is 
incompatible with aggregate output exhibiting a unit root (see his equation 3.4).
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3.3.1 Theory of Long M em ory Processes
Unit roots describe only a small set of nonstationary processes. A class 
that embeds either (covariance) stationary processes and unit roots is given 
by strongly dependent processes also known as long memory or long range 
dependent processes (see Robinson 1994 for a survey on the topic). Usually 
only the second moments properties are considered in order to characterize 
such a behaviour in terms of either the behaviour of the autocorrelation 
function at the long lags or the power spectrum at the zero frequency.
We shall assume that K  denotes any positive constant (not necessarily 
the same) and ~  asymptotic equivalence.
Definition 1
A real valued scalar discrete time process X t is said to exhibit long mem­
ory in terms of the power spectrum with parameter d > 0 if
/(A) -  KX-™ , as A —► 0+.
In the nonstationary case (d >  1/2, see below) /(A) is not integrable and 
thus it is defined as a pseudo-spectrum.
The importance of this class of processes derives from smoothly bridging 
the gap between standard stationary processes and unit roots in an environ­
ment that maintains a greater degree of continuity (Robinson 1994). For the 
purpose, let us consider a parametric example.
Let {yt} be a discrete time scalar time series , t =  1, 2 , . . . ,  suppose vt is
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an unobservable covariance stationary sequence with spectral density th a t is 
bounded and bounded away from zero at the origin, such that
(1 -  L)dyt = vu t = 1 ,2 ,. . .  (3.6)
where L is the lag operator. If d = 0, then yt is a standard or better weak 
memory (covariance) stationary process with spectral density bounded away 
from zero (i.e. an ARM A process), whereas yt is a random walk if d =  1. 
The parameter d however does not need to be an integer.
In what follows, we focus on the case in which yt is a long memory process 
with parameter d positive, real with 0 <  d < 1. In this case, when vt is 
assumed to be a white noise process, the process yt defined in ( 3.6 ) is called 
an ARFIMA(0,d,0) process and more in general when vt is an (inverted) 
ARMA(p,q) we obtain an ARFIMA(p,d,q) process.
The power spectrum of the yt process is given by
f y(A) = | 1 -  elA |~2d f v(A) =  (2sin (\/2 ))~2df v( \ ) , -7r <  A <  +7r ,
where f v(.) denotes the power spectrum of the vt process. Thus from sin(uj) /u  ~  
1 ,lj —> 0, when d > 0 as A —> 0+ we get
/ y ( A ) ~ 4 - d/«(0)A-“ .
Whenever d > 0 the power spectrum is unbounded at the zero frequency, 
implying that the series yt exhibits long memory. This class of processes have 
many important properties. When 0 < d < l / 2 ,  yt has both finite variance 
and exhibits mean reversion. When 1/2 < d < 1 the process has infinite
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variance but it still exhibits mean reversion. This process is not (covari­
ance) stationary but less “non stationary” than an unit root process so that 
standard unit root tests exhibits low power with respect to this alternative 
despite the presence of mean reversion (Diebold and Rudebusch 1991). When 
d >  1 the process has infinite variance and stops exhibiting mean reversion. 
In particular a unit root process is obtained when d = 1 . This represent a 
particular case of a long memory process: a process with an infinite memory.
If —1/2 <  d , (3.6) can be inverted so that
oo
Vt = '52'tivt-u  7i =  I I t= iM ± i ' * >  70 =  1- (3-7)
i=0
B y  use of Stirling’s approximation it follows that as i —> oo
7i ~  K id- ' . (3.8)
This can be interpreted such as the effect of a shock Vt-i , i periods ahead, 
vanishes at an hyperbolic rather than exponential rate exhibiting an high 
level of persistence, higher the bigger the parameter d. When d = 1, the unit 
root case arises where a shock arbitrarily far away in time exhibits permanent 
effects on the current level of yt.
This persistence property reflects the characterization already given in 
the frequency domain. We have seen tha t a long memory process for 0 <  d 
is defined by an unbounded spectrum at the origin. It is well accepted that 
the degree of persistence of a shock can be expressed by the “level” of the 
spectral density at zero frequency (Cochrane 1988) . The definition of long
memory and the previous considerations suggest to take as an exact measure
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of persistence the ’slope’ of the logged spectrum at the origin4. In fact, 
taking logs in both terms in Definition 1, we obtain as A —» 0+ the following 
representation
l n ( f ( \ ) ) ~ K  -  2 d ln (\), (3.9)
W ith respect to the scatterplot of the logged spectrum and 2Zn(A) ,the 
unit root case will be represented by a line with slope minus 7r/4 while the 
case d < 1 is represented by a flatter line. Obviously the bigger (in absolute 
value) the slope the greater the level of persistence. The idea expressed 
by (3.9) is at the core of the estimation procedure suggested by Geweke 
and Porter Hudak (1983) and formalized in Robinson (1995) that is briefly 
described in the Appendix 1 .
3.3.2 R obustness of the Barro regression
This section tries to rationalize the finding of a significant regression coeffi­
cient of /^-convergence in (3.4) .
At first let us consider some back of the envelope calculations. A 2% rate 
of convergence superimposed as exponential over a time span of 20-110 years 
is almost observational equivalent to a parameter of fractional integration 
strictly between 0.5 and 1. In fact, bearing in mind the result in (3.8) a 
parameter of fractional integration, d , that resembles the 2% exponential 
rate of decay after a k period ahead shock can be obtained solving the simple 
equation5
4This concepts is directly derived from a well known strand in the semi-nonparametric 
econometrics literature Robinson 1995, Geweke and Porter Hudak 1983).
5Of course this is just a very simple and approximate exercise yet useful in order to 
understand the main intuition of the paper.
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d r»j 2% exp. rate N. of Obs.
0.912 10
0.865 20
0.821 30
0.781 40
0.742 50
0.703 60
0.667 70
0.631 80
0.596 90
0.561 100
0.527 110
Table 3.1: Parameter of Fractional Integration Corresponding to the 2 % 
exponential rate
(0.98)* =  kd~x. (3.10)
In Table 1 below we report the solutions of this simple equation, for values 
of k that ranges from 10 to 110. As most of empirical studies have used 
sample that ranges from 20 to 100 years, we can consider an underlying 
parameter of fractional integration strictly between 0.5 and 1 as the driving 
force behind the 2% rate of convergence found in the empirical literature on 
/^-convergence.
Secondly, let us consider now the following theoretical result due to Sowell 
(1990), theorem 4. Regressing a variable on its lagged value , the Student 
t of the coefficient behaves discontinuously when the process generating the
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variable is an A R F IM A (0 ,d ,0 )  with d > 0. When d — 1 we obtain that the 
asymptotic distribution of the Student t normalized at the value one, is the 
well known Dickey Fuller distribution (Dickey 1979). But when d 1 one 
obtains very different results that is
f oo , 1 < d < 3/2 ,
p [ -o o  ,1 /2  <  d e l .
Let us now start to draw our conjecture.
If per capita GDP is well represented by a long memory process with 
parameter d with 1/2 <  d < 1, thus displaying infinite variance together with 
(what is important) mean-reversion, fitting the Barro regression would tend 
to give a significative negative Student t  (actually converging to negative
infinity in probability). Thus this simple inference gives exactly the same
conclusion of the aforementioned regression (3.4) obtained in the literature 
when fitting an exponential rate of convergence.
More, the back of the envelope calculations show that superimposing an 
exponential rate of decay over a long memory process with 1/2 <  d <  1 gives 
precisely the well established 2% rate of /^-convergence.
Finally, the property of long memory processes to nest the unit root case 
in a class that maintains a greater level of continuity rather than standard 
weak dependent processes motivates the empirical finding of systematically 
non significant unit root tests.
If our conjecture is right, we could say that the standard approach to test 
for /^-convergence (Barro 1991), suits first step approximation despite the 
mispecification of the empirical model. This test tends to exhibit negative 
Student t in the case of mean reversion (d < 1), leaving nonetheless some
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margins of ambiguity in a particular case of lack of convergence, the unit root 
case (d = 1). On the other hand the Student t will diverge to plus infinity 
when d > 1 delivering the right answer to the issue of convergence.
At this stage, our conjecture still lacks of two elements, a purely economic 
one and a conclusive statistical one. We will show a possible source of the 
long memory feature of the data in a version of the Solow model augmented 
by cross sectional heterogeneity. Secondly, there is the need of a rigorous 
time series analysis of the data to show that the logged per capita GDP is 
well represented by a mean-reverting long memory process with 1/2 < d <  1. 
This is done in section 6.
3.4 The Solow M odel Augm ented by Cross- 
sectional Heterogeneity
In this section we show how long memory could arise in the Solow growth 
model. Suppose that the economy is characterized by N units each behaving 
as in the standard Solow model outlined in section 2. That means tha t 
each of these units representing either different firms or sectors in the same 
economy are investing a fraction Sj of their output in the accumulation of 
capital 6. If this is the case the dynamics of output, y\ , of each of these firm-
6Theoretically this structure could arise either in a world with imperfect capital markets 
where human capital is used as a collateral or because of adjustment costs (see Barro and 
Sala-I-Martin 1995). We decided not to model directly these frictions here because of the 
space constraint. Even the assumption that each units is evolving as an autoregressive 
process of order one is a simplifying assumption that it is is not needed to get the result 
as it will become clear thereafter.
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sector, with steady state output y f , is governed by
y\ -  y t  = (i -  P i)\y \-\ -  yf-A  + 4 + %. * = i-N. ° < A < 1. (3.n)
where ej, r)t represent respectively idiosyncratic and aggregate shock assumed 
mutually uncorrelated white noise and f t is equal to (1 — cti)(gi +  Si). Here 
cti, gi and ft are respectively the unit’s specific productivity of capital, the 
rate of technological progress and the depreciation rate. It follows that the 
variable x\ =  y\ — yl'z behaves like a first-order autoregressive process.
If we indicate respectively with
1 N . 
yt = -7T 2 > J .
i = 1
1 N -* 1 **
2/t /  v Vt t
l y  1= 1
current and long run equilibrium aggregate output, we then have that the 
amount of disequilibrium in the economy evolves as
yt -  f t  = ' i-/N  SC1 _ A)\y\~i -  y't-i +  41 + y t . (3.12)
i=l
Let us define x t — Vt — Vt •
The above equation can behave very differently from equation (3.5) even 
if all the coefficients f t  are bounded between zero and one. We will show that 
under certain conditions on the cross sectional distribution of the coefficients 
f t, x t exhibits long memory. In fact if we assume that the aggregate r]t and 
idiosyncratic e\ shocks are uncorrelated, we get that the power spectrum 
fk (A) of x* is equal to
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_  var(4 ) var{nt)
M  '  2 tt | 1 -  (1  -  p  +  2 tt | 1 -  (1  -  f t ) e iA |2 ' 1 J
This implies that the power spectrum / (A) , —7r < A <  7r of the aggregate 
Xt is equal to
where
/(A )  =  / ,(A )  +  / a(A ), (3.14)
f m  =  i f  uar(e*)
W2 2tt | 1 -  (1 -  & )e iJ |2 ’
/ . W - = ^ I E  127tAT2 (1 -  (1 -  /?fc)eiA)
If we assume that the coefficients (3^  are independent drawings from a 
distribution F{(3) and that the uar(e^) are drawn from another distribution 
independent of the first, we follow Robinson (1978) and Granger (1980) to 
obtain
m » a |1HaJ,ii-(1- r f ',M< (315>
where B  denotes the support of the distribution F{(3) and ~  denotes that 
the relation holds approximately for N  big but finite.
In general long memory arises if the integral in (3.15)
/.( (3-17)
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diverges, where EF(.) denotes the expectation over the measure F(.) In fact 
the second integral in (3.16), viz. EF( 1//3), diverges under stronger condi­
tions which imply the divergence of the former integral in (3.15) but not 
viceversa as we will make clear in the sequel.
We can establish necessary and sufficient conditions on the distribution 
function F(.) such that the integral (3.17) is unbounded. In general we know 
(e.g. in Rudin 1973) that the integral h(t)dt for a continuous function 
h (x ) on an interval [a, 6) is unbounded, if h(.) has at least the same order of 
infinity as 1/(6 — x )a when x goes to b, that is
1/(6 — x )a =  0(/i(x)), x ^ b ~ .
If we assume that the distribution function F(/3) is absolutely continuous 
having a density /(/?), the integrand function of (3.17) is given by f (P ) /P 2. 
Thus a sufficient condition for Xt to exhibit long memory is simply given by
m  >  m  as /? —► o+,
for some positive constant K . Thus the density /(/?) might go to zero as
(3 —*■ 0 but at slower rate than (3 7.
The main implication is that the aggregate process might display long
memory even if the aggregating elements are stationary with probability one.
Also the result is valid even if the aggregating elements are ARMA processes.
In this case the condition to be satisfied is that the probability of extracting
7Instead for the integral in (3.16) to diverge we need the stronger condition f(j3) >  K  
, as (3 —> 0 which clearly implies the former one. Moreover, the presence of the N  and 
N 2 terms in (3.15) and (3.16) does not affect the result as we assume that the above 
arguments hold for a big but finite N.
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a unit root in the autoregressive component dies slowly enough. Moreover it 
is im portant to stress that the result does not depend from either the nature 
of the idiosyncratic and common shocks given their stationarity or from the 
type of dependence among them. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) argue 
that the slow speed of convergence observed empirically can be reconciled 
quantitatively with the the neoclassical growth model if the capital share is 
sufficiently high and around 0.8. This result, on the other hand, delivers 
a different rational for the low rate of convergence found in the empirics of 
the Solow growth model based on aggregation of cross-sectional heterogenous 
units 8.
Intuitively, long-range dependence means that shocks arbitrarily far away 
in time still exhibit some influence on the future dynamics of the process. 
Cross-sectional aggregation kills the Markovian property implicit in standard 
weak memory (covariance) stationary processes provided that there are some 
units with a sufficiently amount of persistence. In this case, to keep track 
of the future dynamics of the aggregate system we must recover the past 
history of the units of the system if we want to know the relative distribution 
of disequilibria in the economy.
8As an example we can consider Granger (1980) formulation where the coefficients 
fa  are drawn (independently both of the idiosyncratic shocks, e{, and common shocks, 
r]t) from a Beta(p,q) distribution. Thus we get that the integrand function (neglecting 
unimportant constant terms) is given by
( l - p y - ' p - i
02
thus yielding the condition q <  2 which coincides with what Granger (1980) obtained 
by expanding the integral in terms of autocovariances. In fact in this case the aggregate 
process can be shown to display long memory with parameter d, =  1 — q/2  .
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3.5 Generalizing the concept o f B eta conver­
gence
In this version of the Solow model augmented by cross-sectional heterogene­
ity, it seems reasonable to propose the following definitions of (3-convergence:
(i) An economy has no tendency to converge towards either its own or the 
common steady state if, after fitting either a country specific or a common 
(linear) trend repectively, the parameter of fractional integration d of the 
residuals is greater or equal than one (d >  1). In the former case we say 
that there is no conditional convergence and that there is no unconditional 
convergence in the latter.
(ii) The case of the Solow model without cross sectional aggregation is rep­
resented by the absence of long memory that is d equal to zero. In this case, 
if we want to recover the rate of convergence of the economy, we must solve 
for the roots of the characteristic equation and look for the greatest solution 
in absolute value.
(iii) Uniform unconditional convergence means that if we fit a common (lin­
ear) trend across all the units in the sample, then the residuals exhibit similar 
parameter of fractional integration d.
(iv) Uniform conditional convergence means that if we fit a country specific 
(linear) trend for all the units in the sample, then the residuals exhibit sim­
ilar parameter of fractional integration d.
We consider further evidence of the exponential 2% rate of convergence, if 
we find a parameter of fractional integration strictly between 0.5 and 1 (c.f. 
see section 3.).
136
In order to make inference on the parameters of long memory of the series 
we employ the semiparametric approach introduced by Geweke and Porter 
Hudak (1983) . Rigorous analysis of this estimator is given in Robinson 
(1995) who established consistency and asymptotic normality of the estima­
tor. Also the result has been developed in a multivariate framework , a novel 
feature in this literature, which represents a crucial property in order to ap­
ply this estimator to a multicountries issue as the question of convergence. 
Robinson (1995) results are valid without assuming any a priori restriction 
on the degree of dependence in the data allowing for either antipersistence 
(—1/2 < d < 0), weak (d =  0) or long memory (0 <  d < 1/2), the only 
restriction on the parameter space being finite variance, viz. | d |<  1/2. We 
defer to Robinson (1995) for the formal proofs of the results, describing the 
main features in Appendix 1.
3.6 Empirical Results
At first, to motivate our conjecture that the per capita GDP is characterized 
by a dynamics that is well approximated by a long memory process let us 
consider Figures 3.2 and 3.3. Interpreting the result according to Definition 
jf, Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show how the periodogram (i.e. an estimate of the 
spectrum) for each of the series in our sample displays a peak at the origin. 
This is what Granger (1966) defines to be the “typical spectral shape of an 
economic variable” and it is the main feature of a long memory process 9 .
9For an analysis of the behaviour of the periodogram for non stationary processes see 
Hurvich and Ray (1994).
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Figure 3.2: The left hand side column displays the periodogram of the logged 
GDP (1865-1994) for the 16 OECD ccitStries here considered. The right hand 
side column displays three lines versus the logged frequency: the continuous 
line represents the logged periodogram ordinates, the bold line represents the 
OLS interpolating line (cf. Table 3.2) while the dashed line represents the 
unit root case (slope 7r/4). An interpolating line flatter than the bysector 
corresponds to a value of the long memory parameter d smaller than one.
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Figure 3.3: It continues previous figure.
Country Conditional Unconditional
Belgium 0.52 0.55
Denmark 0.84 0.55
Finland 0.99 0.98
France 0.56 0.94
Germany 0.83 0.83
Italy 0.56 0.65
Netherlands 1.11 1.26
Norway 0.81 0.82
Sweden 0.58 1.30
Switzerland 1.03 0.84
U.K. 0.58 0,58
Australia 0.69 0.75
New Zealand 0.85 0.85
Canada 0.97 0.96
U.S.A. 0.57 0.46
Japan 0.61 0.92
Asymptotic S.E. 0.177 0.177
Wald test statistic 1.24e+16 (0.0) 1.62e+16 (0.0)
Table 3.2: Log-Periodogram Estimates of d , (OECD, 1885-1994).
The estimation procedure is described in the Appendix. The Wald 
test statistic is distributed as a x 2 with 15 degrees of freedom under 
the hypothesis H q : d\ =  d2 = ... =  d\&. P —values are reported in 
parenthesis.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 plot the logged periodogram against twice the logged 
frequency. As shown in section 3, the slope of the interpolating line expresses 
approximately the parameter d. The unit root case is represented by the line 
with slope minus 7r/4. It is evident how the interpolating line is always 
flatter than the bisector thus supporting the absence of the unit root case. 
Nevertheless the slope appears still positive and in particular between 1/2 
and 1 .
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Table 3.2 reports the estimates based on the log-periodogram estimator 
10. Most of the parameters of fractional in teg ra tio n 's , are less than one 
even if with a very high standard error. As we are interested in the OECD 
countries as a group, we use an induced test based on the sequential Bonfer- 
roni approach11. We want to test for the existence of a number do strictly 
less than one, such that all the parameter of fractional integration of the 
OECD countries in the sample are less or equal than do- For an overall level 
of significance of 10 percent, we examine the country with the highest ex 
post probability of rejecting the null hypothesis and set the significance level 
using the total number of countries examined.
The results of this procedure are reported in Figure 3.4. The horizontal 
line represents the 10 percent critical value of the t-statistics such that the 
null hypothesis is rejected. The x-axis represents the coefficient do consid­
ered under the null. The negatively sloped line shows the actual t-statistics 
calculated for different null hypotheses. Figure 3.4 shows that it exists a non 
empty set of values of do, strictly less than one, such that the null hypothesis 
that the parameter of fractional integration of all the OECD countries are 
less than do can not be rejected at the 10 percent significant level. We also 
note how this set always lays above the value 1/2.
10Diebold and Rudebusch (1989) has used a similar estimator, valid in a univariate case 
only (Geweke and Porter Hudak 1983. The multivariate framework, the gains in efficiency 
and computability of the Robinson (1995) estimator motivates our choice of using the latter 
instead of the former thus explaining the difference in the estimates of the parameter d 
for the US case obtained by Diebold and Rudebusch (1989). The appendix reviews the 
main features of the estimating procedure.
11 This procedure yields a conservative yet consistent test (Gourieroux and Monfort, 
1989, Property 19.7). The exact test for one-side multivariate hypothesis (Gourieroux 
and Monfort, 1989, Chapter 21) is not implementable when the number of constraints is 
greater than two.
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The empirical results can be summarized as follows:
•  GDP per capita of all the countries in the sample exhibit long memory 
(d > 0). In our framework this suggests that the economy behaves as 
an aggregation of Solow models rather than as a Solow model itself.
•  The hypothesis that all the OECD countries are non stationary still 
mean reverting (0.5 < d < 1) can not be rejected using the induced 
test based on the Bonferroni procedure (Figure 3.4).
•  We found the 2% rate of convergence in the form of a parameter of 
fractional integration strictly between 0.5 and 1.
• The rates of convergence are very low and similar across countries even 
if the rate of convergence is not uniform  as the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients of fractional integration are constant across countries is 
strongly rejected (see Table 3.2) .
•  As the order of integration of different OECD countries are different, 
time series tests of convergence based on cointegration are mispecified.
• We conclude that there is unconditional convergence across OECD 
countries and the rates of convergence are pretty similar even if the 
test reject the null of exact equality of the coefficients.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we embed standard approaches to test for /^-convergence in 
a more general framework. In order to do so we join different strands of
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literature, the aggregation theory of dynamic economic models, the theory 
of long memory processes and the literature on the empirics of growth.
We give striking evidence that the (de-trended) per capita GDP is well 
approximated at the low frequencies by a long memory process displaying 
nonstationarity together with mean reversion, stressing the importance of 
capturing in the very long the true rate of convergence. We then find prim­
itive conditions under which long memory arises naturally as the result of 
aggregating heterogeneous units in the same economy and we then apply 
it to  an extension of the Solow-Swan model augmented by cross-sectional 
heterogeneity.
Finally we draw robust inference on the possibility of conditional and 
unconditional /^-convergence among the OECD countries and as a result we 
support the conclusion of the well established Barro type of regression and 
we reconcile both time series and cross sectional evidence.
Some questions still remain open. In particular, we stress how the de­
gree of persistence differs among OECD countries. This drives the question 
of whether the underlying economic structure of OECD countries are differ­
ent and asks for a further investigation of what country specific economic 
mechanism make long memory to arise in real world.
3.8 Appendix 1. The logperiodogram esti­
mator
Following Robinson (1995), let us suppose th a t the time series under study 
is given by the G dimensional real valued vector Zt =  . . . ,  Z gj) '  • The
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(g,h)th element of the spectral density matrix /(A) is denoted by f gh(A) . 
For (Cg,dg) ,0  =  1, ...,G  satisfying 0 < Cg < oo and | dg \< 1/2 it is assumed 
th a t12
f 99W  ~  Cg\~2d° as A —► 0+ .
This represent the only assumption on the shape of the spectrum which 
motivates the semiparametric nature of the estimator of the G+G  parameters 
(Cg,dg) g =  1, . . . ,  G beside integrability to ensure stationarity.
The periodogram13 for the g-th component Zgt , t  — 1 , . . .  , N , N  being 
the sample size, is denoted by
/,(A) = 1 §  ^  I' - S =  1, • • • .G • (3.18)
Defining the fourier frequency Aj  =  ^  one has to define the log-periodogram
Ygk =  ln(Ig(A*)) ,g  = l , . . . , G , k  = l + l , . . . , m .  (3.19)
The positive integer m  is the user-chosen bandwidth number and the positive 
integer Zis the user-chosen trimming number14. In this context there is just 
the need to say that the asymptotic results require that m  and I both tend 
to infinity with N  but more slowly together with l /m  —» 0. Then defining 
the unobservable random variables Ugk by the following set of regressions
Ygk = cg - d g{2ln\k) + Ugkg = , k =  I +  1, . . .  ,m. (3.20)
12Basically as in Definition 1 for each component Z g t  .
13Practically one will consider the periodogram at the fourier frequencies only thus 
making irrelevant to demean the series by the sample mean.
14We refer to Robinson (1995) for a thorough discussion on the concepts and the roles 
played in the asymptotic theory by these two user-chosen numbers.
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where cg =  lnC g +  ^ ( 1) which involves the digamma function 'ip(z) =  
(id/dz)lriT(z) , with T(.) being the gamma function.
Then the OLS estimates of c =  (c1?. . . ,  Cq)' and d =  (di , . . .  ,dcY  are 
given by c,d
= veciY'XiX'X)-1) ,
y  <tef , y  y  y  y  de f  , y  y  y
A — lA /+l» • • • j A mJ , -r — - • i * G )  i
X* = ' (1, - 2 l i i \ k)‘ , Yk = (Yg,1 + 1 Yg,my . 
Denoting as usual the OLS residuals as
Uk =  Yk ~  c +  d(2ln\ k) , fc =  Z +  1 , . . . ,  m , 
and the matrix of sample variances and covariances
1 m
f t  =  —m  — I . ,i=i
(3.21)
(3.22)
one gets that the OLS standard errors for dg , g =  1, . . . ,  G are given by the 
square root of the (G +  g)th diagonal element of the matrix (Z1 Z )~ l (8)
This estimating procedure allows for cross equations restrictions such as 
that all (or some of) the G series are characterized by a common parameter 
of long memory that is
or in matrix formulation
d =  Q8,
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where Q = (1, 1, . . . ,  1)' is a. G x  1 vector and 6 is a scalar representing the 
unknown common long memory parameter. Thus the GLS estimator c and 
d is given by
c f ' I g  o 's “ 1 0 Q'
I g  0
r
I g 0 '
0 Q ) 0 Q f .
v e c ^ - ' Y ' X ) .
When there are no restriction we set Q =  I q and we obtain again the OLS 
estimator15.
Under certain regularity conditions (Robinson 1995) among which Gaus- 
sianity of the process Zt the following asymptotic results are obtained, which 
allows to perform standard inference on the OLS and GLS estimators. For 
the OLS Robinson established
m1/ 2 / r
c)
2m 1/2 (d — d) N  0,
1 - 1
- 1  1 (3.23)
and for the GLS
& r c)
2m 1/2 (d — d)
, r ( 1 - 11 N  f 0, - 1  1 0Q(Q'fi-1Q)~1Q' (3.24)
One obtains a consistent estimate of £1 by using ( 3.22 ) . Considering each 
dg individually the general result in ( 3.23 ) becomes
2m 1/2(dg -  dg) ->d N (0, ^ - ) .
The results allow us to make use of all the regression theory. In particular 
one can build a Wald test for linear restriction expressed by
Hq : Pd = 0 ,
15 Also to obtain a consistent estimate of Cg g =  1, . . . ,  G  one has to consider the relation 
Cg =  exp(cg -  4>( 1)) .
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where P  is a H  x G matrix of rank H  < G. The test statistic is given by
d'F-KO.P) { (X 'X ) - 1 ® n }  (  p  (3.25)
that under Hq is asymptotically distributed like a central x 2 with H  degrees 
of freedom.
E stim ating Procedure.
Firstly we detrend the data fitting either a country specific or a common 
trend. The former has been estimated with OLS, the latter with GLS. We 
then evaluate the order of integration of the residuals16. A preliminary analy­
sis of the parameters dg ,g  =  1, . . . ,  G gives estimated values greater than 1/2 
thus out of the admissible region for the asymptotic results to be valid. If we 
first differenced the data the estimates would be totally independent on the 
type of /^-convergence we are considering (conditional and unconditional). In 
fact the periodogram evaluated at the Fourier frequencies is independent of 
any shift of location. For this reason we prefer to  difference fractionally the 
data before estimating, by multipying them by (1 — L)q ,q = 0.5. Obviously 
in doing so we have to approximate a series with finite sum. Our choice of 
q =  0.5 reflects the trade- off between differentiating “enough” (big q) to
16It is a reasonable question to ask if the properties of the theoretical disturbances carries 
over to the ones of the residuals after detrending the data with either the country specific 
or the common trend (see i.e. Nelson and Kang 1981). There are good reasons to believe 
that it does once a semi-parametric frequency domain approach is undertaken. Nelson 
and Kang (1981) shows that the regression of a driftless random walk against a time trend 
delivers residuals exhibiting a periodogram with a single peak at a period equal to 0.83 
of sample size thus asymptotically at frequency zero, as one would expect. In words, the 
memory of the process is entirely reflected in the residuals.
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obtain estimates in the stationary region and minimizing the approximation 
from using a sum instead of a series (small q) 17. To initialize the fractional 
filter (1 — L)q we use the first 10 observations in the sample.
Choice of Trimming and Bandwidth.
In our application we choose a trimming coefficient equal to two, I = 
2, so that we avoid the first periodogram ordinate (see also footnote 20). 
Unfortunately a complete theory for the optimal choice of the trimming and 
the bandwidth is still missing for this estimator but it seems that choosing a 
trimming bigger than one increases the performance of this estimator in finite 
samples (Hurvich and Ray 1994). Because of this reason we report estimates 
based on the the same criterium as the one used by Diebold and Rudebusch 
(1989) for their univariate analysis, that is m  = T0-525 after checking for 
robustness under alternative bandwidths 18. It is nevertheless important to 
point out that the empirical results are very robust to changes in the the 
choice of the trimming and the bandwidth.
17Even if not formally proved, we follow the empirical literature of long memory 
processes conjecturing that asymptotically this approximation becomes negligible. Also 
the results are globally robust with respect to the choice of q.
18The results are available under requests. We defer to  Beran (1994) for a review on 
parametric and semi non-parametric estimation in a long memory framework.
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Figure 3.4: The test statistic for the null Ho : di < do, i = 1,..., 16 is plotted 
for different values of do- The horizontal line represents the critical value for 
a 10% significance level.
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Chapter 4
The M acroeconom etrics of 
Cross-Sectional H eterogeneity
A bstract
Detrended aggregate time series display a very high degree of persistence. In 
the frequency domain this shows up as a typical spectral shape. Empirical work 
has also shown that at the firm level there is a large amount of heterogeneity. 
This chapter claims that the two facts are closely related: cross-sectional hetero­
geneity is a transmission mechanism of economic shocks and has some distinctive 
properties. I analyse a vintage model where all the uncertainty is driven by either 
productivity or demand factors and it takes the form of an aggregate shock that 
causes reallocations of firms across technological states. As aggregate shocks cre­
ate persistence without affecting either the number of firms in the market or the 
rate of technological progress, this degree of persistence can be attributed to cross- 
sectional heterogeneity. The chapter shows that this transmission mechanism is 
powerful, realistic, robust and general. It is powerful because a sufficient amount 
of cross-sectional heterogeneity is able to generate typical spectral shapes without
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necessarily relying on technological shocks. It is realistic because it is shown how 
two of the most striking empirical regularities in economics, the typical spectral 
shape and Gibrat’s law, might be just two faces of the same coin. It is robust 
because it is able to generate almost any kind of spectral shapes provided that 
aggregate shocks cleanse the economy reallocating between very low and very high 
technological states. It is general because the chapter provides a micro-foundation 
for the fractional cointegration of aggregate economic variables illustrating why a 
typical spectral shape might be such a common phenomenon.
4.1 Introduction
A well documented fact in detrended aggregate time series is persistence. 
This shows up, for example, in the typical spectral shape illustrated by 
Granger (1966). Empirical work has also shown that at the firm level there 
is a large amount of heterogeneity, even within narrowly defined sectors (see 
for example Dunne et al. 1989, Davis and Haltinwanger 1990, 1992). This 
chapter claims that the two facts are closely related. The heterogeneity that 
we observe at the micro level has macroeconomic implications and delivers a 
convincing explanation of aggregate persistence. Cross-sectional heterogene­
ity is a transmission mechanism of economic shocks and has some distinctive 
properties.
We consider a version of the Solow (1960) vintage model. To capture the 
productivity benefits of technical change, older capital vintages must be re­
placed with the most recent equipment. At each point in time, a firm weighs 
the benefits of switching to a better technology, with the the opportunity
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cost (in terms of forgone profits) of investing part of their capital or labour 
resources in technological improvements. These costs may vary across firms 
and thus firms adopting the same vintage can end up using different technolo­
gies. This is now a popular and plausible way of modelling the heterogeneity 
of an economic system (see e.g. Baily et al. 1992, Caballero and Hammour 
1994,1996, Aghion and Howitt 1994, Mortensen and Pissarides 1995, chapter 
one). In our model, aggregate shocks alter the opportunity cost of all firms in 
a similar way and cause a reallocation of firms across technological vintages. 
The shocks do not affect either the number of firms in the market or the 
rate of technological progress. Therefore any persistence can be attributed 
to cross-sectional heterogeneity.
Our purpose in introducing the model is to try to match a well known 
empirical regularity. Granger (1966) observed that most detrended macro- 
economic variables exhibit a typical spectral shape. Estimated spectra look 
like a monotone decreasing function from low to high frequencies with a 
pronounced peak in the neighbourhood of the zero frequency. Frequency do­
main analysis decomposes the dynamics of a time series into different periodic 
components whose weights are given by the spectrum at the corresponding 
frequency. Thus, the typical spectral shape identified by Granger implies 
that the weight of the components with very long periods is disproportion­
ately large, that is detrended aggregate time series display a very high degree 
of persistence.
The typical spectral shape might be the outcome of a process differ­
ent from standard ARIMA processes. Formal empirical investigation (see 
Diebold and Rudebusch 1989, chapter three and Gil-Alana and Robinson
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1997) has concluded that it is the result of long memory processes (see e.g. 
Robinson 1994) in which the impact of shocks vanishes at a very slow hyper­
bolic rate.
The search for economic mechanisms in which shocks vanish at a very slow 
hyperbolic rate turns out to be a formidable task. In general, the economic 
theory generates dynamics in which shocks either have permanent effects or 
vanish at the usual exponential rate1. The first case corresponds to a unit 
root in the underlying time series, the second one to an ARM A process whose 
spectrum is completely flat around zero frequency and thus does not exhibit 
a typical shape. There is a need to find economic transmission mechanisms 
that generate long memory processes, yielding spectral shapes similar to 
the ones observed in the real world. In particular this chapter finds robust 
transmission mechanisms: small alterations to the basic set-up do not shift 
the spectral shape of the time series from the very particular slope associated 
with the unit root case to the flat one corresponding to the ARMA case.
Cross-sectional heterogeneity provides such a mechanism. It is also pow­
erful, realistic and general. It is powerful because a sufficient amount of 
cross-sectional heterogeneity is able to generate typical spectral shapes with­
out relying on technological shocks. The Real Business Cycle tradition has 
argued that technology is the driving force behind the existence of the typi­
cal spectral shape, especially the particular case associated with a unit root,
xThe Real Business Cycle tradition has often argued that technology is the driving force 
behind the existence of a typical spectral shape (Nelson and Plosser 1982, Rotemberg and 
Woodford 1996, Gali 1996). Alternatively models with strategic interaction and spillovers 
have shown their potential to generate multiple equilibria (see e.g. Cooper and John 
1988). If so, aggregate shocks that shift the economy from one equilibrium to the other 
can explain persistence in aggregate fluctuations (see Durlauf 1991).
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(see e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford 1996, Gali 1996). As a consequence, tech­
nology has been inferred to be a major contributor to variation in observed 
output2. In fact, the aggregate shocks analysed in this chapter, just alter the 
opportunity cost of firms and so they can be read as either productivity or 
demand shocks.
In the chapter we identify small (big) firms as the ones adopting vintages 
far-away from (close to) the technological frontier. In general to link pro­
ductivity to size we need some assumptions on the dynamics of factor prices. 
If factor prices grow at the same rate as the technology frontier, a produc­
tivity ranking in terms of vintages corresponds exactly to a one in terms of 
size3. If so, cross-sectional heterogeneity is a realistic transmission mecha­
nism because the assumptions required to generate typical spectral shapes 
match the findings of the growth-firm size empirical literature. For example, 
G ibrat’s law claims that the expected growth rate of firms is independent of 
their sizes, measured by sales, employment, or assets (see e.g. Gibrat 1931 
and Sutton 1996). According to our identification scheme, it means tha t 
the expected growth rate of firms is independent of the vintage currently 
in use. Therefore, an aggregate shock that reallocates units across different 
vintages, generates a permanent effect on the aggregate level of output, tha t 
is a unit root4. Recent studies show however, that small firms tend to have
2See Nelson and Plosser (1982). Lippi and Reichlin (1992) and Quah (1992), however, 
argue against this last inference.
3For example, Baily et al. (1992) and Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1994) find that em­
ployment size and productivity are positively correlated.
4This idea was implicitly contained in Kalecki (1945) as he claimed that “the [standard] 
argument [on which Gibrat’s law is based] implies that as time goes by the standard 
deviation of the logarithm of the variate considered increases continuosly”. It is well 
known that a distinctive feature of a random walk (a particular typical spectral shape) is
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higher and more variable growth rates (see Mansfield 1962, Hall 1987, Evans 
1987 and Dunne et al. 1989). We embed this evidence in the model and we 
assume that firms adopting vintages far-away from the technological frontier 
grows at similar rate but faster than firms adopting vintages close to it. If 
so, aggregate output exhibits a degree of persistence similar to that observed 
in the time series of the US aggregate GDP, that is a degree of long memory 
bigger than the one associated with the ARMA case but smaller than the 
unit root case.
In this respect cross-sectional heterogeneity generates robust spectral shape: 
small alterations to the basic set-up does not shift the spectral shape of the 
time series from the very particular slope associated with a unit root to the 
flat one corresponding to the ARMA case. It is also robust in another respect. 
The model can even generate long memory in the growth rate, even if the 
shocks affect neither the number of firms in the market nor the rate of techno­
logical progress. To generate this we posit two further assumptions. Firstly, 
we assume that the persistence a t the top of the technological distribution is 
so big 5 that the steady state distribution is characterized by each firm stay­
ing with probability one at the top of the technological frontier. Secondly, we 
assume that aggregate shocks cleanse the economy reallocating units from 
very low to very high technological states (cleansing type reallocations)6.
Finally, the chapter highlights why a typical spectral shape might be
that its variance is a linear function of time.
5See Baily et al. (1992) and Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1994) for evidence in this 
direction.
6See e.g. Davis and Haltinwanger (1990, 1992) and Gali and Hammour (1991) for 
empirical evidence in this direction.
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such a general phenomenon. Firms are the minimal working cells of an ag­
gregate economy where most economic decisions are taken. Then, it is not 
difficult to see why aggregates should be cointegrated and the chapter give 
a micro-foundation for the fractional cointegration of aggregate economic 
variables. It also shows why the residuals of the cointegrating relation can 
exhibit themselves arbitrary high level of persistence7. The decision of each 
firm is affected by some specific features of the cross-sectional distribution of 
vintages currently in use. Therefore the relation between aggregate macro- 
economic variables turns out to be quite complex and linear regressions can 
clear only a portion of the aggregate amount of persistence in the time series.
The main contribution of the chapter can be conveniently summarized as 
follows. There are two independent strands of the literature. One has dealt 
explicitly with cross-sectional heterogeneity in order to micro-found macro­
economics solving explicit aggregation problems. The other has analysed 
firms dynamics, in particular the relation between growth and firms’size. 
This chapter notes that the two independent strands of research have im­
portant implications on the low frequency behaviour of aggregate time series 
once a standard vintage model is used to interpret them. Surprisingly, the 
implications of the model matches quite closely with the empirical evidence. 
Moreover, models which do not deal explicitly with cross-sectional hetero­
geneity seem unlikely to provide a robust explanation of aggregate persis­
tence. Thus, the chapter concludes that cross-sectional heterogeneity is an 
important transmission mechanism with some distinctive properties.
The remainder of the chapter is divided into 7 sections. Section 2 reviews
7For evidence in this direction see Robinson and Marinucci (1997).
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the meaning and the empirical evidence in favour of the typical spectral 
shape. Section 3 lays down the structure of a stylized vintage model where 
both the rate of technological progress and the size of the market are exoge­
nous. It then analyses the effects of introducing aggregate uncertainty in the 
basic set-up. In doing so it generalizes results stemming from the pioneering 
works by Bertola and Caballero (1990, 1994), Caballero and Hengel (1990) 
and Caballero (1992) aimed at micro-founding macroeconomics solving ex­
plicit aggregation problems. Section 4 analyses the dynamics of the aggregate 
time series under the assumption that each unit will visit infinitely often all 
states in the system (irreducible case). Section 5 follows the empirical evi­
dence contained in Baily et al. (1992) and Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1994) 
to assume that the persistence at the top of the technological distribution is 
so big that each firm will end up by staying with probability one at the top 
of the technological frontier (reducible case). In this context we prove that 
cleansing type reallocations can generate almost any kind of spectral shapes. 
Section 6 establishes the micro-foundations for the fractional cointegration 
of aggregate economic variables. Section 7 concludes while section 8 contains 
the derivation of most of the results contained in the chapter.
4.2 General typical spectral shapes: empiri­
cal evidence and meaning
This section reviews first the foundations of the frequency domain approach 
to time series, and then the empirical evidence in favour of the typical spectral 
shape of an economic variable observed by Granger (1966).
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4.2.1 The Frequency Domain Approach to  Tim e Series 
Analysis
Consider the spectral representation of a time series X t
X t = P  ettd dZ(9,u) = r  [cos(t9) +  i sin(tO)\ dZ (8 ,u), (4.1)
J—7T J—7T
where Z (0 ,u )  is a zero-mean orthogonal increment process with the property
that E  \dZ(0,Lj)\2 =  dF(9), where dF(9) is called the spectral density of the
process. Time series analysis based on representation (4.1) is called the
frequency domain approach to time series, as it decomposes the variation
of the time series X t into a combination of sines and cosines of different
periods. In general, the higher the value of dF(9) the higher is the weight
of the periodic component of period The representation (4.1) is a very
general one. For instance the Cramer’s theorem (see e.g. Brockwell and Davis
1991) guarantees that a spectral representation like the one in (4.1) holds for
any stationary process while Priestley (1965), Hurwich and Ray (1994) and
Chan and Terry (1995) show how this representation can be extended for
non stationary linear processes. Given a set of observations x t with t that
goes from 1 to T, the spectral density dF(9) is usually estimated through the
periodogram 1(9) (or function of it) defined as the modulus of the discrete
Fourier transform of the observations8:
m  =
2;rT
itS
Jbt  c 
t= 1
(4.2)
8In the case of a stationary process the periodogram is the sample analogue of the 
theoretical spectral density dF(6).
158
Granger (1966) noted how the estimated spectra of most detrended eco­
nomic variables had a shape that he defined to be as typical It is a monoto­
nously decreasing function with a peak in the neighbourhood of the zero 
frequency. Figure 1A shows the typical spectral shape for the level of de­
trended logged GDP per capita for the United States calculated over the 
period 1870-1994. A class of spectral density function able to match exactly 
with the spectral shape9 that arises in the real world is given by
f{ 0 ) =  dF{0) ~  g(6) r M, as 6 -  0+, (4.3)
where “ ~  ” indicates that the ratio of left- and right-hand sides tends 
to bounded quantity, d is a non negative constant and g(6) is a bounded 
function bounded away from zero in a neighbourhood of the origin10. The 
parameter d represents the order of integration of the time series. If it is 
greater than zero is said to exhibit long memory while if the parameter is 
equal to 0 the process is said to exhibit weak memory. The parameter d
9The exact relation between the spectral density, dF{9),  and the periodogram (4.2) 
for non stationary processes {d >  see below) is a topic that goes beyond the scope of 
this chapter. It seems however that the periodogram behaves without any solution of 
continuity in moving from the stationary region (d <  | )  to the non stationary one (d >  
(see Hurwich and Ray 1994, Velasco 1996, Robinson and Marinucci 1997). Because of 
this reason a possible solution consists of defining the theoretical spectral density through 
the periodogram like in Hurwich and Ray (1994). This is implicitly the approach pursued 
here, where to safeguard theoretical rigour we speak about empirical spectral shapes rather 
than spectra.
10A slightly more general definition would allow for g{6) =  L ( |) t o  be a slowly varying 
function at infinity (see e.g. Seneta 1976), that is, a positive measurable function satisfying
—► 1, as 0 —> oo, f o r  all k >  0 .
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measures the rate of divergence of the spectrum around zero frequency and 
thus it measures “how typical the spectral shape is” .
A time domain representation of the time series X t , t >  0, corresponding 
to equation (4.3) is given by the Wold representation11
t
X t = Xo +  7 1 ^  <t>n Ct-n, (4-4)
7 1 = 0
with Wold coefficients (j)n ~  (f>n 4- d n d~l as n  f  oo, where is a function
converging to zero at a rate at least as quick as the exponential one (</>„ <  pn,
0 < p < l a s n |  oo) while d represents the order of integration of the time 
12series .
A standard trend stationary process with A R M A  disturbance exhibits 
Wold coefficient <£n’s decaying at most at an exponential rate, that is a para­
meter of fractional integration d equal to zero. This weak memory property 
of A R M A  processes shows up in frequency domain under the form of a flat 
spectral shape around zero frequency (see for example Figure IB for the 
AR(1) case). A process with a unit root exhibits Wold coefficients asymptot­
ically approaching a constant that is d — 1. Thus its spectral shape is typical 
yet particular as it exhibits a very specific rate of divergence around zero fre­
quency. This set of considerations show how standard ARIM A  processes can 
not generate arbitrary typical spectral shape because they generate shapes
11 In particular, this will be the operational definition of fractional integration that we 
will use throughout the chapter.
12If we allowed for g{0) to be a slowly varying function as in footnote ten, the Wold 
coefficients could behave as 4>n ~  </>n +  nd~1. If so, the case d =  0 would correspond 
to Wold coefficients </>n decaying as This would imply that the covariances /ir would 
behave as for large t , s o  that the spectral density dF(Q) behaves as the slowly varying 
function (In 9)2 as 6 —► 0+ , see Granger and Joyeux (1980).
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Fiq. A: Typical Spactrol Shape, COP/L USA 187 0 -1 9 9 4  FiQ. B: Robust Typicol Spectrol Shape. GDP/L USA 1 8 7 0 -1 9 9 4
  AR(t)
E2I
1
J
Frequency
Figure 4.1: Robust Typical Spectral Shapes. The figure shows the peri­
odogram of the US linearly detrended (OLS) logged per capita GDP (1870- 
1994). The periodogram in figure A is smoothed making use of an 8th order 
polynomial. The data are taken from Maddison (1995). The theoretical 
spectrum for the AR(1) process is obtained using a coefficient of first order 
autocorrelation equal to 0.5.
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with rates of divergence equal to either the one of the unit root or a flat one. 
Given the representation (4.3), a reasonable way of estimating the “typical­
ity” of the spectrum trough the parameter d consists of running a simple 
OLS regression of the log of the estimated spectrum (periodogram) over the 
log-frequency at around the zero frequency13
ln[/(0)] =  const. — 2d In#, as 9 £ |o,0] . (4.5)
Diebold and Rudebusch (1989) and chapter three ran this kind of regression 
for the GDP per capita for a set of different OECD economies and show that 
the rate of divergence of the periodogram is flatter than the one associated 
with a unit root but steeper than the ARM A weak memory case (see Figure 
IB )14. The estimated rate of divergence for different bandwidths T Q, where 
T  indicates the sample size and a trimming coefficient equal to one based 
on the log-periodogram regression proposed by Geweke and Porter-Hudak 
(1983) as modified by Robinson (1996) are reported in table l 15.
This suggests how the real GDP per capita of the US is characterized 
by a parameter of fractional integration greater than zero, but probably less 
than one. That some form of very slow mean reversion actually takes place
13The semi-parametric nature of the estimator implies that the econometrician is left 
with the choice to decide when “close” is sufficiently “close”, that is the size of the interval 
[0,0] . The number of Fourier frequencies used in running the regression (4.5) is called the 
bandwidth.
14See also Gil-Alana and Robinson (1997) for further empirical evidence in this direction 
based on a different methodology.
15 Velasco (1996) shows that the Robinson (1995) log-periodogram estimator is consistent 
and normal even for non stationary d’s. Moreover, in this application, the results are very 
robust with respect to both the choice of the trimming coefficient and/or applying the 
log-periodogram regression on the first difference of the data and then adding unity to the 
obtained result. The results are available on request.
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fpQ!
a  = d parameter Asymptotic S.E.
0.40 0.46 0.24
0.425 0.40 0.22
0.45 0.47 0.21
0.475 0.42 0.20
0.50 0.53 0.18
0.525 0.68 0.17
0.55 0.58 0.16
0.575 0.55 0.15
0.60 0.60 0.14
Table 4.1: L og-periodogram  regression , G D P /L , U S, 1870-1994. The
log-periodogram regression (5) is applied on the linearly detrended (OLS) 
logged GDP per capita. The trimming coefficient is equal to one while the 
bandwidth is set to be equal to T a. This implies that in the log-periodogram 
regression (5) T a — 1 Fourier frequencies are used while the smallest Fourier 
frequency is dropped. For a discussion of the estimating procedure see 
Diebold and Rudebusch (1989) and chapter three. For a derivation of the 
theoretical properties of this estimator originally proposed by Geweke and 
Porter Hudak (1983) see Robinson (1995). For an analisys of the properties 
of the estimator in the non stationary case see Velasco (1996).
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in the data is also confirmed by time domain observation. Figure 2 shows 
how a time trend calculated using data only from 1880 and 1929 forecasts 
extremely well the current level of GDP of the US economy. This implies 
that the new information delivered by the Wold innovations et’s, might be 
irrelevant for forecasting on very long horizons16.
The empirical evidence shows that the underlying stochastic process for 
aggregate GDP exhibits some form of long memory even if the degree of 
memory might remain uncertain i.e. if the particular case of the unit root 
can be ruled out. As a result we would like to know if they do exist eco­
nomic mechanisms able to generate typical spectral shape similar to the ones 
observed in the real world. In this chapter we look for robust economic mech­
anism able to generate typical spectral shape: we define a mechanism to be 
robust if small alterations to the basic set-up do not shift the spectral shape 
of the time series from the very particular slope associated with the unit root 
to the flat one corresponding to the weak memory case17. We argue that an 
economic system able to generate a sufficient amount of cross-sectional het­
erogeneity satisfies this criterion, we show that the underlying disturbances 
must not be necessarily technological and we highlight why a typical spectral 
shape might be so typical.
16See also Diebold and Senhadji (1996) for similar conclusions based on similar evidence.
17Under this respect we make use of a boundary approach similar to the one popularized 
by Sutton (1992) in industrial organization.
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4.3 A stylized vintage model
This section first lays down the structure of a stylized vintage model. It then 
characterizes the dynamics of the system once a set of aggregate disturbances 
is introduced in the basic set-up.
4.3.1 The M odel
Time is discrete and goes from — oo to oo.
The rate of technological progress is exogenous at rate 7  (ongoing growth).
The number of firms in the economy is fixed with Lebesgue measure equal 
to one. We think of this as a free entry condition. In fact this would be the 
equilibrium outcome in a search theoretic framework with fixed amount of 
resources where each operating firm requires a given amount of resources and 
non operating firms must wait for these resources to be freed before using 
them (see e.g. Pissarides 1990)18.
The firms in the economy can be in different technological states. In 
particular we say that a given firm is in aggregate state i > 0 a t time t if 
the firm is using technology t — i (cross-sectional heterogeneity). Firms using 
different technologies are able to produce different quantities of goods, in 
particular a firm in state i at time t produces a quantity of goods equal to 
7 (t — t)19.
18Given these considerations, the model considers as observational equivalent the event 
in which technological adoption takes place through destruction and successive creation of 
a new firm to that in which firms live forever. Mortensen and Pissarides (1995) analyze a 
vintage model in which firms explicitly face a trade-off between the two events.
19We are implicitly assuming that all variables are denominated in logs, this implies 
that differences indicate growth rates while arithmetic averages are geometric ones. It is 
possible to work out the model in which firms in state i  at time t  produce a quantity of
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We indicate with 7rt the countable infinite dimensional vector20 collecting 
the measure of firms in each state. The ith  element of the vector 7i\ tells us 
the measure of firms at time t using the technology t — i + 1. This vector is 
strictly positive, bounded between zero and one and thus it has the nature 
of a probability measure.
This implies that the level of aggregate output at time t, Yt is equal to
Yt = i t  — 7 ^ 0 ,  (4.6)
where a indicates the transpose operator on the given vector usually 
taken as a column vector. The vector 0  indicates a column vector with the 
property th a t its ith  element is exactly equal to i — 1.
At a given point in time t a firm in aggregate state i has two possibilities
either doing nothing and using the technology t — i so that in the next period
the firms will be in aggregate state i -f 1, or adopting the leading technology
in the economy so tha t in the next period the firms will be in aggregate
state zero. Technological adoption, however, implies some costs. We assume,
very parsimoniously, that the cost of adopting the leading technology in
the economy consists of three components which enter additively. c* is a
deterministic component of the cost of adopting the leading technology in
the economy while e* and A* represents respectively an aggregate and a firm
specific state dependent stochastic opportunity cost component. As a result
the total cost of adopting the leading technology in the economy for a firm
goods equal to exp7 (£ — i). We avoided to do this here just to keep notation as simple as 
possible. In the footnotes we will keep track of the required modifications.
^Hereafter all vectors are taken to be countable infinite dimensional column vectors.
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in state i a t time t is given by c* 4- Ct +  A*. et represents the realisation at 
time t of a zero expected value aggregate random variable common across 
states and assumed to be identically and independently distributed, iid, over 
time. {A*, 2 > 0} indicates a sequence over states t ’s of zero expected value 
random variables each one with support (possibly unbounded) Zi C 9ft. A; 
represents an idiosyncratic shocks independently distributed across units and 
over time. et , \  can be read indifferently as either technological or demand 
shocks as they simply measure the firm-specific opportunity cost (in terms 
of forgone profits) of investing part of its own capital or labour resources in 
technological improvements (see e.g. Aghion and Saint Paul 1993 and Saint 
Paul 1993). The value of a firm V  (i, t, et , \ )  in state i at time t  whose cost 
of adopting the leading technology in the economy is given by Cf +  et +  A*, 
follows the Belman equation
V  (i, t, et , Ai) =  max 7 (t — i) — s (c* +  et +  A*) +
se {o ,i}
+/? (1 -  s) V e (i +  1, t +  1) 4- P s V e (0, t +  1). (4.7)
0 <  P < 1 is the discount factor while V e (j, t) indicates the expected value 
of V  (j , t, Aj) taken with respect to the random variables et and A*21. If 
follows from standard dynamic programming argument that the problem is 
well defined. In particular the operator in (4.7) defines a contraction in the 
function V  (i, t, et , A*) as the Blackwell sufficient conditions for a contraction, 
monotonicity and discounting, are satisfied (see e.g. Stokey and Lucas 1988,
21 As the random variables et’s and A,-’s are independently distributed across times and 
across states the expected value Ve (•, •) does not depend on past realisations of aggregate 
and idiosyncratic shocks.
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Theorem 3.3)22. It also follows by standard corollaries to the contraction 
mapping theorem (see e.g. Stokey and Lucas 1988, Corollary 3.1), th a t the 
value function V  (i , t, et , Ap  is linear in t23,strictly decreasing in i (under 
the maintained assumption that 7z +  c» is strictly increasing in z), and finally 
weakly decreasing in et and A*24. In ‘normal tim es’, tha t is when the aggregate 
component et is equal to  zero, the firm will then decide to adjust (s =  1) all 
the times tha t
p  [Ve (0, t +  1) -  V e (z +  1, t +  1)] >  a  +  Ai. (4.8)
That is the firm weights the benefits of technological adoption P [Ve (0, t  +  
1) — V e (z 4- 1, t 4- 1)] with the costs that it implies A* 4- c*. If we indicate 
with 1— Pi the probability that the event (4.8) occurs25, this represents the 
probability th a t a firm in aggregate state i will be using the best technology 
available in the economy at time t +  1 when et = 0. There are no theoretical
22In the case where a firm in state i at time t  produce a quantity of goods equal to 
exp7 (t — z), the condition required to assure finite discounted values would be 7  <  — In/?.
23Log-linear in t  in the case where a firm in state i at time t  produce a quantity of goods 
equal to exp7 (i — i).
24For sake of exposition only, it is useful to consider the myopic problem in which at 
each point in time t  a firm in state i maximises
M a x  [/?7 (t -  i ) , p 7 (t +  1) -  a  -  et -  A<].
25It follows from the linearity in t  of the value function V  (i, t, €t, Aj) that the probabil­
ities 1 — pi’s are well defined and independent of t. In the myopic problem they are defined 
as those corresponding to the events
Aj <  (3j{i +  1) -  c,-.
If the idiosyncratic shocks are iid with distribution function F(x),  p, is equal to F\fiy(i  -f 
1) -  a ] .
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reasons for assuming any a priori structure on the values of the probability 
Pi s . For example in Aghion and Howitt (1994), Caballero and Hammour 
(1994b) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1996), both the probability distri­
bution of the idiosyncratic shocks A* and the cost of adopting the leading 
technology q , are state independent so that the probabilities pi s are un­
equivocally decreasing in i , that is firms adopting obsolete technologies are 
more likely to end up on the technological frontier rather than firms close 
to it. This reflects the fact that the higher the technological gap the higher 
is the incentive to adjust. However, other models with switching costs and 
human capital specificity stress why these probabilities might be constant 
(chapter one) or even increasing like in Acemoglu and Scott (1995), Jones 
and Newman (1995) and Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996). In fact the higher 
the technological gap the more difficult is technological adoption so tha t the 
cost of adopting the leading technology c* might be thought to be positively 
related to i26. This implies that the dynamics of the state of a generic firm 
in normal times et = 0 is characterized by the infinite dimensional Markov 
chain P  given by
■ 1 - P o Po 0 0 0 0 •
1 - P i 0 Pi 0 0 0 .
1 ~ P 2 0 0 P2 0 0 •
1 ~ P 3 0 0 0 P3 0 •
1 ~ P a 0 0 0 0 Pa •
where the rows and columns represent the set of feasible technological
26 Clearly a change in the deterministic component of technological adoption c, changes 
also the structure of the value function, that is the left hand side of equation (4.8). Dis­
counting, (3 <  1, implies however that induced changes on the left hand side are always 
smaller than those on impact on the right hand side of equation (4.8). As a result an 
increase in C\ always makes the value of 1 — p, to fall.
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states in the economy while the elements 1— s indicate the probabilities 
that a firm in state i at any time t will end up on the technological frontier 
at time t +  1. We think of the matrix P  as of the transmission mechanism 
in the economy.
4.3.2 Structure of the Transmission M echanism
Given the lack of any strong a priori theoretical restrictions on the structure 
of the transmission mechanism P, we merely assume that whatever it is its 
current aggregate state, a firm sooner or later will adjust with probability 
one.
A ssu m p tio n  1 Indicate with (3ji the probability that a firms starting in 
aggregate state j  does not adjust before i periods, so that j3ji =  f l^ o  Pj+k- 
Assume that limjioo^ji =  0, V7.
We will keep Assumption 1 throughout the whole analysis, as it seems 
very plausible that arbitrarily inefficient firms would be eventually be driven 
out of business by more efficient ones (see Jovanovic and Nyarko 1996). The 
side effect of this assumption is that our framework will exhibit one and only 
one recurrent (ergodic) class. That is, there does exist only one set of states 
each one of them will be visited infinitely often by the firms in the economy.
L em m a 1 Under assumption 1, the transmission mechanism P  has al­
ways one and exactly one recurrent class.
Proof: See appendix.
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This lemma shows how our framework rules out multiple equilibria (multi­
ple ergodic sets) to explain persistence in aggregate fluctuations (see Durlauf 
1991). Under this respect the chapter is firmly in the second generation of 
Neo-Keynesian economics where macroeconomics is micro-founded solving 
explicit aggregation problems.
The previous lemma proved the existence of one recurrent class. We are 
interested in distinguishing the case in which this class is of infinite dimen­
sion (irreducible transmission mechanism) from the case in which it is of finite 
dimension (reducible transmission mechanism). The first case constitutes a 
useful benchmark case and implies that each firm will visit infinitely often 
all the aggregate states in the economy. The second one corresponds to a 
situation in which firms will end up with probability one in a finite dimen­
sional set. Despite the lack of clear empirical evidence in either directions, 
the observation by Baily et al. (1992) and Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1994) 
that the persistence at the top of the technological distribution is very high, 
might support the reducible nature of the transmission mechanism P.
A ssum ption  2 Indicate with f t, ft*, so that f t =  IELo Pk> assume that 
0 < f t  < 1 and ft*, =  limiTooft)i =  0.
Assumption 2 guarantees that the transmission mechanism P  is irre­
ducible.
L em m a 2 Under assumption 2 the infinite dimensional transmission 
mechanism P  is irreducible and recurrent.
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Proof: See appendix.
In the next section we will analyse the dynamic of the system under the 
condition that Assumption 2 holds (irreducible transmission mechanising 
while in section 4 we will analyse the dynamics of the system under the 
assumption that it does exist an aggregate state i such that Pi is equal to 
zero (reducible transmission mechanism).
In general we are interested in knowing under which conditions a steady 
state distribution does exist. The existence of a steady state distribution 
seems to be a reasonable requirement for the plausibility of the theory. The 
following lemma answers this question.
L em m a 3 I f  either the series YfS=\Pi converges or the matrix is reducible, 
a steady state distribution exists.
Proof: See appendix.
4.3.3 Aggregate Shocks with Cross-sectional H etero­
geneity
We now want to analyse the dynamics of the system once a certain degree of 
aggregate uncertainty is introduced in the system. In particular we are inter­
ested in analysing the speed with which aggregate shocks propagates in the 
economic system. Let us consider a sequence of zero mean aggregate shocks, 
et, assumed to be identically independently distributed over time, that is iid  
events. Equations (4.7) and (4.8) show how this modifies the problem of the 
firm: an aggregate shocks modifies, in a similar way, the incentive to adjust
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of all the firms in the economy. For example a positive aggregate shock, 
et > 0, increases the cost of technological adoption for all the firms in the 
economy, so that in the next period we will be observing less firms adopting 
the leading technology in the economy relative to what it would have oc­
curred in normal times, et =  0. This implies that all the times at which the 
aggregate shock arrives a reallocation of the technological positions of firms 
takes place. We indicate with 8t the size and structure of this reallocation 
where 8t has the property that the sum by column of its entries, 81, is ex­
actly equal to 0 that is =  0 (reallocation property of the shock). We
think of 8t as the reallocation structure of the economy. 8t has the nature of 
an error term measuring the difference between the observed cross-sectional 
distribution 7rt and what would have occurred in normal times P  irt-1- As a 
result the dynamics of the cross-sectional distribution of vintages currently 
in use, 7rt , is described by the equation
irt = 8t T P 'n t- i .  (4.9)
In order to summarize the above discussion we introduce the following 
formal definition for a reallocation structure 8t.
Definition 1 (R eallocation Structures) Indicate with a t and{ei, z > 0}, 
respectively, the natural a — fie ld  generated at time t by the sequence of 
aggregate shocks et, and a sequence of vectors where the generic element e* 
has a value minus one in place one, one in place i + 1  and zero otherwise. A 
reallocation structure 8t has the form
O O
=  S(at ) = ]TV (et, eh
i—1
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where the weighting coefficients wt(et,<Jt-i),s are a non decreasing function 
in c t ,V i ,  and Vt7t_ i ,  0  < w \e u at- 1 ) < (1  ~  P i)^ l- l  i f  >  0 , ' P i K - i  <  
w*(et ,a t- 1) <  0 i fe t < 0, while =  0.
Firstly, we assume that the reallocation structure 6t is well defined so that 
a reallocation has a bounded effect on aggregate output. This requirement 
is satisfied by the following assumption.
A ssum ption 3 Assume that Vat the reallocation structure St has weight­
ing coefficients wt(et , (Tt-iYs that are at least of order for some e >  0 and 
some j  >  027.
Before proving the following proposition we need to show that the infinite 
dimensional matrix products are well defined.
Lem m a 4 Under Assumption 3, the product 6t' P nO is bounded Vn and 
well defined as the matrixes associate, that is 6t' (P nO) =  (6t Pn)O i Vn.
Proof: See appendix.
This chapter focuses on the persistence of aggregate fluctuations so that 
we are interested in a set of simplifying assumptions implying that aggregate 
output behaves as a linear symmetric process28.
27This assumption is trivially satisfied for “finite” reallocations, that is for reallocation 
structures 6t ’s where only a finite number of weighting coefficients w ”s is strictly positive.
28Assumption 4 is unlikely to hold as a “reasonable” approximation if aggregate and 
idiosyncratic shocks are independent one of another, in fact Caballero, Hengel and Halti- 
wanger (1997) find a strong negative correlation between the second moment of the idio­
syncratic distribution and aggregate shocks. The reader that believes that Assumption 4
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A ssu m p tio n  4 Assume that 6t = 6(et), where S(-) is a linear function29 
so that St = 6 et , 6 = w% ei> where, Vz, 0 < w% € 5ft, and w% < 1-
P ro p o sitio n  1 (H ete ro g en e ity  an d  lin earity ) Under assumption 4 
the aggregate output, Yt , is a linear process.
Proof: In what follows we define a process to be linear if there does exist 
a Wold decomposition where the innovations follow a martingale difference 
process. That is for the process to be linear it must be that Vn > 0
E(Yt+n -  yt_! I <Tt ) =  E(Yt+n -  yt_! I et),
where at indicates the natural a —fie ld  generated at time t by the sequence of 
aggregate shocks. Given Assumption 4 and the iid property of the aggregate 
shocks, et , we have that, Vn > 0
E(Yt+n -  yt_! I at) = 7 (" +  1) -  m - i  P nO -  7<V P nO + 7< - i O =
= E(Yt+n - Y t.  i | c t),
can never hold as a reasonable approximation should think of the aggregate shocks here 
considered as once for all shocks. Moreover, it seems that aggregate time series do not 
behave as linear symmetric processes (see e.g. Neftci 1984) and well accepted measures 
of persistence for non-linear processes are not readily available. The main contribution 
of the chapter is simply to show that aggregate shocks can vanish and even get amplified 
at very particular rates in a simple and popular stochastic model where cross-sectional 
heterogeneity is explicitly taken into account.
29 Assumption 4 can be justified formally drawing on the definition of reallocation struc­
ture. In fact 8t =  8(€t,ot- i ) ,  so that a Taylor expansion around zero implies that the 
approximation 8t ~  8(at- i ) e t holds if 8t is differentiable with respect to et . Assumption 
4 further requires that the previous history of the system does not affect the realloca­
tion structure. This second assumption is not necessary and only Proposition 1 would be 
affected by relaxing it (see footnote 29).
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as 6t is function of et only. Q.E.D.
The above formula allows to recover the Wold coefficients for the time 
series of aggregate output. In fact Yt can be written as
t
Yt =  7*0 O -  7710' P l0  +  7 t +  ^ 2  <t>n et- n, (4.10)
n=0
where (j)n = —75'PnO, while <5 indicates the reallocation structure of the 
economy. If a steady state distribution exists so that Kq P* =  ttq Vi and 
we initialize the process at this point we have that the representation (4.10) 
collapses to
t
Yt =  Yq +  7 1 +  (f>n €t-n > (4*11)
n=0
where Yq  is the level of output at the starting date normalized to be equal 
to O30.
The result contained in the previous proposition generalizes results by 
Bertola and Caballero (1990, 1994) and Caballero (1992). Despite the large 
non linearities in the process with which firms adjust to the changing of the 
technological environment, the aggregate time series behaves like a linear 
symmetric process. The reason of this depends on Assumption 4. In general, 
a reallocation structure St is function of all the previous history of the system, 
that is St = S(crt) where at indicates the natural a — fie ld  generated at time 
^In general, (see footnote 28) the representation for aggregate output is
t 
Yt = Y0 + y t  + ^ 2  $n{pt—n—l) €t — nj
71=0
where <f>n(ot- n- i )  -  - 76(t7f_n_ 1)/P nO.
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t by the sequence of aggregate shocks. Assumption 4 imposes two strong 
restrictions on the reallocation structure, the first is that the reallocation 
that takes place is function just of the current realization of the aggregate 
shock, that is St =  S(et). If we remove this condition we obtain that aggregate 
time series can exhibit non linearities. For example this is the case if the 
mass of firms in a generic state that reallocates is a function of the current 
measure of firms in that state.
The second one is that £(•) be a linear function, for this assumption to 
hold it must be that 7r* =  St -f P '^ t- i  > 0 with probability one. If we remove 
this condition we have a possible source of asymmetries in aggregate time 
series. As this chapter focuses on the persistence of aggregate fluctuations, 
it analyses the dynamics of the linear model assuming implicitly that As­
sumption 4 holds as a “reasonable” approximation31. The main implication 
of this result simply states that aggregate uncertainty must enter linearly for 
the aggregate time series to be a linear process.
Given the representation (4.11) the following proposition shows the rela­
tion between growth in aggregate output and technological adoption.
P ro p o s itio n  2 (Technological ad o p tio n  a n d  g row th ) I f  a steady 
state distribution exists, the long run growth rate o f the aggregate economy is 
equal to that of the leading technology 7 . '
31 If we relax this assumption we have at hand a possible source of non linearities and 
asymmetries in aggregate time series without relying on strategic complementarity. The 
reasonable question to ask, then, is how much non-linearities and asymmetries this simple 
mechanism is able to generate. See Caballero and Hengel (1994) for an explanation based 
on strategic complementarities.
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Proof: It follows from the representation (4.11) and the fact that the 
sequence of aggregate shocks {et , t > 0} is iid with zero expected value by 
assumption. Q.E.D.
This chapter focuses on the conditions under which typical spectral shapes 
arise. For this to happen it must be that the transmission mechanism P  
allows for a sufficient amount of cross-sectional heterogeneity.
P ro p o s itio n  3 (T h e  role of cross-sectional h e te ro g en e ity ) I f  the
transmission mechanism P  is finite dimensional, the aggregate always behaves 
like a trend stationary process with ARMA disturbance, that is the Wold 
coefficients <f>n ’s decay at least exponentially, \(f>n\ < pn , 0 < p < 1 as n  |  oo.
Proof: See appendix.
This very simple result might look trivial but it is not. In fact it says that 
if the number of states in the system are finite, the degree of integration of the 
aggregate variable is equal to that of the underlying stochastic disturbance32. 
Given that a variable with a finite number of states is bounded, it is not sur­
prising that the aggregate can never be a non stationary process (d > | ) 33. 
This theorem however claims much more, as it states that no typical spec­
tral shape can be generated where cross-sectional heterogeneity is uniformly
32This result is hardly surprising given what has been found in the representative agent 
framework by Real Business Cycle models. As they are, they lack a transmission mecha­
nism (see e.g Rotemberg and Woodford 1996). The attempt of introducing search frictions 
in the basic RBC model (see e. g. Andolfatto 1996 and Merz 1995) goes exactly in the 
same direction as highlighted by this chapter.
33 Given the representation (4.4) a process with d >  |  has infinite variance and so 
non-stationary in second moment.
178
bounded. In this respect Proposition 3 allows one to generalize results by 
Bertola and Caballero (1990, 1994), Caballero and Hengel (1990) in the sS  
literature. Despite the large non linearities implied in their framework, the 
rate with which the expected value of the cross-sectional distribution con­
verges to its long run value is always exponential. Moreover, the result is 
also consistent with the observation by Bertola and Caballero (1994), that 
an increase in the variance of the idiosyncratic uncertainty reduces the speed 
of convergence of the aggregate variable even if, in their set-up, the rate of 
convergence still remains exponential. In other words, this proposition illus­
trates the role of ongoing growth in producing the amount of cross-sectional 
heterogeneity required to generate a degree of integration in the aggregate 
variable strictly greater than that of the underlying aggregate disturbance. 
In fact, it might be argued that in the real world cross-sectional heterogeneity 
is always bounded. This is, however, not the case when the forward looking 
nature of the transmission mechanism P  is taken into account and we allow 
for ongoing technological growth. In fact Proposition 3 requires merely for 
the possibility that a firm currently adopting a given vintage can wait for an 
arbitrary number of periods before switching to the best technology in the 
economy. This implies that at each point in time cross-sectional heterogene­
ity can appear to be bounded but still not uniformly bounded. This is all 
that is required by Proposition 3.
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4.4 Irreducible Transmission M echanism
In this section we focus on the dynamics of the aggregate system under the 
assumption that the transmission mechanism P  of the aggregate economy is 
irreducible. Under Assumption 2 each firm will visit infinitely often all the 
states of the aggregate economic system. In this and the next section we 
will identify small (big) firms as the ones adopting vintages far-away from 
(close to) the technological frontier. For example, Baily et al. (1992) and 
Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1994) find that employment size and productivity 
are positively correlated. In general to link productivity to some measures of 
size (employment, sale, assets) we need some assumptions on the dynamics 
of factor prices. If factor prices grow at the same rate as the technology 
frontier, a productivity ranking in terms of vintages corresponds exactly to 
a one in terms of size.
The first result we show is a negative one. Under the assumption of 
irreducibility the reallocative structure does not matter.
P ro p o sitio n  4 I f  the transmission mechanism P  is irreducible, the rate 
of absorption of the shocks as measured by the Wold coefficients (j)n is inde­
pendent of the reallocation structure 8.
Proof: See appendix.
We are interested in conditions such that aggregate output is trend sta­
tionary with weak memory disturbances. This is the case if for example, 
the chance of ending up at the top of the technological frontier is higher (or 
equal) for firms adopting obsolete technologies, rather than for firms already
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at the top of the technological frontier.
P ro p o sitio n  5 (ARM A  p rocesses) I f  the probabilities p i ’s are weakly 
decreasing in i, the aggregate time series behaves as an AR M  A process, that 
is the Wold coefficients (f)n ’s decay at least exponentially, \(pn\ <  pn,0  <  p < 1 
as n  |  oo.
In this case, the steady state distribution 7r* cannot have a degree of skew­
ness greater than that associated with the geometric distribution, that is
*i ^  V%, 0 < p < 1, as 2 —> oo, 
where 7rt*indicates the steady state probability o f ending up in state i.
Proof: See appendix.
As an application of this result we can consider the two following para­
metric examples:
Example 1: If pi =  , for some 0 < a < 1, the aggregate time series
behave like a trend stationary series with AR(1) disturbance and first order 
correlation equal to a34. If a =  p we are in the case where all the probabilities 
Pi s are constant. In this case the steady state distribution is geometric so
^Indicate with R \n  ^ the generic element in place i, of the vector — P^O . It follows 
the recursion R =  (1 — p^R^1 ^ +  Pi R^h where R 1 =  PO.  If we guess that the 
solution of this system has the form R\n  ^= cn + ani, we obtain that the system is satisfied 
if cn — cn- 1 =  po a71-1, c1=po so that cn =  • This implies that
S' P nO =  an S'O.
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that the upper bound in the degree of skewness permitted by Proposition 5 
is reached. This is the vintage model analysed by chapter one.
Example 2: If a =  0, so that pi = 7^ , the aggregate time series behave 
like a trend stationary series with white noise disturbances, in this case the 
steady state distribution is Poisson with parameter p.
In general Proposition 5 sets a lower bound to the degree of skewness 
required to generate typical spectral shapes. If the transmission mechanism is 
irreducible, cross-sectional heterogeneity can generate typical spectral shapes 
only if the steady state distribution exhibits a degree of skewness greater than 
the one associated with the geometric distribution.
Table 1 showed that the aggregate GDP of the US economy might be 
characterized by a parameter of fractional integration, d, lower than one 
but still positive. This might arise if firms adopting older vintages, small 
firms, tend to grow at a similar rate but quicker than firms at the top of 
the technological frontier, big firms. This also implies that small firms have 
more volatile growth rate as recent empirical evidence seems to suggest (see 
Mansfield 1962, Hall 1987, Evans 1987 and Dunne et al. 1989 for empirical 
evidence in this direction)35.
P ro p o sitio n  6 (Long m em ory) Define with gi the expected growth rate 
of a unit in aggregate state i, that is pi =  (1 — Pi)(i 4- 1). I f  it does exist an 
aggregate state s* such that
g% = h'y, 1 < h, Vz >  s*,
35If we consider as an index of volatility the quantities either p ,(l — Pi )( i+ l )  or p , ( l—p,), 
these are in fact increasing in i under the assumptions of Proposition 6.
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the order of integration of aggregate output d is equal to 2 — h, that is the 
Wold coefficients (J>n ~  nd~l , as n  f oo.
The steady state distribution, 7r*, is approximately Pareto’s, that is tt* ~  
n~h where ir? indicates the steady state probability of ending up in state i.
Proof: See appendix.
The intuition of the results in Proposition 6 is simple. If the Wold 
coefficients decay hyperbolically the shock is absorbed at decreasing rates 
rather than at constant ones as it would be in the exponential case, th a t is 
nd~l rsj (1 — -^ ) (1  — ^ y )  • • • (1 — ^ - )  (see appendix). Fast growing small 
firms eventually become big and so they end up by growing at the same rate 
as the big ones, as a result the rate at which the shock is absorbed shrinks 
over time. The degree of skewness in the steady state distribution required 
to generate typical spectral shapes, does not seem to be excessive as the 
Pareto distribution is often argued to possess the degree of skewness found 
in empirical studies (see e.g. Hall 1983 and Sutton 1995).
The following proposition shows that if the transmission mechanism is 
irreducible we can never generate a unit root together with a stationary dis­
tribution. We can interpret this result in either two ways. If we believe that 
the transmission mechanism P  is irreducible, Proposition 7 makes a strong 
theoretical case in favour of the empirical evidence arguing that aggregate 
GDP exhibits some form of long memory but smaller than the one associated 
with a unit root. Alternatively, we can keep Proposition 7 as a hint of the 
fact that some additional structure must be put on both the transmission
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mechanism P  and the reallocation structure 6 in order to generate typical 
spectral shapes. This last point will be the consideration that we will exploit 
in the next section.
P roposition  7 (Killing irreducibility) I f  the transmission mecha­
nism P  is irreducible and a steady state distribution does exist, the order 
of integration of aggregate output is always strictly smaller than one. More­
over, if  the transmission mechanism P  is irreducible, the order of integration 
of output can never be greater than one.
Proof: See appendix.
As application of the previous proposition we can consider the following 
result:
Proposition 8 (Random walk and G ibrat’s Law) A necessary and 
sufficient condition for aggregate output to be a random walk and the trans­
mission mechanism P  to be irreducible is that
gi = h'y, 0 < h < 1, Vi.
Proof: See appendix.
In this case firms in different technological states are growing at the same 
rate 7 h independently of their current size. This is exactly what is claimed by 
G ibrat’s Law (see Gibrat 1931 and Sutton 1995, 1996). If there is a random
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walk in output, the growth rate of output is equal to 7/1 so that it is system­
atically lower than 7 , as 0 < h < 1. This implies, by Proposition 3, th a t no 
steady state distribution exists. In fact the coefficients (3{ are decreasing at 
rate i~h (see appendix) that is strictly lower than the one assumed in Lemma 
3. In this case the matrix is null recurrent, that is limn_>oo P n =  0, and there 
is no convergence in the cross-sectional distribution so that the dispersion of 
technological states widen over time.
The previous proposition shows how aggregate shocks that reallocates 
units across vintages can generate typical spectral shapes in aggregate out­
put under plausible conditions. However, the results are not robust in the 
sense that we can not generate an order of integration strictly greater than 
one, while a unit root in output implies (quite implausibly) that the growth 
rate of aggregate output 7/1 is systematically lower than that of the tech­
nological frontier 7 . The next section shows that in order to derive robust 
typical spectral shapes some structure is required on both the transmission 
mechanism P  and the reallocation structure 8.
4.5 Reducible Transmission M echanism
In this section we focus on the dynamics of the aggregate system under the 
assumption that the transmission mechanism P  of the aggregate economy is 
reducible. That means that with probability one, each firm will end up by 
positioning at the top of the technological frontier. This implies, by Lemma 3 
and Proposition 3, that a steady state distribution always exists and that the 
growth rate of aggregate output is always equal to that of the technological
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frontier 7 .
The main message of this section is that, in order to generate robust 
(0 <  d < 2) typical spectral shape, some structure is required both on 
the transmission mechanism P  and on the reallocative structure <5. In what 
follows we show what additional structure is required.
Proposition 9 (The reallocation structure m atters) Different real­
location structures 8 can generate different rate of absorption of the shocks 
as measured by the Wold coefficients (pn ’s.
Proof: See appendix.
Recent empirical evidence suggests that recessions are a period of cleans­
ing in which marginal firms are driven out of business (see e.g. Davis and 
Haltinwanger 1990, 1992 and Gali and Hammour 1991). The following defi­
nition embeds this idea in our reallocation structure36.
D efinition 2 (Cleansing type reallocation) Suppose that the transmis­
sion mechanism P  is reducible where the recurrent class is identified by the 
first s technological stated7, then we define a reallocation structure,
00 00
8 = ^2,w%ei, 0 < w* 6 Vi, < 1
i=l i—1
of the cleansing type, i f  3 wl > 0, for some i > s38.
36 “Cleansing” does not have to take place necessarily in the recession. For example, if 
there are liquidity constraints, the best period for reallocating is the boom.
37For simplicity, here, we identify the recurrent class s as given by s =  max{i : Pj 7^  
OV7 > i}.
^This implies that at time zero either we assume that we are not in steady state or
1 8 6
A reallocation of the cleansing type is a drastic reallocation in the sense 
that it reallocates units from the transient states to the recurrent ones. We 
now show that a cleansing type reallocation can generate robust spectral 
shapes.
Proposition 10 (Robust typical spectral shapes) Suppose that s < 
oo, the reallocation is of the cleansing type and the expected growth rate of a 
unit in aggregate state z, gi, is such that
gi = ( 1 -  pi)(i +  1) =  h i ,  i >  s*
for some s* where h > 0, then the order of integration of aggregate output d 
is equal to 2 — h, that is the Wold coefficients (j>n ~  nd-1, as n  j  oo.
Proof: See appendix.
The intuition of the result is simple. In fact, if the Wold coefficients 
behave hyperbolically the shock propagates at decreasing rates rather than 
at constant ones as it would be in the exponential case, that is nd_1 ~  
(1 — -^ ) ( 1  — • • • (1 — —p ) (see appendix). As small firms eventually
become big, the degree of disequilibrium induced by the shocks shrinks or 
gets amplified, depending of the relative growth rate of small versus big firms. 
Moreover, as the number of small firms shrinks over time, the rates at which 
the shocks propagates over time shrinks as well.
the first shock must be positive. In general Assumption 4 can not hold here. For all the 
reallocations to be of the cleansing type it must be that positive aggregate shocks, et >  0, 
cause more reallocation than negative ones.
We are particularly interested in the case in which 1 < h < 2, th a t is 
0 < d < 1, because as documented in section one it is the case tha t seems to 
be consistent with the empirical evidence. If this is the case:
(i ) Small firms tend to grow faster than big firms (see Mansfield 1962, 
Hall 1987, Evans 1987 and Dunne et al. 1989 for empirical evi­
dence in this direction)39.
(it) Independent of the relative growth rate of big versus small firms 
there is convergence iri the cross-sectional distribution, so th a t we 
are in a case of Galton’s fallacy (see Quah 1993).
(Hi) The growth rate of output is equal to that of the leading technol­
ogy in the economy, by Proposition 2.
(iv ) If h <  1 so that big firms grow faster than small ones (see Davies, 
et al. 1993 for empirical evidence in this direction), the stochas­
tic process for the growth ra te  of aggregate output exhibits long 
memory. In the limit case, in which h = 0 (in this case Assump­
tion 1 would not hold) aggregate output is an integrated process 
of order 2.
4.6 Fractional Cointegration
A definition of cointegration for variables integrated of order d, hereafter 
1(d), is as follows:
39 This also implies that small firms have more volatile growth rates as recent empirical 
evidence seems to suggest (see Mansfield 1962, Hall 1987, Evans 1987 and Dunne et al. 
1989 for empirical evidence in this direction). If we consider as an index of volatility the 
quantities either p ,(l — p,)(i +  1) or p,( l  — Pi), these are in fact increasing in i.
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D efinition 3 (Fractional cointegration) For a p x  1 vector Yt where the 
all i — th  elements Yu = 1(d) , we say that the variables are cointegrated with 
degree of cointegration b — d — d ', i f  there exists a p x  1 vector a ^ O  such 
that et = a1 Yt ~  I(d') where d' < d.
As firms are the minimal working cells of an aggregate economy where 
most economic decisions are taken it is not difficult to see why aggregates 
should be cointegrated. To fix ideas we can consider the problem of the firm 
of choosing the optimal quantity of labour as a function of the technology 
it is actually using. Suppose for example that the profits given by using an 
amount of labour Z*, when a firm is in aggregate state i, is equal to
m ax7 (et 4- 1 -  i) U -  ^  l\ -  j t  lu
H £
where 7 (e* + t  — i) — 7aZt- is the marginal revenue of labour decreasing in 
while 71 represents the cost of using a given amount of labour assumed to 
grow exogenously at the same rate as the one of the leading technology in 
the economy. In this case, the first order condition for the firm states tha t
h =  ~ ( t^ i) > a
so that in the aggregate the relation
A 1 =  “ ( e « “  ir't0 ), a
holds, where I is an infinite dimensional vector collecting the optimal decision 
of firms at each given aggregate state i. This implies that aggregate employ­
ment is cointegrated with aggregate output with a degree of cointegration 
equal to the order of integration of aggregate output (d1 =  0).
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Robinson and Marinucci (1997) show how in the real world the order of 
integration of the residuals is different from zero {d! ^  0). In our framework 
the phenomenon can arise if the cost of using a given amount of labour is not 
just a function of the leading technology in the economy, but also of other 
moments of the cross-sectional distribution. If wages for instance solve some 
form of bargaining problem like for example in the case where some search 
frictions are introduced in the system (see e.g. Pissarides 1990), the wage 
paid by firms in aggregate state i, Wi, can be thought as equal to
V > i = P ( t - i )  +  ( 1 - 0 )  [/(7Tt) +  t],
where j3 represents the bargaining power of the worker, while f(ir t) captures 
the outside options of the workers as a function of the cross sectional distri­
bution of vintages currently in use.
In this case
U =  “ h  -  (1 -  P)i -  (1 -  P)f(nt)],a
so that in the aggregate the following relation holds
7 #  =  - [ e t  -  (1 -  P)ir't O  -  (1 -  P)f(vt)]- a
To fix ideas, we can suppose technological adoption takes place through 
destruction and successive creation and that the outside option of the worker 
is given by the amount of creation equal to 7i f , where 7T® indicates the first 
element of the vector 7rt. It can be checked that under the assumption of 
Proposition 10, 7if evolves as an integrated process of order d =  1 — h. If 
so a cointegrating relation between output and employment might leave an
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order of integration in the residual strictly positive and equal to d! — 1 — h. 
More generally under the assumptions of Proposition 10 the r th  moment 
of the cross sectional distribution behaves as an integrated process of order 
d = 1 + r  — h. Moreover, under the assumption tha t the Wold innovations et 
are Gaussian, Taqqu’s theorem (Taqqu 1975) argues that non linear trans­
formation of the original (stationary) process can generate arbitrary rates of 
divergence of the spectrum around zero frequency40.
4.7 Conclusions
Ex ante homogeneous firms end up by having very different histories. This 
implies that once a picture of the economic system is taken, a lot of cross- 
sectional heterogeneity appears. This chapter has shown tha t the mechanism 
generating heterogeneity in the real world also generates persistence in the 
aggregate fluctuations. Moreover, as aggregate shocks create very high de­
gree of persistence without affecting either the number of firms in the mar­
ket or the rate of technological progress, this degree of persistence is simply 
attributed to cross-sectional heterogeneity. Because of this reason the chap­
ter concludes that cross-sectional heterogeneity is an important transmission 
mechanism with some distinctive properties. We summarize them by saying 
that cross-sectional heterogeneity is a powerful, realistic, robust and general 
transmission mechanism. It is powerful because a sufficient amount of cross- 
sectional heterogeneity is able to generate typical spectral shapes without
40Taqqu (1975) consider a function g(-) where Xt is stationary Gaussian and E(xt) <  oo. 
He shows that the behaviour of g(xt) is governed by the Hermitian rank m  of g(-). More 
precisely if x t =  1(d) , then g(xt) =  I (md  +  where m  is the Hermitian rank of <?(•) 
so a natural number greater or equal than one.
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necessarily relying on technological shocks. It is realistic because it is shown 
how two of the most striking empirical regularities in economics, the typical 
spectral shape and Gibrat’s law, might be just two faces of the same coin. 
It is robust because it is able to generate almost any kind of spectral shapes 
provided that reallocations cleanse the economy reallocating between very 
low and very high technological states. It is general because the chapter 
gives a micro-foundation for the fractional cointegration of aggregate eco­
nomic variables illustrating why a typical spectral shape might be such a 
common phenomenon.
A lot of questions still remain open. In particular realism does not imply 
reality so tha t a careful empirical investigation is required to see what really 
are the sources of the persistence of aggregate fluctuations. Three obvious 
candidates come to the mind: the dynamics of the leading technology in the 
economy, 7 , the size of the market (the number of firms in the market) or 
cross-sectional heterogeneity. This seems to be a promising basis for dis­
criminating across different macroeconomic theories. On the one hand the 
Real Business Cycle tradition as well as growth theories based on learning 
by doing, would stress that most aggregate persistence would arise because 
of the dynamics of the leading technology in the economy. On the other 
hand Neo-Keynesian macroeconomics stressing the role of coordination fail­
ures might argue that most aggregate persistence arise because of either the 
dynamics of the size of the market or the fact that multiple ergodic sets ex­
ist in the economic system. This chapter has departed from both the two 
strands of the literature and has drawn on the recent tendency to micro­
found macroeconomics solving explicit aggregation problems. It has argued
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that cross-sectional heterogeneity might be a powerful source of persistence 
and has concluded that the interplay between idiosyncratic and aggregate 
uncertainty shapes the dynamics of macroeconomic variables in a distinctive 
way.
4.8 Appendix
4.8.1 Proofs of results in section 3
P ro o f  of L em m a 1 Two states i and j  are said to communicate if it does 
exist a positive probability that in a finite number of transitions, state j  can 
be reached starting from state i and vice-versa. As the concept of commu­
nication satisfies the reflexivity, the symmetry and the transitivity property 
is an equivalence relation. This implies that we can partition the totality of 
states into equivalence classes. The states in an equivalence class are those 
which communicate with each other. The Markov chain is irreducible if the 
equivalence relation induces only one class. A state i is recurrent if and only 
if, starting from state i, the probability of returning to state i after some 
finite length of time is one. A non-recurrent state is said to be transient. All 
states in an equivalence class are either recurrent or transient so that both 
recurrency and transience are a class property (see e.g. Karlin and Taylor 
1975, 1981). Given Assumption 1, the Markov chain P  has the property that 
starting from state i } the probability of returning to state zero is one. This 
implies firstly that state zero is recurrent and secondly that either state i 
and state zero belong to the same class or state i is transient. As state zero
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is recurrent, it follows that at least one recurrent class does exist and given 
the previous considerations this is the only one. Q.E.D.
P ro o f  o f L em m a 2 Given Assumption 2 it follows that every state can 
be reached starting from state zero and vice-versa so tha t all states commu­
nicate and the transmission mechanism P  is irreducible. Given Lemma 1 a 
recurrent class does exist so that the transmission mechanism P  is irreducible 
and recurrent. Q.E.D.
P ro o f  of L em m a 3 If the matrix is reducible, given Assumption 1 
and Lemma 1, the statement is trivial as eventually all units will enter with 
probability one in the recurrent finite dimensional set. If the Markov chain 
is irreducible it follows from the basic limit theorem of Markov chains (see 
Karlin and Taylor 1975, theorem 1.2.) that either two cases hold. Either 
it is null recurrent so that asymptotically P™ goes to a matrix of zeros, or 
it is positive recurrent so that the matrix P 71 converge to a m atrix whose 
rows are identical and equal to the steady state distribution, call tha t 7r*. 
It is easy to check that 7r*, if it does exist, must have the property that the 
element in place i 7rJ must satisfy the equality 7rt* =  7rJ $ .  This implies that 
a necessary and sufficient condition for the transmission mechanism P  to be 
positive recurrent is that
=  I___
0 E£i A'
exists finite and strictly positive. Q.E.D.
P ro o f  o f L em m a 4 We first write the reallocation structure 6 as equal
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to <5 =  <5+ — S~ where <5+ >  0 and 6~ >  0. We then note that non­
negative matrixes associate under multiplication and that the distributive 
property is always satisfied for denumerable matrixes (see e.g. Kemeny, 
Snell and Knapp 1966 proposition 1-2 and corollary 1-4). This implies that 
6'PnO = (<5+ — 6 -y P * 0  is well defined provided that for each n, (8~)' PnO 
and (<5+y P nO are (not necessarily uniformly) bounded . To show this, firstly 
we note tha t the reallocation structure 6 is such that (6~)f O and (<5+y O are 
both finite as by Assumption 3 the series ® converges. Sec­
ondly we note that each element in place j  of PnO has increments bounded 
above from one, below from —pPjn{j +  n) where 0 <  p  <  1. It then fol­
lows that |(<5")# F"O -  (6 -y P " - 10 \ and \(6+)' P nO -  (<5+)' P n~lO\ are both 
dominated by
max -i n \ '  I uJ pi v—> VJ&n S ~ h ~ + @n n S X
1=1 Pi 2=1 P i .
where Pi =  IISUo Pk after replacing P i  — 1 for those pHs equal to zero. As­
sumption 3 then guarantees that both (6~)' P nO and (<5+y P nO are bounded. 
Q.E.D.
P ro o f  o f P ro p o sitio n  1 Given in the main text.
P ro o f  o f P ro p o sitio n  2 Given in the main text.
P ro o f  o f P ro p o sitio n  3 (T he  role o f cross-sectional h e te ro g en e­
ity ) In this case the transmission mechanism P  is finite dimensional and we 
indicate with k the number of states. If the Markov chain P  is irreducible 
we know by Lemma 1 that it also recurrent. If all probabilities pt’s are not
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exactly equal to one, the Markov chain P  is aperiodic. In this case we know 
that a steady state distribution 7r* does exist and the rate of convergence is 
exponential and independent of the initial distribution (see e.g. Stokey and 
Lucas 1988, theorem 11-4) that is
(n) *
Pij - * i < A p n, V i,j, (4.12)
where A > 0 and 0 < p < 1 while p\j , tt*- indicate respectively the element 
in row i and column j  of Pni the nth  iterated of P  and the element in place 
j th  of the column vector 7r*. It follows from the triangle inequality that
|<5t'P nO| < B p n,
where B  is a bounded quantity. If the matrix is reducible we know tha t the 
first s < k states of the transmission mechanism P  are recurrent while all the 
other k — s are transient. The structure of P  implies th a t a unit starting from 
one transient state will enter the recurrent class after a number of periods 
less or equal than k — s . If we indicate with ir* the element in place i of the 
steady state distribution of P, 7r*, we then know tha t the previous reasoning 
applies starting from the k — s th  iterations so that
P if  —ft j < A p n, V i,j, n > k  — s.
It follows that necessarily |<VPnO| < B  pn \ i n > k  — s where B  is a bounded 
quantity. Q.E.D.
4.8.2 Proofs of results in section 4
P ro o f  of P ro p o sitio n  4 Indicate with R\n  ^ the generic element in place i
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of the vector R ^  = P nO. For each z, R\n  ^ follows the recursion
i4"> =  (1 -  pi) 4 n' 1) +  Pi (4.13)
where R ^  =  PO. If we solve for m  equation (4.13) and we substitute
backwards for P!-n\  we obtain that, Vz > 0,
d(”) _  ^ d(«+*) 1 ~  PO o(n+*-l) PoO- ~  P i )  D(n+i-2) A - l( l  - P i - l )  D(n)
Ri a  a  ° }
where A  == f ljto  Pk, is such that 0 < A <  lj Vi given Assumption 2. It then 
follows that
fl,(n) = ^  y„+i-i + §-K„+i-2 + §K„+i-s + • • • + + 4 n), vi > o,
Pi Pi Pi Pi
where Yn+i-1 =  Rq™^ — Rq1* * ^ . Given Assiunption 4, S = wl e*, where,
Vz, 0 < wl 6 5ft, and < 1 so that =  0. As the distributive
property is always satisfied for denumerable matrixes (see e.g. Kemeny, Snell 
and Knapp 1966 proposition 1-2 and corollary 1-4), the Wold coefficients 
<f>n =  7  &'P nO can be written as equal to <j>n =  7 E £ i  'wteliP nO that is well 
defined by Assumption 3.
We now show that each element of the sum e,iP nO behaves asymptotically 
behaves as Yn. Firstly we show a limit for Yn does exist. In fact, by the 
definition of Yn we obtain that
n+1
y„ = 4 n+1) -  4 n) =  £ b & +1) -  j4">] i,
i=0
where p $  indicates the element in row 0 and column j  of P 71, the n th  iterated 
of P . As 0 < 1 — Pi < 1, the transmission mechanism P  is aperiodic, so that
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Pop always converges as n  f oo by the basic limit theorem of Markov chains 
(see e.g. Karlin and Taylor 1975, theorem 1.2.). It follows that a limit for 
Yn always exists. Moreover we know that this limit will be greater or equal 
than zero by recurrency and will be less than one as the first difference of 
is uniformly bounded by one. It follows that
lim Yn — a, 0 < a <  1.
71—>00
Suppose now that limn_^ 00 Yn = 0, we want to show that, Vi, PiP nO — 
&;Yn+i- 1 +  ^ Y n+i- 2 +  fKn-M-3 +  • •' +  ^ Y n  ~  Yn. To prove this we note 
that lim ^oo Ya'p- =  Ai < 1, Vi where A  is positive as Yn is positive for big
* n
n  because of recurrency. Let us argue by contradiction and suppose that 
Ai > 1. Then Ve there does exist N* 3 Vn > N* Ai — e <  < Ai +  e. If
Y  n
so Ym > (Ai — e)Ym-i >  (Ai — e)21*-  Yn, that is eventually unbounded when 
m  increases if A  > 1) but this implies a contradiction as Yn is uniformly 
bounded by one. As a result we obtain that e,iP nO ~  Yn. Then we note 
that (f>n = 7  £ £ i  wte,iP nO is written as the sum with non negative weights 
of quantities each one behaving asymptotically as Yn, then it follows tha t (f>n 
itself behaves asymptotically as Yn (see e.g.g Davidson 1994). For the general 
case where l im n -^ !^  =  a > 0 , we can follow the same steps as before to 
show
e'p"o -  Bt =  §  yn+i_, + ^ y n+i_2 + ^ y „ +i-3 + • • ■+% iy „  -  b { ~  y„ -  a,
Pi Pi Pi Pi
where Bi = —^ — a. From the previous reasoning it follows that (j)n — B  ~  
Yn — a where limn_>oo (j)n = B  = ]C£i wtB i, where B  is bounded by Assump­
tion 3 as Y f f iP j  ^  *• Q.E.D.
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In order to prove the next three propositions we will make use of the 
following lemma:
L em m a 5 Yn =  i^ n+1  ^— satisfies the recursive relation given by
oo
Y n  =  -  £  A +1 Y n - i - 1  +  A i n, Vn >  0, (4.14)
*=0
where Yn =  0 if n  <  0.
Moreover, if the transmission mechanism is irreducible and a steady state 
distribution does exist limn_>00 Yn = 0.
P ro o f  o f L em m a 5 In the course of the proof of Proposition 4 we have 
shown that a limit for Yn does exist so that
lim Yn = a, 0 <  a <  1.n—►oo
/ \
R q indicates the expected position after n  iterations of a unit starting in 
state 0. By the law of iterated expectations, it follows that
oo
i^ n) =  A (1  -  p i ) R :(0n' t} +  pn n, n > 0,
i=0
where Rq1^ =  0 if n  <  0,while A  =  Ilfc^o Pk- It follows from the definition of 
Yn that
oo
Y„ = 4 n+1>- 4 n) =  X ) A ( l - p 0 r B- i - i + A ,n - A , - i ( n - l ) ,  n  >  0 , (4.15)
1 = 0
where Yn =  0 if n  <  0. We can now use equation (4.15) to prove by recursion 
that
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Y ^ ( 3 i Y n - i - i  ~  f i n — i (n -  1) =  0, Vn > 0,
i= 0
so that
Yn — 'y j fii+l Yn—i—i -(- fin n , 'tf'fl >■ 0,
t= 0
where Yn =  0 if n < 0. This proves the first part of the lemma.
We now show that under the assumption that a steady state distribution 
does exist lim ^oo Yn = 0. By step one we know that the limit is bounded. 
Let us argue by contradiction and suppose tha t lim ^oo Yn =  a > 0. If so Ve, 
3 N *, 3 Vn > N* the following inequality is satisfied
\Yn - a \  =
<
- J 2 f i i+ i ( Y n- i - 1 -  a ) -  a ^ 2 f i i  + fin n
t = 0  t = 0
e
(4.16)
£ £ o / W
that is well defined as fii+iis bounded by the assumption that a steady
state distribution does exist and Lemma three. We now note that given any 
two quantities A  and B,
\A\ -  \B\ < \A + B\ < \ A\ +  \B \ .
We apply this result to equation (4.16) with
n - N *
A = - d  fii,
i—0
n - N *
B  ^   ^ fii+i\Yn-i— i a.] y  ] fii+\Yn-.i_\ -f- fin n,
i=0 i = n —N * + l
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so that \Yn -  a\ =  \A +  B \ . We now show that \B\ can be made arbitrarily 
small so that equation (4.16) can be satisfied only if |A| =  0 tha t is a — 0. 
In fact, the triangle inequality implies
n - N * nVI -  Y  p i + 1 ( Y n - i - 1 -  a) + Y P i + l Y n - i - l + Pn n <
i = 0 i = n —N * + 1
<  e +  ( iV * )2 s u p  Pi +  p n n ,
n —N * < i < n
as Yn-i, for i > 0 can have a jump of size at most equal to n. As limn_>oo Pnn  =  
0 by Lemma three, |B| can be made arbitrarily small so that equation (4.16) 
can be satisfied only if |j4| =  0 that is a = 0. Q.E.D.
P roof o f Proposition 5 {ARM A  processes) It follows from Proposi­
tion 4 that the Wold coefficients =  7 <5'P nO ~  Yn where Yn is the first 
difference of R ^ \  that is Yn- \  =  R ^  — R ^ _1\  We want to prove that 
in, i < pn, 0 <  p < 1 as n  |  oo. If the probability pi are decreasing in i, Pi 
falls at a rate that is quicker than the exponential one as Pi <  Pq, so tha t by 
Lemma 3 a steady state distribution does exist. This implies by Lemma 5 
lim ^oo Yn =  0. We want to show that there does exist a number J  >  1 such 
that limn_>oo jjj* =  0. We choose p such that ^  < 1 tha t is well defined as by 
Assumption 2, 0 < po < 1. Given equation (4.14) it follows that
y  oo
=  yn = ~  Y  A+i Yn-i-i +  Pn n , Vn >  0, 
p  i =0
where Yn = Pi+i =  . We can then follow the same proce­
dure as in the proof of Lemma 5 to show that limn_>00 Yn = 0 as the series 
£ £ o f t+ i  converges.
Finally, by Lemma 3 we know that if a steady state distribution, 7T*, does 
exist it must have the property that its element in place z, 7TJ1, is such that 
tt? =  7Tq 13i where Pi < p l0. This proves the last assertion of the proposition. 
Q.E.D.
P ro o f  o f P ro p o sitio n  6 (Long m em ory) It follows from Proposition 4 
that the Wold coefficients =  r)8'PnO asymptotically behaves as Yn where 
Yn is the first difference of Ron\  that is Yn_i =  Rq^ — Rq1-1 .^ In order to 
prove the assertion we want to show that Yn ~  nd_1 =  n 1~h, where d is the 
order of integration of aggregate output.
If n >  s*, Pn =  P3* /?a*(n_s*). We now show tha t P s *(n - a * )  ~  n~ h as n  f  oo. 
In fact Ps*(n- 8*) =  I lJ S f -1 Ps*+k is equal to
h h
& • ( » - • ) - ( !  3,  +  j K 1 - s . +  2
For large i, we have the approximation
(1 -  £>•n (4.17)
1 -
h
i + 1 1 + z +  l j
-h
(4.18)
as it follows from a Taylor expansion around zero of the function (1 +  x ) h. 
Substituting (4.18) into (4.17) we obtain that
P s * ( n —s* )
n  +  1 ' -h n -h i 4- 2 ' -h rs* +  3i -h rs* +  2 i
n n — 1. i + 1. .s* -f- 2 . .3* +  l .
-h
= B{n + l ) - h,
where B  is a bounded quantity. It follows tha t Pn behaves asymptotically
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as n~h, (3n ~  n~h. As 1 < h, it follows from Lemma 3 th a t a steady state 
distribution does exist so that limn_>oo Yn =  0, by Lemma 5.
We now show limn_^ 00(n +  b)h~l~eYn =  0, Ve >  0, where b is an arbitrary 
positive quantity. In fact, it follows from equation (4.14) tha t
oo ^
(n +  6)/l-1_eyn =  Yn =  -  ^  ft+i g(n ,i) Yn- i - i  +  A»n, Vn > 0 ,
z= 0
where
Yn = (n + b)h- 1~eYn,
A+i =  A+i(* +  i ) h 1 e>
/ =   (n +  fr)71"1"6_
9{n’%} (i +  ( n - i -  1 +  ft)71" 1"6’
We now show that the positive quantity
ii™ L f t+ is fa -* )  (4-19)i=0
is bounded and bounded away from zero. In fact, mini<i<„_i(i +  1) (n — i — 
1 +  b) =  2(n +  b) if b is sufficiently big. This implies tha t
<  2 ]T A + i,
1 = 0  1= 0
that is bounded as 0i+1 ~  (z +  l ) _1_e. We can then follow the same procedure 
as in the proof of Lemma 5 to show that lim ^oo Yn =  0.
This implies that the rate of convergence of Yn is at least equal to n 1-h. 
We now show that, the rate is exact. Let us argue by contradiction and sup­
pose that limn_+00(n +  b)h~lYn — 0 where b is an arbitrary positive quantity. 
It follows from equation (4.14)that
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n —1
(n + b)h 1Yn = Yn = ~ ^ 2 P i+ ih {n,i) yn_i_1 +  (n +  5)ft l/3n n, Vn > 0,
i=0
where h(n ,i) = . This implies that
(n + b)h 1(3n n - 'y ] / j^+i h(n,%) Yn_i_i
i=0
t — 1 < Y n <
< {n  + b)h 1{3n n +  - J 2 ^ + i h (n ^ ) Y n- i- i
i=0
We now show that the positive quantity
(4.20)
n— 1
J™  £ A + iM M )
t = 0
is bounded and bounded away from zero. In fact
M (t» +  ft)'1-1S A+, C"’*) ~ S («■-«- 1 + 6)A-1(i +1)*
= £
(4.21)
(n +  fef" 1 ^  (n +  fef" 1
14- 6)/l-1(i 4- l ) ft +  i3i+ i fa — i -  1 4- b ) ^ 1^  4- 1)A
<
1 , b M-H n.
n —1 i b i-/i
2 n  £ J ( »  + 1) *=4+i rz n
where the first term is bounded as h > 1, while
n—1
(?)-'*  £  l 1 - ^  ^ *=§+! \  n  n ,
1 - /1 n(i)-h
l-/i
+  £ , n \ - hn  ~  (tt)
2 - / i
2 n i-/t
so that it goes to zero when n  j  oo. We can then follow the same procedure as 
in the proof of Lemma 5 to show that under the assumption that lim ^oo Yn = 
0, Ve, 3N* 3 V n > N *
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(n  4- b) Pn n — e < Yn <  (n +  6) pn n  4- e,
that is a contradiction.
Finally we prove the last assertion of the proposition. By Lemma 3 we 
know tha t if a steady state distribution it* does exist, it must have the 
property that its element in place i , 7r?, is such that 7rt* =  7rj P i where ft  ~  n~h 
as n  |  oo. Q.E.D.
P ro o f  o f P ro p o sitio n  7 (K illing irred u c ib ility ) For aggregate output 
to exhibit an order of integration greater or equal than one it must be tha t
as limn >oo Yn = a ^ 0  possibly unbounded, where Yn is the first difference
of b !q \  where R q1^ indicates the expected position after n  iterations of a unit 
starting in state 0. It follows by Lemma 5 that if a steady state distribution 
does exist the order of integration must be strictly less than one. To prove 
the second part of the proposition, we recall that for aggregate output to 
exhibit an order of integration greater than one it must be tha t the Wold 
coefficients (f>n ~  nd~l where d > 1, so that they are eventually unbounded. 
This, however, can not be the case. In fact the Wold coefficients (j)n ~  Yn,
but the limn >00 Yn is greater or equal than zero by recurrency and is less
than one as the first difference of R ^1^ is uniformly bounded above by one. 
Q.E.D.
P ro o f  o f P ro p o sitio n  8 (R andom  w alk a n d  G ib ra t’s law) For
aggregate output to be a random walk it must be that the Wold coefficients 
0n =  'y6,P nO be equal to a constant for all n. If we indicate with R\n  ^ the
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generic element in place i of the vector =  P n0 ,  we note that a necessary 
and sufficient condition for aggregate output to be a random walk is that
=  i +  Cn, Vi,Vn, 
where cn is function of n  only. It can be checked that
(4.22)
=  (1 -  pi)R$‘- 1) + P i  ^ 7 1), where R (1) = PO , Vi. (4.23)
Putting together equation (4.22) and equation (4.23) we obtain that
(Cn Cn—1 +  i)
Pi =
while Cn is such that Cn = Cn-i +po. This implies that p* =  (1 — so
that pj =  7(1 — p0), where 0 < po < 1 and h = 1 — p0. Q.E.D.
4.8.3 Proofs of results in section 5
P roof of Proposition  9 (The reallocation structure m atters) We are
assuming that the transmission mechanism P  is reducible where the recurrent 
class is identified by the first s technological states. Following the same steps 
as in the proof of Proposition 3 it can be shown that P nO has the structure
P nO = 3
c?+l +  Ps+lPs+2  • • • Ps+n (S +  1 +  Tl) 
3^+2 +  Ps+2Ps+3 • • • Ps+n+1 (s +  2 +  n)
(4.24)
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where c” ’s are such that c” <  /?nCj, where 0 <  p < 1 while c,’s are properly- 
defined positive bounded quantities such that, Vz, Ci < s, see for example 
equation (4.12). Given Assumption 4 6 = where, Vi, 0 <  w% E 3ft,
and YaL i wt < 1. It follows that
00 ~ 00 9 -1- i
6'Pn0  ~  pn J 2 w t(ci - c 0) + ps+lnJ2-~  w3+t +
i= l  *=1 Ps+1 s+i
00 W 3 + i
+ n ( 3 s + --------> (4-25)
t=l Ps+ls+i
where (3ji = r C i  Pj+k  after replacing p i  = 1 for those p i  s equal to zero, 
where w a+l is equal to w3+t if mino<j<n P s+ i+ j  7^  o, equal to zero otherwise 
while the quantities X!£i ^ -^ l—-ws+t and E £ i  p u“*t : are both bounded by 
Assumption 3. It follows that the reallocation structure might matter. In 
fact, a reallocation structure that reallocates just inside the recurrent class, 
that is wl =  0,Vi >  5 , generate Wold coefficients, (f)n = 7  6rP nO, tha t will 
decay exponentially. A reallocation structure that reallocates also out of the 
recurrent class, that is 3 wl > 0, for some i >  s will generate rates of decaying 
that will be equal to the minimum between the exponential one and that of 
n fis+ln if pi ^  0, Vz >  s, where (3a+ln = n?=o Ps+i+k- Q.E.D.
P ro o f  of P ro p o sitio n  10 (R o b u st ty p ica l sp e c tra l sh ap es) In or­
der to prove the assertion we want to show that (f)n = 7 6,PnO ~  nd_1 =  
n 1_/l, where d is the order of integration of aggregate output while the sym­
bol “ ~  ” indicates that the ratio of left- and right-hand sides tends to a 
bounded quantity as n  j  00. As the transmission mechanism is reducible 
the representation (4.25) for 6'PnO holds. Following the same reasoning as 
the one in Proposition 6, it can be shown that under the stated assumptions
207
P i n  ~  n h for big i. This implies that a reallocation structure of the cleansing 
type will generate Wold coefficients, (f>n ~  n 1-/\  Q.E.D.
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Figure 4.2: Per Capita GDP in the United States, 1880-1987 (Natural Log­
arithm). The Data are from Maddison (1982,1989) as used in Jones (1996). 
The solid bold line represents the time trend calculated using data only from 
1880 to 1929.
209
Bibliography
[1] Acemoglu, D. and Scott, A. (1995), “Asymmetric Business Cycles: 
Theory and Time Series Evidence” , M IT  Working Chapter, 95-24, Au­
gust.
[2] Acemoglu, D. (1996), “A Micro-foundation for Social Increasing Re­
turns in Human Capital Accumulation” , Quarterly Journal of Eco­
nomics, Vol. 111(3), August, pp.779-804.
[3] Adams, J. (1990),“Fundamental Stocks of Knowledge and Productivity 
Growth” , Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, August, pp. 673-702.
[4] Adams, J. (1993),“Science, R&D, and Invention Potential Recharge: 
U.S. Evidence” , American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 
Vol. 83(2), May, pp. 458-462.
[5] Aghion, P. and Howitt, P. (1992), “A Model of Growth Through Cre­
ative Destruction” , Econometrica Vol.60, March, pp.323-351.
[6] Aghion, P. and Howitt., P. (1994), “Growth and Unemployment” , Re­
view of Economic Studies, July, 61(3), pp. 477-494.
210
[7] Aghion, P. and Howitt., P. (1996), “On the Macroeconomic Effects of 
Major Technological Change” , Mimeo, London School of Economics.
[8] Aghion, P. and Tirole, J. (1994), “Opening the Black Box of Innova­
tion” , European Economic Review 38, pp.701-710.
[9] Aghion, P. and Tirole, J. (1994), “The Management of Innovation” , 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 1185-1209.
[10] Aghion, P. and Saint-Paul, G. (1993), “Uncovering some Causal Rela­
tionships between Productivity Growth and the Structure of Economic 
Fluctuations: a Tentative Survey” ,NBER Working Paper Series, No. 
4603, December.
[11] Aghion, P. and Gilles Saint-Paul, (1991), “On the Virtue of Bad Times: 
an Analysis of the Interaction between Economic Fluctuations and Pro­
ductivity Growth” , CEPR Discussion Paper No. 578, October.
[12] Andolfatto, D. (1996), “Business Cycles and Labour-Market Search” , 
American Economic Review, Vol.86, NO.l, March., pp. 112-132.
[13] Bagliano, F. Brandolini, A. and Dalmazzo, A. (1991) “The OECD-CEP 
Data Set” , Centre for Economic Performance Working Paper n.118, 
June.
[14] Baily, M.N. Hulten, C. and Campbell, D. (1992), “Productivity Dy­
namics in Manufacturing Plants” , Brookings Papers on Economic Ac­
tivity: Microeconomics, pp. 187-249.
211
[15] Barro, J. (1991), “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries” , 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2, pp. 407-443.
[16] Barro, J. and Sala-I-Martin, X. (1991), “Convergence across States and 
Regions” , Brookings Paper on Economic Activity , 1, pp. 107-182.
[17] Barro, J. and Sala-I-Martin, X. (1995), Economic Growth, McGraw^ 
Hill, Advanced Series in Economics.
[18] Bartelsman, E. and Dhrymes, P. (1994), “Productivity Dynamics: US 
Manufacturing Plants, 1972-1986” , Division of Monetary Affairs Fed­
eral Reserve Board, Washington, Finance and Economics Discussion 
Series no. 94-1, January.
[19] Baumol, W. (1990), “Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, 
and Destructive” , Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98(5), pp.893- 
921.
[20] Bean, C. (1990),“Endogenous Growth and the Procyclical Behaviour 
of Productivity” , European Economic Review 34, pp.355-363.
[21] Bean, C. and Pissarides, C. (1993), “Unemployment, Consumption and 
Growth” , European Economic Review 37(4), May, pp. 837-854.
[22] Benhabib, J., Rogerson, R. and Wright, R. (1991), “Homework in 
Macroeconomics: Household Production and Aggregate Fluctuation­
s’’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 99(6), pp.1166-1187.
212
[23] Bentolila, S. and Bertola, G. (1990), “Firing Costs and Labour De­
mand: How Bad is Eurosclerosis?” , Review of Economic Studies, 57, 
pp.381-402.
[24] Beran, J. (1994) Statistics for Long Memory Processes, Chapman and 
Hall.
[25] Bernard, A. and Durlauf, S. (1996), “Interpreting Tests of the Conver­
gence Hypothesis” , Journal of Econometrics, 71(1-2), pp. 161-173.
[26] Bertola, G. and Caballero, R. (1990), “Kinked Adjustment Costs and 
Aggregate Dynamics” , in Blanchard, O.J. and Fischer, S. (eds) NBER  
Macroeconomics Annual 1990,(Cambridge (MA): MIT Press).
[27] Bertola, G. and Caballero, R. (1994a), “Irreversibility and Aggregate 
Investment” , Review of Economic Studies, 61, pp.223-246.
[28] Bertola, G. (1994b), “Flexibility, Investment, and Growth” , Journal of 
Monetary Economics 34 (2), October, pp. 215-38.
[29] Blanchard, O.J. and Quah, D. (1989), “The Dynamic Effects of Aggre­
gate Demand and Supply Disturbances” ,American Economic Review, 
79, pp. 655-673.
[30] Blanchard, O.J. and Diamond, P. (1989), “The Beveridge Curve” , 
Brookings papers on Economic Activity, pp. 1-60.
[31] Blanchard, O. (1990), “Why Does Money Affect Output? A Survey” , 
in Handbook of Monetary Economics edited by Friedman B. and Frank 
H.,Volume 2, chapterl9 , pp.779-835
213
[32] Bradford De Long, J. (1990), “Liquidation Cycles: Old-Fashioned Real 
Business Cycle Theory and the Great Depression” , NBER Working 
Paper Series No. 3546, December.
[33] Brock, W. and Sayers, C. (1988), “Is the Business Cycle Characterized 
by Deterministic Chaos?” , Journal of Monetary Economics 22, pp. 71- 
90.
[34] Brockwell R , and Davis, R. (1991), Time Series: Theory and Methods, 
Springer Verlag New York.
[35] Caballero, R. and Engel, E. M.R.A. (1991), “Dynamic (S,s) 
Economies” , Econometrica, 59, pp. 1659-1686.
[36] Caballero,R. (1992), “A Fallacy of Composition” , American Economic 
Review, December, pp. 1279-1292.
[37] Caballero, R. and Engel, E. M.R.A. (1993), “Heterogeneity and Output 
Fluctuations in a Dynamic Menu-Cost Economy” , Review of Economic 
Studies, 60, pp. 95-119.
[38] Caballero, R. (1993), “Unemployment, Consumption and Growth: 
Comment” , European Economic Review 37(4), May, pp.854-861.
[39] Caballero, R. and Jaffe, A. (1993), “How High are the Giants Shoul­
ders: An Empirical Assessment of Knowledge Spillovers and Creative 
Destruction in a model of Economic Growth” . In NBER Macroeco­
nomics Annual 1993, edited by Blanchard, O. and Stanley, F. Cam­
bridge Mass.: MIT Press.
[40] Caballero, R. and Hammour, M. (1994a), “On the Timing and Ef­
ficiency of Creative Destruction”, NBER Working Paper Series, No 
4768, June.
[41] Caballero, R. and Hammour, M. (1994b), “The Cleansing Effect of 
Recessions” , American Economic Review Vol. 84 NO.5, December, pp. 
1350-1368.
[42] Caballero, R. and Hammour, M. (1996), “The Fundamental Transfor­
mation in Macroeconomics” , NBER Working Paper n. 5471, February.
[43] Campell, J. and Mankiw, N. (1987), “Are Output Fluctuations Tran­
sitory?” , Quarterly Journal of Economics, 4, pp. 857-880.
[44] Chan, N. and Terrin, N. (1995), “Inference for Unstable Long-Memory 
Processes with Applications to Fractional Uhit Root Autoregressions” , 
Annals of Statistics, Vol. 23 No. 5, pp. 1662-1683.
[45] Chow, G. C. (1979),“Optimum Control of Stochastic Differential Equa­
tion Systems” , Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 1 1 pp. 
143-175.
[46] Cochrane, J. (1988), “How Big is the Random Walk in GNP?” , Journal 
of Political Economy, 96, pp. 893-920.
[47] Coe, T. and Helpman, E. (1993), “International R h D  Spillovers” , 
NBER Working Paper n.4444) August.
215
[48] Cooper,R. and John, A. (1988), “Coordinating Coordination Failures 
in Keynesian Models” , Quarterly Journal of Economics, 13, pp. 441- 
465.
[49] Cornish, W.R. (1989), Intellectual Property: patents, copyright, trade 
marks and allied rights, Sweet h  Maxwell, second edition.
[50] Davidson, J. (1994) Stochastic Limit Theory, Oxford University Press 
1994.
[51] Davis, S. and Haltiwanger, J. (1990),“Gross Job Creation and De­
struction: Microeconomic Evidence and Macroeconomics Implication­
s’’, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Vol.5,pp. 99-113.
[52] Davis, S. and Haltiwanger, J. (1992), “Gross Job Creation, Gross Job 
Destruction and Employment Reallocation” , Quarterly Journal o f Eco­
nomics 107, pp. 819-63.
[53] Dickey, D.A. and Fuller, W. (1979), “Distribijtion of the Estimators for 
Autoregressive Time Series with a Unit Root” , Journal o f American 
Statistical Association , 74, pp. 427-431.
[54] Diebold, F. and Rudebusch, G. (1991),“Long Memory and Persistence 
in Aggregate Output”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 24, pp. 189- 
209.
[55] Diebold, F. and Rudebusch, G. (1989),“Long Memory and Persistence 
in Aggregate Output”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 24, pp. 189- 
209.
216
[56] Diebold, F. and Senhadji, A. (1996),“Deterministic vs. Stochastic 
Trend in U.S. GNP, yet Again” ,American Economic Review, 86,pp. 
1291-1298.
[57] Dunne, T. Roberts, M. and Samuelson, L. (1989) , “The Growth 
and Failure of U.S. Manufacturing Plants” , Quarterly Journal o f Eco­
nomics, 104(4), November, pp. 671-98.
[58] Durlauf, S. (1991), “Multiple Equilibria and Persistence in Aggregate 
Fluctuations” , American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 
May, Vol. 81 no.2 , pp. 70-74.
[59] Evans, D.S. (1987), “Tests of Alternative Theories of Firm Growth” , 
Journal of Political Economy, vol.87, no.4, pp.657-674.
[60] Evans, D. and Leighton, L. (1989), “Some Empirical Aspects of Entre­
preneurship” , American Economic Review, Vol. 79(3), June, pp. 519- 
535.
[61] Evans, D. and Jovanovic, B. (1989), “An Estimated Model of Entre­
preneurial Choice under Liquidity Constraints” , Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 97(4), pp.808-827.
[62] Fomi, M. and Reichlin, L. (1995), “Let’s Get Real: a Dynamic factor 
analytical approach to Disaggregated Business Cycles” , CEPR Discus­
sion Paper Series no. 1244.
[63] Gali, J. and Hammour, M. (1991), “Long Run Effects of Business Cy­
cles” , Mimeo, (Columbia University, New York).
217
[64] Gali, J. (1996), “Technology, Employment and the Business Cycle: do 
technology shocks explain aggregate fluctuations?” , CEPR Discussion 
Paper Series no. 1499.
[65] Geroski, P.A. and Walters, C.F. (1995), “Innovative Activity over The 
Business Cycle” , The Economic Journal, 105, July, pp. 916-928.
[66] Geweke, J. and Porter Hudak, S. (1983), “The Estimation and Appli­
cation of Long Memory Time Series Models” , Journal of Time Series 
Analisys, 4, pp.221-238.
[67] Gibrat,R. (1931), “Les inegalites economiques applications: aux 
inegalites des richesses, a la concetration des entreprises, aux popu­
lations des villes, aux statistiques des families, etc., d ’une loi nouvelle 
la loi de l’effet proportionel” , Paris: Librarie du Recueil Sirey.
[68] Gil-Alana, L. and Robinson, P. M. (1997), “Testing Unit Root and 
other Non-Stationary Hypotheses in Macroeconomic Time Series” , 
Journal of Econometrics, Vol.80-2, October, pp.223-239.
[69] Gourieroux, C. and Monfort, A. (1989), Statistics and Econometric 
Models, Cambridge Press.
[70] Griliches, Z. (1979), “Patents: Recent Trends and Puzzles” , Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics, pp. 291-330.
[71] Griliches, Z. (1988), “Productivity Puzzles and R &D, Another Non­
explanation” , Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28, pp. 1661-1707.
218
[72] Griliches, Z. (1990), “Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: a Sur­
vey” , Journal o f Economic Literature, 28,December, pp. 1661-1707.
[73] Granger, C.W.J. (1966), “The Typical Spectral Shape of an Economic 
Variable” , Econometrica 34,no. 1, pp. 150-161.
[74] Granger, C.W.J. (1980), “Long Memory Relationships and the aggre­
gation of Dynamic Models” , Journal o f Econometrics 14, pp. 227-238.
[75] Granger, C.W.J. and Joyeux, R. (1980), “An Introduction to Long- 
Memory Time Series Models and Fractionally Differencing” , Journal 
of Time Series Analysis Vol.1, no.l, pp. 15-29.
[76] Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. (1991), “Quality Ladder in the Theory 
of Growth” , Review of Economic Studies, January, 43(1), pp.43-62.
[77] Hall, R. (1988), “The Relation between Price and Marginal Cost in 
U.S. Industry” , Journal of political Economy, vol. 96-5, pp. 921-947.
[78] Hall, B. (1987), “The Relationship Between Firm Size and Firm 
Growth in the US Manufacturing Sector” , The Journal o f Industrial 
Economics, Vol. 35-4, June, pp. 583-606
[79] Harrod, R. (1939),“An Essay in Dynamic Theory” , The Economic 
Journal 49, March, pp. 14-33.
[80] Helpman, E. and Trajtenberg, M. (1994), “A Time to Sow and a Time 
to Reap: Growth Based on General Purpose Technologies” , NBER  
Working Paper Series, No 4854, September.
219
[81] Hosios, A. (1990), “On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Mod­
els of Search and Unemployment” , The Review of Economic Studies, 
57,pp. 279-298.
[82] Hurwich, C.M. and Ray, B.K. (1995), “Estimation of the memory Pa­
rameter for Non-stationary or Non-invertible Fractionally Integrated 
Processes” , Journal of Time Series Analysis, Vol.16, No.l, pp. 17-41.
[83] Jones,C. (1995a), “Time Series Tests of Endogenous Growth Models” , 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, pp. 495-525.
[84] Jones,C. (1995b), “R&cD Based Models of Economic Growth” , Journal 
o f Political Economy, 103-4, pp. 759-783.
[85] Jones, R. and Newman, G. (1995), “Adaptive Capital, Information De­
preciation and Schumpeterian Growth” , Economic Journal 105, July 
pp. 897-915.
[86] Jovanovic, B. and Nyarko, Y. (1996), “Learning by Doing and the 
Choice of Technology” , Econometrica, Vol. 64, No. 6, November, pp. 
1299-1310.
[87] Kalecki, M.(1945), “On the Gibrat Distribution” , Econometrica, April, 
13(2), pp.161-170.
[88] Karlin, S. and Taylor, H.M. (1975), A First Course in Stochastic 
Processes, Academic Press, Inc. (London) LTD.
[89] Karlin, S. and Taylor, H.M. (1981), A Second Course in Stochastic 
Processes, Academic Press, Inc. (London) LTD.
220
[90] Kemeny, J.G. Snell, J.L. and Knapp, A. W. (1966), Denumerable 
Markov Chains, The University Series in Higher Mathematics, D.Van 
Nostrand Company, Inc., Princeton New Jersey.
[91] Keynes, J.M. (1936), The General Theory of Employment Interest and 
Money, Reprinted Harbinger, Harcourt Brace and World 1964.
[92] Kortum, S. (1993), “Equilibrium R&D and the Decline in the Patent- 
Rh D  Ratio” , American Economic Review: Papers and Proceed­
ings^Vol. 83 2, pp. 450-457.
[93] Kortum, S. (1994), “A Model of Research, Patenting and Productivity 
Growth” , NBER Working Paper n. 4646) February.
[94] Laing, D. Palivos, T. and Wang, P. (1995a), “Learning, Matching and 
Growth” , Review of Economic Studies, vol. 62(1) n. 210, January, pp. 
115-130.
[95] Laing, D. Palivos, T. and Wang, P. (1995b), “R&D in a Model of 
Search and Growth” , American Economic Rewiev Papers and Proceed­
ings, Vol. 85 n.2, May, pp291-295.
[96] Levin, A. and Lin, C.F. (1992), “Unit Root Tests in Panel Data: 
Asymptotic and Finite-Sample Properties”,Discussion Paper 92-92, 
UCSD.
[97] Levine, R. and Renelt, D. (1992), “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross- 
Country Growth Regressions” , American Economic Review, Vol. 82, 
No.4, September.
221
[98] Lippi, M. and Reichlin, L. (1992),“Permanent and Transitory Compo­
nents in Macroeconomics” in Thygesen,N., Velupilai,K. and Zambelli, 
S. eds. Business Cycles: Theories, Evidence and Analisys, Macmillan 
Academic and Professional Ltd.
[99] Lippi, M. and Reichlin, L. (1994), “Diffusion of Technical Change and 
the decomposition of output into Trend and Cycles” , Review of Eco­
nomic Studies, 61, pp.19-30.
[100] Lucas, R. (1988), “On the Mechanics of Economic Development” , Jour­
nal o f Monetary Economics, July, 22(1), pp.3-42.
[101] Malthus, T.R. (1798), An Essay on the Principle of Population, Lon­
don, W.Pickering, 1986.
[102] Mankiw, N. Romer, R. and Weil, D. (1992),“A Contribution to the 
Empirics of Economic Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107- 
2, pp. 407-437.
[103] Mansfield, E. (1962), “Entry, Gibrat’s Law, Innovation, and the 
Growth of Firms” , American Economic Review, Vol.52-5, December, 
pp.1023-1051.
[104] Merz, M. (1995), “Search in the Labour Market and the Real Business 
Cycle ” , Journal of Monetary Economics, 36, pp. 269-300.
[105] Mortensen, D. (1991), “The Discovery Process and Endogenous 
Growth” , Mimeo, August, Northwestern University.
222
[106] Mortensen, D.T. and Pissarides, C. (1994), “Job Creation and Job 
Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment” , Review of Economic 
Studies, 61, July, 397-415.
[107] Mortensen, D.T. and Pissarides, C. (1995), “Technological Progress, 
Job Creation and Job Destruction” , Centre for Economic Performance, 
Discussion Paper No. 264, September.
[108] Murphy, K. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1991), “The Allocation of 
Talent: Implications for Growth” , Vol.56, pp.503-530.
[109] Nelson, C. and Plosser, C. (1982), “Trends and Randon Walks in 
Macroeconomic Time Series: some Evidence and Implications” , Jour­
nal of Monetary Economics, 10, pp. 139-162.
[110] Nickell, S. Wadhwani, S. and Wall, M. (1992), “Productivity Growth 
in U.K. Companies, 1975-1986” , European Economic Review, 36, pp. 
1055-1091.
[111] Pissarides, C. A. (1985), “Short-Run Equilibrium Dynamics of Unem­
ployment Vacancies and Real Wages” , American Economic Review, 75, 
pp. 676-90.
[112] Pissarides, C. A. (1990), Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell 1990.
[113] Priestley, M. (1965), “Evolutionary Spectra and Non-Stationary 
Processes” , Journal of the Royal Statistical Association, No. 27, pp. 
204-237.
223
[114] Quah, D. (1992a), “The relative Importance of Permanent and Tran­
sitory Components: Identification and some Theoretical Bounds” , 
Econometrica 60, pp. 107-118.
[115] Quah, D. (1992b), “International Patterns of Growth: Persistence in 
Cross-Country Disparities” , Working Paper, London School o f Eco­
nomics.
[116] Quah, D. (1993a), “Empirical Cross-Section Dynamics in Economic 
Growth” , European Economic Review, 37-2/3, pp. 426-434.
[117] Quah, D. (1993b), “Galton’s fallacy and tests of the convergence hy­
pothesis” , Scandinavian Journal o f Economics, 95(4), December, pp. 
427-443.
[118] Quah, D. (1995), “Empirics for Economic Growth and Convergence ” , 
Discussion Paper 253, Centre for Economic Performance .
[119] Ramey, G. and Ramey, V. (1991), “Technology Commitment and the 
Cost of Economic Fluctuations” , NBER Working Paper Series, no 
3755, June.
[120] Ramey, G. and Ramey, V. (1994), “Cross-Country Evidence on the 
Link between Volatility and Growth” , American Economic Review, De­
cember, Vol. 85 no. 5, pp.1138-1151.
[121] Ricardo, D. (1817), On the Principles o f Political Economy and Taxa­
tion, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1951.
224
[122] Rivera-Batiz, L. and Romer, RM. (1991), “Economic Integration and 
Endogeneous Growth” , Quarterly Journal o f Economics, 106, 2(May), 
pp.531-555.
[123] Robinson, P.M. (1978),“Statistical Inference for a Random Coefficient 
Autoregressive Model” , Scandinavian Journal of Statistics 5, pp. 163- 
168.
[124] Robinson, P.M. (1986),“On a Model for a Time Series of Cross- 
Sections” , Journal of Applied Probability,23A, pp. 113-126.
[125] Robinson, P. (1994), “Time Series with Strong Dependence” , in Ad­
vances in Econometrics, Sixth World Congress, ed. by C.A. Sims, Vol. 
1, pp. 47- 95, Cambridge University Press.
[126] Robinson, P.M. (1995), “Log-Periodogram Regression of Time Series 
with Long Range Dependence”, Annals of Statistics , 23-3, pp. 1048- 
1072.
[127] Robinson, P.M. and Marinucci, D. (1997), “Semiparametric Frequency- 
Domain Analysis of Fractional Cointegration” , Mimeo, London School 
of Economics.
[128] Romer, P. (1986), “Increasing Returns and Long Run Growth” , Journal 
of Political Economy, October, 94(5), pp. 676-90.
[129] Romer, P. (1990a), “Are Non Convexities Important for Understanding 
Growth?” , NBER Working Paper, no. 3271, February.
225
[130] Romer, P. (1990b), “Endogeneous Technological Change” , Journal of 
Political Economy, 98(5), pp. 71-102.
[131] Rosen, S. (1981), “The Economics of Superstars” , American Economic 
Review, Vol. 71(5), December, pp.845-858.
[132] Rotemberg, J. and Woodford, M. (1996), “Real-Business-Cycle Models 
and the Forecastable Movements in Output, Hours, and Consumption” , 
American Economic Review, Vol. 86-1, March, pp.71-89.
[133] Rudebusch, G. (1993), “The Uncertain Unit Root in Real GNP” , 
American Economic Review, 83, pp. 264-272.
[134] Rudin, W. (1973), Functional Analysis, McGraw-Hill New York.
[135] Saint-Paul, G. (1993),“Productivity Growth and the Structure of the 
Business Cycle” , European Economic Review 37, pp.861-890.
[136] Schankerman, M. and Pakes, A. (1986), “Estimates of the value of 
Patent Rights in European Countries during the post-1950 Period” , 
The Economic Journal, 96, December, pp. 1052-1076.
[137] Schumpeter, J. (1934), “Depressions” , in Douglas Brown et al. The 
Economics of the Recovery Program, New York:McGraw-Hill, pp.3-21.
i
[138] Schumpeter, J. (1939), Business Cycles: a Theoretical, Historical and 
Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, New York McGraw-Hill.
226
[139] Schumpeter, J. A. (1943), “Capitalism in the Postwar World” , in Post­
war Economic Problems, Seymour E. Harris, ed., New YorkiMcGraw- 
Hill, p p . 113-126.
[140] Schumpeter, J. A. (1946), “Capitalism” , in Encyclopedia Britannica , 
Vol. IV, pp. 801-807.
[141] Schumpeter, J. A. (1947), “The Creative Response in Economic Histo­
ry” , Journal of Economic History, November, pp. 149-159.
[142] Schumpeter, J.A. (1949), “Economic Theory and Entrepreneurial His­
tory” , in Change and the Entrepreneur. Prepared by the Research Cen­
ter in Entrepreneurial History, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, pp.63-84.
[143] Seneta, E. (1976), Regularly Varying Functions, Springer, Berlin.
[144] Shleifer, A. (1986), “Implementation Cycles” , Journal o f Political 
Economy, 94, pp.1163-1190.
[145] Solow, R. (1960), “Investment and Technical Progress” , in Mathemati­
cal Methods in the Social Sciences, 1 9 5 9 , edited by Arrow, K.J., Karlin, 
S. and Suppes P., Stanford University Press, Stanford California.
[146] Sowell, F . (1990), “The Fractional Unit Root Distribution” , Economet- 
rica, 58-2, pp. 495-505.
[147] Stiglitz, J. (1993), “Endogenous Growth and Cycles” , NBER Working 
Paper Series, No 4286, March.
227
[148] Stokey, N. Lucas, R. and Prescott, E. (1988), Recursive Methods in 
Economic Dynamics, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press.
[149] Summers, R. and Heston, A. (1991), “The Penn World Table (Mark 5): 
An Expanded set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988” , Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, pp. 327-368.
[150] Sutton, J. (1992), Sunk Costs and Market Structure , The MIT Press.
[151] Sutton, J. (1995), “The Size Distribution of Business Part I: a Bench­
mark Case” , The Economics of Industry Group, Discussion Paper Se­
ries EI/9, December.
[152] Sutton, J. (1996), “Gibrat’s Legacy” , The Economics of Industry 
Group, Discussion Paper Series EI/1J, October.
[153] Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, 
MA: M.I.T. Press.
[154] Velasco, C. (1996), “Non-Stationary Log-Periodogram Regression” , 
Mimeo,London School of Economics.
[155] Yong, C. (1974), Trigonometric Series, Cambridge University Press.
[156] Young, A. (1995a), “The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Statis­
tical Realities of the East Asian Growth Experience” , Quarterly Jour­
nal of Economics, August, pp.641-680.
[157] Young, A. (1995b), “Growth Without Scale Effects” , NBER Working 
Paper n. 5211, August.
228
